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FOREWORD 
Despite what its title may suggest, this work is patently not an attempt to reconcile 
chemistry and pantheism. Our interest is largely epistemological-or, if you will, 
"semiotic with an eye to normativity", to being right. We are concerned primarily 
with two conflicting ways of ascertaining the objectivity of our representations of the 
world. "Atomism", in this sense, is the idea that we can evaluate the bearing of our 
representations upon that domain by piecemeal correspondences; whereas 
"wholism" is the thesis that such neat little matches cannot be achieved or could be 
overruled by concerns for internaI coherence. Now it is clear that these 
philosophical acceptations depart in important ways from the usages typically 
reserved for the terms. The word "atom" still registers to most minds as the hard 
little nugget of matter shown in grade schools, and "wholism" (with or without the 
"w") carries in its wake images of mysticism and so-called "alternative medicines". 
Given our technical concerns over the nature, structure, and norrns of objective 
representation, it is legitimate to ask why we should want to keep employing terms 
potentially hazardous to our enterprise. 
Try as we might, we cannot solely by stipulation rid these terms of their 
persistent connotations. Regardless, we have chosen to deploy the terms "atomism" 
and "wholism" (and their cognates) without any significant dilution or qualification. 
As we see it, the unequivocal context of our discussion should more than suffice to 
keep the build-up of oblique semantic accretions in check. Upon further reflection, 
however, we find that connotative departures from strict technical usage-while 
certainly not encouraged-might not be such a bad feature after aIl. The adoption of 
the term "atomism" by twentieth-century philosophers was not innocent. There was 
(and still is) a palpable desire to make the epistemological project a scïentific one, 
and the lay person's understandable confusion that meaning and representation can 
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be handled with methods vaguely analogous to those of chemistry or physics is 
arguably not an unwelcome consequence. Similarly, the idea that "wholism" is a 
doctrine which somehow underwrites flights of fancy is not entirely without basis, as 
even the most arid variants of the theory have served as engraved invitations for the 
revival and validation of all sorts of irrational beliefs. Of course, this work remains 
strictly epistemological in both scope and intent. But we are opposed to atomism 
and wholism, connotations included; and as such, we shall not be too wounded if 
our bi-directional critique and attendant pursuit of a more satisfactory alternative 
inadvertently serves to undermine both technocratie and supernatural delusions 
along with the philosophie stances proper. 
The ideas presented in this work are the culmination of sorne five years of fairly 
cohesive philosophieal reflection and scholarly research-salient moments of which 
occasionally surfaced in the form of papers read before various learned societies. 
Early suspicions about the logical and ontological possibility of any forrn of wholism 
were declared in a May 2005 exploration titled "Le holisme sémantique à la lumière 
de l'entendement aristotélicien du temps", delivered at the Francophone Association 
for Knowledge congress in Chicoutimi. Our understanding of Sellars' stance in 
particular was significantly deepened during a stay with the Peirce-Wittgenstein 
Research Group in the 2003-04 academic year, when an intensive study of sign 
declensions made us grasp the precise manner in which Sellars takes justification 
and intelligibility to involve only the most developed state of semiosis (i.e., the 
argument), thereby relegating aIl anterior states to virtual ineffability. Sorne of the 
views which flowed from this crucial insight would eventually be presented in the 
summer of 2006 at the Canadian Philosophical Association' s annual congress in 
Toronto, under the title "Sur l'asymétrie de l'indexicalité chez W. Sellars". Among 
other things, this paper marked our first public foray into the writings of John 
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McDowell, as we sought to clarify if and how the sort of wholism advocated by 
Sellars could be distinguished fram McDowell's "unbounded" view of the 
conceptual realm. 
Although McDowell's fusion of experience and concepts figured as a 
praiseworthy counterpoint to Sellars' asymmetry in that critique, we grew 
increasingly dissatisfied with sorne of the more sceptical elements nested in the 
former's philosophy. Our misgivings in this regard were confirmed-and even 
fostered-when we were later asked by the Canada Research Chair in the Theory of 
Knowledge to produce a preliminary documentary sketch of McDowell' s position 
vis-à-vis the "externalist" trend in philosophy of mind. While McDowellian 
eclecticism basically ensured that no straightforward answer would come from the 
assignment, we did essay an account in "McDowell and the Standing Obligation of 
Rationality" at a two-day international symposium on 'Rationality in Contemporary 
Epistemology' held under the auspices of the Canadian Society for Epistemology in 
Sherbrooke in September 2006. 
Lest this make it appear as if we criticized wholistic theories exclusively, we 
should note that our qualms with atomism and radical noninferentialism were laid 
out, for example, in a paper on "Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong", presented at 
the Cognitio 2006 conference 'Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated, and 
Distributed Cognition' in Montreal. In the same vein, our identification and 
disparagement of atomism's "laser" metaphor was announced at the annual meeting 
of the Francophone Association for Knowledge, Montreal, May 2006; in a paper on 
"La proportionnali té inverse de l'intension et de l'extension: un élargissement de la 
critique de Marc-Wogau". The negative views advanced therein eventually gave rise 
to our "constrictive" conception, selected technical aspects of which were presented 
a year later at the same organization' s 75th congress in Trois-Rivières, with "Pour 
'dé-matérialiser' l'argument conjonctif fregéen". 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Selon John McDowell, l'atomisme et le holisme sont chacun incapables de porter 
fruit. Plutôt que d'osciller futilement entre ces deux pôles, il croit que nous devrions 
repenser notre façon de concevoir la relation liant l'esprit et le monde. Inspiré par 
certains passages de Kant, il nous invite donc à reconsidérer l'expérience de telle 
sorte qu'on y admette d'entrée de jeu l'exercice d'une liberté distinctement 
humaine-l'étendue de l'esprit devenant ainsi dénuée de toute contrainte externe. 
À notre avis, McDowell a plus de succès lorsqu'il dépeint le va-et-vient entre 
l'atomisme et le holisme que lorsqu'il propose une façon d'échapper à ce 
mouvement. Nous croyons que la fusion qu'il cherche à développer ne tient pas la 
route dans la mesure où, d'un point de vue naturaliste, il y a bel et bien lieu de 
distinguer la réceptivité empirique et la spontaneité conceptuelle. À l'encontre de 
McDowell, nous soutenons qu'il n'y a oscillation entre ces facultés que si l'on 
endosse une inférence allant du statut non-atomique des représentations au holisme, 
saut inductif qui repose sur une approche spéculative que nous rejetons. 
Le premier chapitre cherche à démontrer comment les théories holistes de filière 
quinéenne se fondent sur des présupposés spéculatifs et comment les éléments plus 
louables de la philosophie de McDowell à cet égard sont rendus impuissants par son 
assentiment à la critique que fait W. Sellars du "mythe du Donné". Le second 
chapitre reconstruit méticuleusement l'argument fort complexe qu'étale McDowell 
dans Mind and World, pour ensuite critiquer sa suggestion que la culture et 
l'éducation induisent chez l'être humain une attitude critique pouvant remplacer la 
friction produite par l'expérience. Le troisième chapitre soutient que la thèse de 
Sellars voulant que l'expérience peut causer mais non justifier nos représentations 
détruirait non seulement la connaissance empirique mais aussi la capacité de tirer 
des inférences. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une nouvelle vision 
"constrictive" qui, par l'entremise des notions de coercition et de complexité, 
reconnait que la représentation du monde met en jeu une échelle plus large que 
l'atome mais plus petite que le tout. 
Mots clés: Atomisme, holisme, représentation, John McDowell 
ABSTRACT 
According to John McDowell, the atomist and wholist programs that have 
alternately vied for dominance in epistemology have revealed themselves incapable 
of bearing out their promise. Rather than oscillate between these two poles, 
McDowell believes we should dramatically rethink our most fundamental 
conceptions of mind and world. Loosely inspired by Kant' s thesis that "thoughts 
without content are empty" and "intuitions without concepts are blind", he asks us to 
reconsider experiential episodes in a way that allows for the irreducible contribution 
of a distinctly human brand of freedom-the domain of mind thus being pictured as 
an unbounded expanse devoid of any worldly frontier. 
In our assessment, McDowell is more convincing in portraying the seesaw 
between atomism and wholism than he is in elaborating a tenable dismount from il. 
While we sympathize with his aim, we argue that the fusion he advocates is not 
tenable, insofar as there is a legitimate basis for distinguishing the mind's receptivity 
to the world from its spontaneity. In an effort to present an overarching theory of 
representation which resolves this tension without deserting either notion, we argue 
that the oscillation depicted by McDowell is spawned by an unwarranted inference 
going from the non-atomic character of representation aIl the way to wholism. Even 
if supplementary contents play a role in the normative evaluation of given 
representations, we hold that there is no basis to conclude that this commits us to 
upholding the whole as a standard, unless by recourse ta a speculative approach we 
repudiate. 
The first chapter sets down what we believe are the legitimate grounds whence 
the establishment of a third way between atomism and wholism should proceed. 
Our chief concern is to show how wholistic theories of Quinean descent rest on 
speculative assumptions which effectively beg the question against atomistic 
accounts. Although McDowell adopts a mixed attitude in this regard, we argue that 
the more laudable (non-speculative) elements of his philosophy are rendered 
powerless by his acquiescence to W. Sellars' rejection of the "myth of the Given". 
Provisionally setting aside critical appraisal of this Sellarsian constraint, the 
second chapter examines McDowell's positive-theoretic proposaI in detail. By a 
series of argumentative linkages, we attempt to reconstruct the structure of his 
ambitious and difficult book Mind and World. Having laid down the rationale 
underpinning McDowell's improbable suggestion that the notional distinction 
between the experiential and the conceptual should be dissipated, we criticize what 
we see as its main faults. The bulk of our critical attention is directed at the idea that 
culturally-instilled scepticism can supply a friction supplanting worldly receptivity. 
XIV 
Returning to the issues set aside at the close of the first chapter, the third chapter 
seeks to undermine the most binding constraint adopted by McDowell, namely 
Sellars' argument that experiential impacts can at best causally generate 
representations within the mind, not justify them. Taking this technical claim at face 
value, we examine its epistemological repercussions. Our conclusion is that this 
asymmetry thesis effectively sunders inferential knowledge and that as a result, there 
simply could not be a "space of reasons" left for the wholist to exploit if it were true. 
The final chapter presents an alternative vision which we believe manages to 
harmoniously recognize the distinct contributions of both receptivity and spontaneity 
in the mind's representation of the world. Prafiting fram the intricate discussions of 
the previous chapters, we develop a "constrictive" stance whose scale is greater than 
the atom but smaller than the whole. By conjugating the notions of coercion and 
complexity, we argue that there is a way to recognize that the mind has considerable 
interpretative leeway in the manner it depicts the world while also admitting that this 
license cannot overrule the worldly domain in question. 
Keywords: Atomism, wholism, representation, John McDowell 
INTRODUCTION
 
If the receptlvlty of our mind, its power of recelvmg 
representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be 
entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing 
representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, 
should be called the understanding. Our nature is so constituted 
that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it 
contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. 
The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the 
objects of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of 
these powers maya preference be given over the other. 
lnunanuel Kant 
Critique of Pure Reason (1787) 
Tt is something of an oversimplification to say that a person knows more than what is 
present before her. But the question is altogether more complex when one considers 
what role, if any, those collateral representations play in the apprehension of a given 
worldly object (broadly understood). On the one hand, one could argue that what is 
present before us accounts for its own intelligibility and meaning. Indeed, what else 
could do a better job of revealing what a thing is than that thing itself? On the other 
hand, the case couId be made that the presence before us is far too brute to have any 
intelligibility, and that it is at best a catalyst making us delve into a vast reserve of 
interrelated representations which can extend far beyond the object in question. 
Quantitatively, these seerningly straightforward answers involve very different 
epistemic scales. In the first case, only those areas concerned by a given object are 
solicited. Knowledge and representation, in this view, is a piece by piece affair. The 
task at hand may requiœ one to go further-but in principle, one can stop here. In 
the second view, a given prompting always involves more representational content 
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than what is there-in principle, one can never stop at a neatly circumscribed area. 
One might have to summon the whole of one's epistemic heritage in order to render 
a thing fully intelligible. Qualitatively, the first of these options involves attributing 
a more passive task to the apprehending mind. For if our knowledge of an object is 
a private duet involving no other representations-and one is not merely dreaming 
or fantasizing-then surely it is reasonable to assume that it is the object which leads 
the dance and that its apprehension cornes by way of our receptivity to it. In the 
other view, the knowing subject has much more leeway in her apprehending role, 
taking the clue put before her and actively placing it within a total framework of 
prior representations. Seen in this light, our encounters with the world allow for a 
certain spontaneity. 
As John McDowell emphasizes in rus seminal Mind and World ([ 1994] 2002), 
what makes the situation so difficult-and by the same token, so potentially 
fruitful-is that these sharply diverging construals both have a great deal going for 
them. 
[T]he topography of the conceptual sphere is constituted by rational relations. 
[...] In a slogan, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom. 
But if our freedom in empirical thinking is total, in particular if it is not 
constrained from outside the conceptual sphere, that can seem to threaten the 
very possibility that judgements of experience rnight be grounded in a way that 
relates them to a reality external to thought. And surely there must be such 
grounding if experience is to be a source of knowledge, and more generally, if 
the bearing of empirical judgements on reality is to be intelligibly in place in our 
picture at aIl. (Ibid., p. 5) 
Indeed, it seems sober to recognize that our knowledge of the world involves, in 
sorne respect, autonomous correspondences with those things represented, and that 
the forceful nature of these contacts limits the kind of creativity we can marshal. 
Yet we must also concede that we do have great leeway in conducting and making 
sense of our experiential encounters with the world, and that this interpretative 
margin can and often does involve much more than what seems germane to a given 
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object. As McDowell astutely remarks, « [f1ully developed, of course, such a 
combination would amount to an antinomy: experience both must [... ] and cannot 
[...] stand in judgement over our attempts to make up our minds about how things 
are» (Ibid., p. xii-xiii). 
Given the seemingly irreconcilable natures at hand, it seems we can never fully 
settle on one side. But as if that weren't enough, McDowell argues that the more 
rigorously we endeavour to alleviate the fundamental tension, the more we are likely 
to fall prey to the "philosophieal anxiety" that the mind may have no way to confirrn 
its bearing upon something other than itself. Thus, according to McDowell, 
philosophy is bound to go back and forth between the two unsatisfactory options of 
atomism and wholism-to "oscillate" between epistemological theories of 
receptivity and spontaneity. 
The diachronie trajectory of recent philosophie discourse provides us with a 
vivid illustration of this movement. The atomic ostensions pivotaI to the successful 
working of empiricist theories of meaning were soon confronted with profound 
difficulties. In this regard, we can cite Quine ([1960] 1999) and Sellars' ([1956] 
1963) respective critiques of the inconsistencies of the generic atomistic framework 
and their parallel promotions of wholistic takes on language and representation. The 
dialectic movement in these cases has gone from the atom to the whole. Yet as the 
wholistic alternatives put forth in response to the failings of atomism have not borne 
out their promise, they have increasingly become the object of scrutiny and criticism. 
Although it is somewhat early to tell in a definitive way, one can arguably discern 
the beginnings of a concerted return to the option of atom. This renewal with a 
notion once deemed invalid, McDowell daims, could not be otherwise: 
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Davidson recoils from the Myth of the Given aIl the way to denying experience 
any justificatory role, and the coherentist upshot is a version of the conception of 
spontaneity as frictionless, the very thing that makes the idea of the Given 
attractive. This is just one of the movements in the oscillation that l have spoken 
of. There is nothing to prevent it from triggering the familiar recoil in its tum. 
([1994] 2002, p. 14) 
To one who finds such imagery both appropriate and worrying, the idea of the 
Given can give the appearance of reinstating thought's bearing on reality. And at 
this point in the dialectic, it is no good pointing out that the appearance is 
illusory, that the idea of the Given does not fulfil its apparent promise [...J. The 
effect is simply to bring out that neither of the two positions that we are being 
asked to choose between is satisfying. (Ibid., p. 15-16) 
What beckons us, then, if we are to put an end to the futile oscillation between the 
atom and the whole, is to search for a tenable third way: « A genuine escape wouId 
require that we avoid the Myth of the Given without renouncing the claim that 
experience is a rational constraint on thinking » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 18). 
Guiding McDowell like a beacon in this quest are Kant' s twin theses that « 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind » (Kant, 
[1787] 1965, B75; cf McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 3-4). In an attempt to heed that 
admonition and transcend the seesaw, McDowell's Mind and WorLd sets itself the 
task of « reshaping our philosophical imagination, our sense of the space of 
intellectual possibilities » (Williams, 1996, p. 411). At the scale of the atom, 
McDowell invites us to rethink the world's experiential impingement upon man the 
rational animal as somehow imbued with an irreducible element of conceptual 
content and freedom from the very start. As a result, at the scale of the whole, he 
recommends that we no longer picture the conceptual sphere as "bounded" by 
anything beyond itself. 
While McDowell's proposaIs are rich in suggestive power, we find it difficult to 
see how-short of a more robust account-the antithetical amalgam of "receptive 
spontaneity" at the heart of his proposaIs could be made tenable. McDowell has 
clearly struggled over how best to describe this crucial philosophie idea, and we 
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recognize the earnestness of his undertaking. Yet by our lights, McDowell's 
proposed outlook makes no concrete theoretical difference. We are at a complete 
loss to see how, if spontaneity and receptivity are not even "notionally separable" 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 9), one could have any grievance with either the option 
of receptive atomism or spontaneous wholism. For instance, why should it be 
troublesome that sorne reductionist philosophers strive to capture the mind solely in 
terms of its receptive faculties (Ibid., p. 73)? Conversely, why can't the world's 
order be totally captured in a spontaneity-only idiom-as someone like Davidson 
does when he insists that by fully embracing wholism, we effectively throw 
relativism "by the board" ([ 1984] 2001, p. 198)? To have a legitimate complaint 
against either of these projects (and ontologies), one must notionally separate 
receptivity from spontaneity-a move which McDowell's professed fusion prevents 
him from doing. 
Our overarching goal in this work is thus to put forth an alternative solution to 
McDowell's problem. In sum, we endeavour to show that the oscillation depicted in 
Mind and World is triggered by an unwarranted inference from the non-atomic 
character of representation to wholism. Granting that supplementary contents play 
a role in the normative assessment of representations, we hold that there is no 
sufficient basis to conclude that these necessarily extend to the conceptual whole. 
As a result, we argue that the recoil away from atomism which sets the seesaw in 
motion should be "absorbed" from the start, in order to develop a more viable 
theoretical model which is non-atomic yet non-wholistic. As Robert Brandom 
remarks, although McDowell's project is « heavily diagnostic and lightly 
therapeutic, but not at aIl theoretical [...] the therapeutic dimension of the enterprise 
of Mind and World involves commitment to there being at least some satisfactory 
way of extending the things he has said [... ] » (2002, p. 104). While our amendment 
is avowedly less spectacular than McDowell' s, we think it nevertheless satisfies 
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what we see as the legitimate desiderata set down by the atom-versus-whole 
problem; namely, making allowances for the interplay of our representations without 
allowing internaI coherence to become the sole cllterion for evaluating their 
epistemological warrant. 
Before we embark on our argumentative journey, we should like to make sorne 
important comments. The first is a disclaimer of sorts. We want to make it clear 
from the outset that although we bOITOW certain thinkers and themes from what has 
come to be called "analytic" philosophy, we are not thereby endorsing that tradition 
or its concerns. It would be sheer arrogance to presume that because one addresses a 
rival theory, one necessarily embraces that theory's canonic frame of reference 
(methodological assumptions, idiomatic conventions, and so on). Analysis and 
synthesis are movements of equal mellt, and we refuse to further promote the all­
too-prevalent dogma which considers the fracturing of issues into minutiae to be the 
hallmark of philosophic profundity and clarity. As Frege himself put it: « It is just as 
important to ignore distinctions that do not touch the heart of the matter, as to make 
distinctions which concern essentials. But what is essential depends on one's 
purpose » (1997, p. 331). In other words, Monet was able to see things Ingres 
couldn't because he squinted bis eyes. 
The issue brings to mind a very pertinent comment once made by Ayn Rand to a 
fellow philosopher (in Berliner, 1997 p. 520-521). There are over three hundred 
different sects of Christianity, each of which sees itself as espousing the true 
interpretation of the scriptures. However, if one wishes to challenge the broad 
contention that faith can be a source of knowledge and values, then it is not 
incumbent upon one to familiarize oneself with aIl of the doctrinal rivalries that 
separate the various schools. In fact, this would be a considerable hindrance to 
argument; the never-ending calls for distinctions effectively diverting attention away 
from the challenged party' score commitments. Rand is therefore right to insist that 
to avoid such a quagmire, the premises addressed must be as basic as the 
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disagreement is deep (Ibid.). Likewise, the specialist in atomist or wholist theories 
will leave this text very disappointed if she comes to it expecting a detailed 
comparative study of those positions' many variants (this, incidentally, is the motive 
behind our use of an additional "w" to designate the latter cluster of views). Unless 
otherwise stated, our default setting will be the search for generalisations about 
representation in ils broadest sense. That is not to say that we will not split hairs 
every now and again. But the establishment of such subtleties, if and when it will be 
called for, will be subservient to the issues we are addressing, not necessarily those 
that have found currency in accepted scholarship, past or present. 
Now the philosopher's job would probably be much easier (and more dull) if 
every position was either entirely wrong or entirely correct. However, as things 
stand, most of the correct theories available on the market contain in them a great 
deal that is incorrect, just as predominantly incorrect stances enclose their fair share 
of correct theses. This is not to say that appraisal of a given philosophic position is 
to be forever postponed or qualified. It does mean though, that in passing 
judgement, we should not shy away from case by case admixtures of disavowal and 
praise. Adhering to tms precept is aIl the more impoltant when one elects to employ 
authorship as a means of demarcating an object of study, as one is thereby 
encumbered with tenets often related only by the accidents of biography or the 
frivolities of preference. 
This brings us to the second caveat we want to register: to put the matter 
succinctly, the present dissertation should not be read as a treatise on John Henry 
McDoweli or "his thought". Rather, we are concerned in this work with a general 
schema involving part / whole and passive / active distinctions-and the need for us 
to reconcile them in explicit theorizing. These issues, nested as they are in our 
cognitive situation qua rational animaIs, transcend any single exposition. That 
McDowell's Mind and World brings some latent theoretical tensions to the fore 
(with great skill) is a contribution we rightly acknowledge. Granted, there are many 
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aspects of his philosophy which, we opine, are simply mistaken. Yet if we have 
chosen to address McDowell's work, it is in large measure a mark of intellectual 
respect. Specifically, we are deeply sympathetic to his programmatic desire to 
bridge the chasm which has been dug (time and time again) between mind and 
world. In that respect, we consider him a philosophical ally. What's more, as a 
publicly-accessible common ground, his work provides us with a division of 
communicative labour, allowing us to begin our investigation in media res. 
Nevertheless, McDowell's book remains a sign; and as such, it is not an end but a 
means-a surrogate vehicle which stands for something more than itself. 
We are thus confronted on the meta-theoretical front with the same tension 
addressed on the object-Ianguage front; namely, whether a given representation can 
bear on its object by itself or whether it is inevitably bound to a wholistic web. As 
our topic is a fundamental one, there is no refuge from the issues it raises. Such a 
queer methodological predicament should come as no surprise: pronouncements on 
matters of knowledge and representation are no small moves, and commit us to 
wearing our conclusions on our sleeves (indeed, one would be well-advised to 
question the relevance of a philosophical investigation which cornes to a set of 
conclusions by way of assumptions wholly inconsistent with those discoveries). The 
methodological question then, is whether a reading of Mind and World commits us 
to a hermeneutic greater than that work-and if so, how far the intertextuallinkages 
extend and to what degree "spontaneity" is at our disposaI in the selection of those 
linkages. 
It would be disastrous for us to claim attainment of a viable third way between 
the atom and the whole, all the while acquiescing to one of these poles. A strict, 
dogmatic reading of a single source is thus no friend to our enterprise-nor are 
endless exegetic digressions. We can therefore augment our concern for a corpus­
transcending object with the following criterion, which we want to make clear from 
the start: we will consider primarily those intertextual references which bleed 
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outwardsfrom Mind and World, and will by and large disregard those which could 
be made inwardly from the body of commentary now coating that core. In keeping 
with our desire to eschew speculation (cf sect. 1.2), the mere existence of a further 
sign will not suffiee to entitle its interpretation. The boundary ensuing fram such a 
policy will thus lie somewhere between singularity and totality. One will find more 
than just Mind and World in the bibliography-yet one should not expect an 
exhaustive survey of aIl related literature. 
The good philosopher is like the ship-captain who, upon being handed the fruits 
of sorne explorer's hard-earned pragress at mapping the coastline of a new world, 
gathers his crew and hurries to his vessel with virgin sheets of paper in hand, 
anxious to build upon his predeeessor's achievements. The bad philosopher is like 
the sedentary courtier who puts the map under a glass frame, hangs it on a wall 
behind a velvet rape and chides anybody who returns from their own ventures with a 
better (henee different) rendering as not having understood the original intent of the 
work. 
CHAPTERI 
FRAMING THE PROBLEM, FORECASTING AN ANSWER 
A part of the very complicated trick of the Chinese rings 
consists in taking two solid rings linked together, talking 
about them as though they were separate-taking it for 
granted, as it were-then pretending to put them together, and 
handing them immediately to the spectator that he may see 
that they are solid. The art of this consists in raising, at first, 
the strong suspicion that one is broken. 
Charles Sanders Peirce 
"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man" (1868) 
1.1 Introduction 
In Mind and World, John McDowell portrays philosophy as trapped in a dialectic 
knot of sorts. We begin by searching for sorne stable part onto which we can anchor 
discourse and judge the merit of our beliefs. At first glance, the receptivity of 
punctate experiences seems to fit the bill. However, upon further scrutiny, this 
option reveals itse1f far too brute to render an intelligible verdict. We find that we 
must make 'this is such and such' the ground floor of thought if we are to appeal to 
the 'this' of receptivity in a way that can be epistemologically relevant. Yet this 
alternative ends up according conceptual content such a dominant l'ole that it « 
makes it hard to see how experience could function as a tribunal, delivering verdicts 
on our thinking » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. xii). For by the time conceptual 
content arrives to help read receptivity's cryptic utterances, suspicion has set in that 
this proctor might in fact be the one pronouncing epistemic judgement. McDowell 
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thus argues that neither of these options provides a satisfactory home for thought, 
which seeks friction from beyond itself yet grasps that such friction will only be 
epistemically relevant "inside" the web of its representations. 
The more we play up the connection between reason and freedom, the more we 
risk losing our grip on how exercises of concepts can constitute warranted 
judgements about the world. What we wanted to conceive as exercises of 
concepts threaten to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game. And that 
deprives us of the very idea that they are exercises of concepts. (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 5) 
Our goal in this chapter will be to lay bare the main philosophic arguments 
wruch give rise to McDowell's oscillation. In sum, what sets that seesaw in motion 
is an attack on atomism by wholists like Willard Quine, Donald Davidson, and 
Wilfrid Sellars. Of these three thinkers, we will make the case that only the 
technical arguments of the third merit serious attention. Key to our dismissal of 
Quine and Davidson will be the demonstration that the general "radical translation" 
setting whence their wholistic arguments proceed rests on a set of tacit sceptical 
assumptions which in effect beg the question against the very possibility of a 
receptive contact. As such, we will maintain that a precondition to truly attempting 
to untie (or sever?) McDowell's Gordian knot is an epistemology "enchanted" 
enough to give the mind its aetiologic due yet naturalized enough to muzzle the 
scepticism bequeathed (alongside science) by modemity-Iest the knot's 
entanglements self-perpetuate in proportion to speculative prowess. 
Unfortunately, we will further see how McDowell manifests a certain morbid 
fascination with the speculative arguments he proposes to "dissolve", and how that 
harmful sympathy should in principle be ruled out by his calI to renew with a pre­
modem world-view. As a case study in McDowell's mixed allegiances, we will 
examine the conflict between his Wittgenstein-inspired "openness to the world" 
stance-which has aIl the trappings of receptivity-and his ad hoc insistence that we 
must perpetually reflect about the warrant of our beliefs regardless of whether or not 
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those beliefs have hitherto availed themselves successful. Understanding the 
rationale behind this tension will then lead us to address Sellars' sophisticated 
argument against the allegedly "mythical" Given. The chapter will conclude by 
provisionally assuming Sellars' conclusions about the "asymmetrical" structure of 
representation to be correct, that we may proceed with an examination of 
McDowell's response to them in the next. 
1.2 A speculative origin: the imaginary native as Cartesian deceiver 
1.2.1 A pair of typologies 
Aristotle famously said that philosophy begins in wonder. True enough-after aIl, 
the very term by which we designate the activity was originally intended to capture a 
strange new breed of thinkers fascinated with wisdom for its own sake (the oft­
repeated adjective "disinterested" is in fact a misnomer). But there are other 
catalysts as weIl. Indeed, if philosophy is a form of problem-solving, then the 
problems can emerge from the reflections of a thinker, the world itself, or 
admixtures thereof. In the case of McDowell's problem, its origin is an infertile 
crossbreed of the speculative and the mundane. 
The fact of representation (broadly construed) is so familiar to us as to be largely 
foreign to reflexive scrutiny. This queer feature has lent this most human of abilities 
a quite suspect reputation, especially among those incredulous philosophers who 
have no qualTel doubting cornmon sense. As a result, depending on the literature 
one peruses, one finds the following postures adopted: 
a)	 One can take as a starting point the fact that we do, by and large, 
successfully represent objects in the world and then experimentally 
reproduce or test the rnechanisms by which this is achieved. 
b)	 One can take as a starting point the recognition that we do, by and 
large, successfully represent objects in the world and then inquire as 
to how this is so ("reverse engineer" how this is the case) in the hopes 
of explaining and eventually guiding this process. 
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c) One can take as a starting point the daim that perhaps we can 
represent worldly objects and then submit that daim to doubt so as to 
see whether and to what extent it withstands criticism. 
Posture (a), which we will call the scïentific posture, pertains to domains like 
psychology, the cognitive sciences, or even biology. Posture (b), which we will 
label aetiologic, is an inquiry into causes that pertains to non-sceptical enterprises 
like philosophy or semiotics. John Deely best explains the distinction between the 
aims and methods of postures (a) and (b): 
From first to last, philosophy has only a demonstratio ad intellectum, an "appeal 
to intelligibility", whereupon to rest its case. Science is the domain of 
experiments. The domain of philosophy is intellectual doctrine as irreducible to 
what can be manifested as decisive in an empirical frame. There are many areas 
in the development of hypotheses and the elaboration of frarneworks for the 
testing of hypotheses where, to be sure, philosophy and science overlap. But 
ultimately there is always the difference between scientia as what can in sorne 
important measure be reduced to a crucial experiment demonstrando ad sensus, 
and doctrina as a body of thought sensitive to its own implications and striving 
for consistency throughout, while achieving explanations (however provisional) 
at a level beyond what can be empirically circumscribed in unarnbiguous ways. 
(2001, p. 491) 
It should be noted, however, that we have chosen to speak of "postures" instead 
of "methods". This is because while (b) and (c) share a common method (one 
different frorn the scientific), they have sharply diverging outlooks vis-à-vis the role 
of material adequacy in the determination of an argument's worth. According to (c), 
which we will call the sceptical posture, the fact that a thing is (or seems) intuitively 
(or "pre-theoretically") thus-and-so contributes no weight whatsoever in the 
evaluation of a given hypothesis' merit. In a sense, one could say that while both (b) 
and (c) agree that a strong case is made for an hypothesis when it resists falsification 
from the inside, they disagree on what counts as relevant in that "inside"; it is a 
divergence on where to set the rnodulus of philosophie inquiry. For the aetiologic 
posture, the fact that we (as ordinary people or as scientists) observe a certain 
worldly occurrence most definitely counts as a premise. In contrast, the sceptical 
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posture construes argument more narrowly, so that anecdotal observations, weIl­
framed empirical reports, and past-fecundity cannot themselves enter into 
consideration. We can thus say that while the aetiologic posture is sensitive to the 
overaIl cogency of its arguments, the sceptical variety deems validity-no matter 
how counterfactual-to be the sole criterion of a tenet's philosophic merit. 
This divergence is most manifest in the respective starting points each posture 
adopts. For the aetiologic theorist, effective representation is the starting point. 
Pinning this effect down as a sort of naturalist axiom, it then proceeds to inquire as 
to its underlying causes (albeit with tools different from the scientist's). For the 
sceptic posture, a sort of refined incredulity is the starting point. Taking this 
standing policy for granted, it sees effective representation rather as a finishing line 
to be possibly attained upon survival of its criticisms (whether a sincere desire to 
attain that end can be made consonant with such a policy is an interesting question 
we shaIl set aside). Typical of the speculative enterprise' s gait is its readiness to 
depart from the mundane. As we shaIl see, contrived scenarios about virgin 
interpreters trying to pin alien utterances to their (putatively difficult to discern) 
objects are a perfect example of this. 
Now the threefold typology of scientific / aetiologic / sceptic postures is related 
to the mundane / speculative distinction of origins in an important way. The 
scientific posture must be mundane in origin and cannot be speculative, as it needs 
to return to a cause's stable worldly effect in order to test its models. The aetiologic 
posture, it would seem, can be either mundane or speculative in origin; as one can 
certainly ponder the causes of an effect in response to a worldly friction or out of 
sheer curiosity. As for the sceptical posture, it must be speculative in origin, as 
putting in doubt worldly manifestations requires a counterintuitive effort of thought. 
It is clear that McDoweIl's work is not scientific in the sense aimed at in (a). But 
his enterprise does embrace a constructive tone akin to (b), aIl the while making 
certain concessions which introduce elements of (c) into its premises. The result of 
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this mixed approach is that his work combines profound insights with serious errors. 
Our first task, then, will be to examine how this admixture of the speculative and the 
mundane plays out in McDowell's work. For if one can rule out the speculative 
origin of McDowell's problem and adopt a strictly mundane view, then one ipso 
facto separates the aetiologic wheat from the sceptic chaff, this last needing the 
continued sustenance of speculation. More specifically, our aim will be to canvass 
the various ways in which Davidson and Quine' s general philosophie attitude-their 
latent modus operandi-introduces an element of scepticism into McDowell's work, 
which in principle should have been alien to his (otherwise remarkable) endeavour. 
McDowell says that « we seem to be confronted with philosophical obligations 
of a familiar sort» and that although we should « unmask that appearance as illusion 
[...] It matters that the illusion is capable of gripping us » ([1994] 2002, p. xi). 
However, we believe that if one frames the issue in such a way as to forbid the play 
of speculative thought, then the illusion is not gripping at aIl. As we will see, once 
the argumentative field of force is so altered, not only do the legitimate terms of 
debate becorne clearer, but new possibilities for a tenable third way begin to emerge. 
1.2.2 Setting up radical translation 
As Michael Friedman points out, despite the fact that McDowell ends up rejecting 
coherentism, « it is precisely Davidson' s philosophy of radical interpretation that 
sets the stage for McDowell's own argument» (2002, p. 44). The figures of 
Davidson and Quine indeed loom large in McDowell's writings. McDowell ([1994] 
2002, p. viii) explicitly cites Davidson's "Truth and Meaning" and "On Saying 
That" as sorne of his most substantial intellectual influences. This subtle thinker 
(synchronically) reaches McDowell twice-removed in the person of Quine, "without 
whom not", in Davidson' s memorable acknowledgement ([1984] 2001, p. v). But 
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the influence of these two thinkers on McDowell which we want to bring out is not 
so much declarative as it is operative, especially with regard to their meta­
philosophieal approach. 
So what have Quine and Davidson chosen to think about, how do they go about 
thinking about it, and to what resolution do they ultimately come? At the risk of 
overly generalizing (we shall here focus on the commonalities), the respective 
answers are: the possibility of empirically grounding language and thought, raising 
doubts about the epistemic potency of ostension, and wholistic coherence as a 
normative standard (as we will see later in the chapter, W. Sellars , work basically 
shares these three concerns-although he gives them a different technical gloss). 
A good way into these topics is the title of this section (1.2), which cornes from 
two sources: for its signified, Quine's essay on "The Problem of Meaning in 
Linguistics" ([1953] 2001, p. 47-64) and subsequent elaboration in Ward and Object 
([ 1960] 1999); and for its signifier, an interesting cultural survey by historian Daniel 
Francis titled The Imaginary Indian (1997), which highlights the various ways in 
which the figure of the Native American has served as a semiotic vessel for the 
hopes, fantasies and fears of non-Native cultures. We shaH leave the ethical and 
political implications of such projections aside. What is of interest to us is the 
commonfictional nature of the narratives. 
Quine provided a revamped context that went on to nourish post-war Anglo­
American philosophy, sustaining most of Davidson's intellectual ventures (and 
captivating many of McDowell's). That context, of course, is radical translation. It 
is instructive to revisit the way in which Quine originally presented his fully 
developed scenario. In a section of Ward and Object entitled "First Steps of Radical 
Translation", Quine sets up his mature "field linguist" narrative from a more overtly 
speculative formulation and then progressively adding layers of logical and scientific 
plausibility. The speculative core begins with what is in effect the conclusion of the 
radical translation argument: 
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A first uncritical way of picturing this scope for empirically unconditioned 
variation [in one's conceptual scheme] is as follows: two men could be just alike 
in aIl their dispositions to verbal behavior under aIl possible sensory 
stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically 
triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radicaIly, for the two 
men, in a wide range of cases. (Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 26) 
Notice the strength of the daim being made: morphemically and spatio-temporarily 
isomorphic occurrences-isomorphic "under al! possible sensory 
stimulations"-could each be nomologically answerable to "radically divergent" 
frameworks. Whatever the merits of this tenet, Quine recognizes he may have 
perhaps prematurely spilled the proverbial beans and quickly moves on to a more 
logicist gloss: 
Sense can be made of the point by recasting it as follows: the infinite totality of 
sentences of any given speaker's language can be so permuted, or mapped onto 
itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior remains 
invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of sentences with 
equivalent sentences, in any plausible sense of equivalence however loose. 
Sentences without number can diverge drastically from their respective 
correlates, yet the divergences can systematically so offset one another that the 
overall pattern of associations of sentences with one another and with non-verbal 
stimulation is preserved. (Ibid., p. 27; cf also p. 72, 78) 
This formulation was particularly attractive to Davidson, who deemed it « [t]he 
simplest, least questionable way of showing that reference is inscrutable » ([ 1984] 
2001, p. 229). Yet if "simple" is an appropriate adjective, surely "least 
questionable" is not, as here again a very onerous daim is affirmed as a truism. 
We finally come to the third form of Quine's scenario-the only one truly 
worthy of being called "radical translation". Once more, Quine presents this 
narrative as a synonymous gloss of the same issue. If the first statement is overtly 
speculative and the second logicist, this third is scientific in tone: 
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The same point can be put less abstractly and more realistically by switching to 
translation. The thesis is then this: manuals for translating one language into 
another can be set up in divergent ways, aIl compatible with the totality of 
speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places they 
will diverge in giving, as their respective translations of a sentence of the one 
language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no 
plausible sort of equiva1ence however loose. (Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 27) 
Given the recurrent structure, this statement is ostensibly meant to be read in light of 
the antecedent proposaIs. Yet if read on its own, Quine's manual statement is not a1l 
that tendentious. Surely it is sober to recognize that rival translation manuals' 
respective takes on a common object-language can and do diverge in countless 
places. To argue that "manuais for translating one language into another can be set 
up in divergent ways" is a plausible and easily defensible daim. Be that as it may, 
the two previous accounts condition the interpretation of the manual example. Seen 
in the light of these statements, especially permutation, one understands that the 
"countless" in Quine' s formulation is intended to carry a whole lot more weight. 
From "countless places" in the sense of "so many places scattered here and there" 
we slide to "countless places" in the mathematical sense of "infinite"-a hasty 
inference from anatomism to wholism we will criticize throughout this work. 
However, Quine's radical translation metaphor has come to be known not in the 
a priori / hermeneutic terms of relating books to one another, but rather in the a 
posteriori / empiricist setting centring around the various epistemological difficulties 
a (nondescript) "field linguist" would likely face in attempting to (re?)construct the 
lexicography of a totally alien language from on-site observations. This narrative, 
now part of the mainstream philosophical patrimony, typically unfolds as follows. A 
linguist goes to a foreign land inhabited by a people whose language he knows 
absolutely nothing about (henee the adjective "radical"). In a sense, his only 
resources are his own language, scientific training, keen senses, a notepad, and a 
shared humanity (although the effective contributions of this last are usua1ly played 
down; compare Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 60-63 with Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 77). The 
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ontogenetic or inductive issue at stake is how, given these radical conditions, the 
linguist could successfully catalogue the native' s behaviour and utterances so as to 
create a manual of synonymies. More speculatively, the epistemic or deductive issue 
is why, should such a manual be produced, would we be warranted in retroactively 
considering the link posited between the two languages to be empirically grounded? 
The key question thus lies in ascertaining if and to what extent the field linguist' s 
putative terrn-to-object synonymies rely on imperatives of intra-manual consistency. 
For if intemal consistency is to be the ultimate epistemological ground, it seems to 
leave open the possibility that the structure we take to be our understanding in fact 
owes more to the free exercise of conceptual faculties than ta each parts' 
correspondence with stable sets of possible experiences. What we have here, in 
effect, is a restatement of McDowell's tension between receptivity and spontaneity, 
one which registers decidedly in favour of the wholistic seat of the seesaw. 
1.2.3 How far radicalism extends 
Suppose we begin by recognizing that we can fruitfully understand each other across 
linguistic boundaries. How does this fact come about? In other words, what are the 
mechanisms underlying the ontogenetic development of cross-linguistic 
understanding? In the (somewhat implausible) context of a radically tabula rasa 
encounter, it would seem reasonable to suppose that the linguist's first atternpts at 
establishing sorne workable grasp of the native's utterances would have to rely on a 
set of bold conjectures. But what of the world in aIl this? Surely il tao is a resource 
at the field linguist' s disposal-it is a field study after aIl, and not just sorne library 
exercise. A clue to decrypting what is meant by the native's utterances could thus be 
found in the very context in which an utterance is enunciated, thus dimming the 
boldness of the linguist' s initial conjectures. Quine recognizes for exarnple that « 
[t]he utterances first and most surely translated in such a case are ones keyed to 
present events that are conspicuous to the linguist and his informant» ([1960] 1999, 
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p. 29) and that « [fJor translation theory, banal messages are the breath of life » 
(Ibid., p. 69). And so, the linguist waits for an occasion where the native will utter a 
fairly straightforward sound in a fairly straightforward manner in a fairly 
straightforward context, and then surmises a fairly straightforward guess at what was 
meant and voilà, first contact has been established. However, as with most things 
speculative, although we begin with something so simple as to not seem worth 
stating, we end up with something so complex as to be paradoxical (to echo 
Russell's famous ladder-discarding credo, [1918, 1924] 1998, p. 53). 
It is important to understand that the alleged "indeterminacy of translation" 
which underwrites wholism is itself underwritten by an erotetic rationale, the exact 
(speculative) workings of which remain largely tacit. Indeed, the field linguist' s 
attempts at pinning down the worldly objects of the native's utterances serve as a. 
rhetorical template whence to unpack what is for aIl intents and purposes the true 
philosophic aim of the narrative. Let us therefore try to bring out the manner in 
which speculative scepticism is articulated in radical translation. 
The stock tale presented to university students (extracted and creatively 
expanded from the suggestive account provided in Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 29) 
usually begins with the native declaring "Gavagai" as a rabbit shoots by. The prima 
facïe bait we are meant to seize upon here, of course, is the idea that this 
representation enjoys an atomic bond with rabbits, a one-to-one correspondence with 
sorne stable aspect of the world (be it construed as a universal or a set of particulars). 
However, that somewhat facile lure is soon pulled away, never to return: « The 
nature of this entering wedge into a strange lexicon encourages the misconception of 
meaning as reference, since words at this stage are construed, typically, by pointing 
to the object referred to » (Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 62). Invited as we are to rid 
ourselves of any uncouth "folk-theoretic" delusions, our attention is subsequently 
drawn to the multiplicity of the event which was contiguous to the native's 
enunciation of "Gavagai". For instance, suppose the aforementioned rabbit was 
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leaping over a bush as the sun was setting. The representation in question could then 
have bushes as its object, or again the act of leaping itself, or the sun setting, or 
animal fur-and so on. 
Now at this crucial moment in the radical translation narrative, the addressee is 
expected to proceed from these intervening factors-each of which expresses a 
purely contingent fact-to a generalized inference about the nature of representation 
as such. Relying on an understandable wish not to belabour the point, we thus move 
surreptitiously from an (apparently unbridled) enumeration of alternative referents to 
an ampliative induction: « The difficulty here is not just that those subjective 
components of the situation are hard to ferret out. [...] Theoretically the more 
important difficulty is that [...] there is in principle no separating languagefrom the 
rest of the world, at least as conceived by the speaker» (Ibid., p. 61; italics ours). 
By silently granting plausibility to this daim, we effectively participate in an 
important epistemological transition, one going from the non-atomic character of 
representation-from the idea that things are not as tidy as our linguistic mastery 
leads us to assume-aIl the way to the idea that new (wholistic) norms need be 
developed. 
Of course, the more ad hoc "variables" keep chopping away at the erstwhile 
innocent terms of the problem, the more we are made to retreat from the world and 
look to our immediate subjectivity for a remnant of certainty. It is not surprising 
then to find Quine eventually leaving the "primordial" level where « the points of 
condensation [... ] are things glimpsed, not glimpses » ([1960] 1999, p. 1) for of a 
speculative plane where « [i]n experimentally equating the [native's] uses of 
'Gavagai' and [the linguist's] 'Rabbit' it is stimulations that must be made to match, 
not animaIs» (Ibid., p. 31). What follows is a drastically revised vocabulary which 
takes pains to admit nothing that common sense could remotely recognize: « [The 
linguist] can reasonably conjecture that the native would be prompted to assent to 
'Gavagai' by the microscopically same irradiations that would prompt him, the 
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linguist, to assent to 'Rabbit', even though this conjecture rests wholly on samples 
where the irradiations concerned can at best be hazarded merely to be pretty much 
alike »(Ibid.). The trench of mistrust having been dug so deeply, cruder arguments 
about the possible co-extension of multiple worldly referents-which were 
originally deployed to plausibly lure us into reconsidering « the misconception of 
meaning as reference » (Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 62)-seem like needless overkill. 
The speculative tenor of radical translation, it would seem, has reached its 
sceptical consummation. The modernism at work here is twofold. Its more readily 
apparent manifestation lies in the eventual retreat to subjectivity, which of course 
betokens the sceptical conception espoused by David Hume, who famously averred 
that « [t]he mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot 
possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects » (Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, § 12, part 1; in Pojman, 1998, p. 724). But it is 
important to realize that this mistrust of receptivity is in fact a derivative, answerable 
to a more fundamental meta-philosophical approach. Indeed, the sort of 
reductionism which makes it its business to reword our everyday vocabulary into 
"stimuli responses" is of a piece with the outlook that reads an ever-growing panoply 
of intervening variables into what would otherwise be fairly sedate cases of 
ostensive reporting. 
Since our ultimate objective to take the wind from McDowell's sceptic sails, the 
key weakness to exploit is the fact that a proviso like "what can be doubted in the 
least degree should be doubted altogether" requires constant speculative fodder. The 
radical translation scenario conjured up by Quine, which in large measure provides a 
home for the polemics of Davidson-and later, mainly through him, John 
McDowell-is a perfect example of speculation feeding scepticism, the first being 
an irreplaceable and necessary constitutive feature of the second. We can 
summarize the main thrust of our critique by saying that translation is only as 
indeterminate as it is kept radical. Indeed, while radical translation's addressee can 
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be forgiven for not wishing to belabour the point about the many possible objects of 
"Gavagai", the whole point is precisely that in order to get her assent, it would be sa 
laboured; and this in an open-ended fashion. Opting for this enumerative route 
instead of the ampliative shortcut would of course bring the play of speculation ta 
the full light of day, thereby undermining the unwarranted supposition that since 
epistemic justification is non-atomic, it must be wholistic. 
1.2.4 Dispensing with the burden of toil 
In attempting to bring out the observational variables and theoretical imports which 
intervene at the level of atomic ostension, the radical translationist accepts a tacit 
account of how one should go about representing representation. In short, while 
Quine insists with regards to physical objects that « [a]nalyse theory-building how 
we will, we aIl must start in the middle » ([1960] 1999, p. 4), he frames his 
investigation of meaning in an aseptic tabula rasa scenario where, instead of asking 
how Adam could name things, he instead asks how Eve could name what Adam 
names. 
A forceful argument against giving the mind this kind of ontological priority 
over the world is that it not only jettisons any credible gauge by which we could 
have evaluated the epistemic merit of our thoughts, but-more importantly-it 
leaves us unable to account for the ontogenesis of those thoughts (or of thoughts tout 
court). As McDowell writes: 
[Davidson] thinks the anly point of wanting a rational connection between 
intuitions and thoughts is reassurance that we are justified in endorsing the 
thoughts, as if we could take it for granted in any case that they are thoughts, that 
they possess content. But if we do not let intuitions stand in rational relations ta 
them, it is exactly their possession of content that is put in question. When 
Davidson argues that a body of beliefs is sure ta be mostly true, he helps himself 
ta the idea of a body of beliefs, a body of states that have content. ([1994] 2002, 
p. 68; italics ours) 
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Notwithstanding Richard Rorty's suggestion that « we secrete theorems and 
symphonies as our spleen secretes dark humors » (1980, p. 44), the speculative 
setting of radical translation thus leaves the burden of world-to-mind categorization 
to the native; with the convenient upshot that the linguist (with whom we are 
presumably to identify) has only to address the less onerous task of a mind-to-mind 
hermeneutic. 
Yet the linguist's hoId on the world is arguably only as strong as the native's 
ability to correctly seize upon the object of his own utterances. Indeed, the native's 
categorizations become the ground floor, transitively linking the spheres of culture 
and nature (it has long been a widespread assumption that Native peoples are more 
in tune with nature). However, in type-theoretic fashion, the problem of accounting 
for this last (presumably limpid) tie to the world is effectively ignored by the radical 
translationist. Leonard Peikoff encapsulated this manoeuvre most eloquently when 
he wrote: « The concepts are here. How did they get here? Somehow» ([1967] 
1990, p. 97). Ironically, since Quine and Davidson' s arguments are presented as a 
concern for the methods of the social sciences, this patently subjectivist ousting of 
the world can masquerade as a forro of "naturalism". 
The matter is akin to the sharply different answers one gets depending on 
whether ethical inquiry is set against the backdrop of a lifeboat (human vs. human) 
or a deserted island (human vs. nature). Like lifeboaters quarrelling over a certain 
store of wealth without burdening themselves with how it came to be, Quine and 
Davidson help themselves to a slew of pre-existing concepts. In the ethical case-as 
in its epistemological counterpart-the question of "distribution" fallaciously takes 
precedence over that of creation. Granted, concept-acquisition may be the result of 
"toil" or "theft". Indeed, 
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Acquiring categories by honest toil is doing it the hard way, by trial and error, 
which is time-consuming and sometimes perhaps too slow and risky. Getting 
them any "other" way is getting them by theft, because you do not expend the 
honest toil. 
This is transparent in the case of Darwinian theft (which is perhaps better 
described as "inherited wealth"). In the case of symbolic theft, where someone 
else who has earned the category by sensorimotor toil simply tells you what's 
what, "theft" is also not such an apt metaphor, for this seems to be a victimless 
crime: Whoever tells you has saved you a lot of work [...]. (Harnad, 2002, p. 
151) 
Nevertheless, it seems entirely correct to recognize that « the vocabulary of theft 
must be grounded directly in honest toil [...J, it cannot be sYffibolic theft aIl the way 
down» (Ibid., p. 153). 
Although the wholistic epistemology which emerges from the speculatively­
contrived polemic of radical translation is originally posed as a response to the 
difficulties of inter-systemic encounters between cultures and languages, it is 
subsequently held to be a covering model applicable to aIl human cognition per se, 
even when the contact is intra-systemic. As Davidson writes: 
The problem of interpretation is domestic as weIl as foreign: it surfaces for 
speakers of the same language in the form of the question, how can it be 
determined that the language is the same? Speakers of the same language can go 
on the assumption that for them the same expressions are to be interpreted in the 
same way, but this does not indicate what justifies the assumption. AlI 
understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation. ([1984J 
2001, p. 125) 
In short, if the objects of third-person reports (e.g., a rabbit being pointed to) are in 
principle unassignable, then aIl one need do is substitute the "native" with a parent 
and construe each child as a kind of amateur "field linguist", and one becomes as 
disconnected from one's peers as from a "hitherto untouched people" (Quine, [1960J 
1999, p. 28)-nay, untouchable people. 
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In truth, no one can consistently adopt the scepticism outlined above, even for 
argumentative pm-poses. Davidson recognizes this when he writes: « In giving up 
dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside aIl 
schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth [...] but re­
establish unmediated touch with the farniliar objects whose antics make our 
sentences and opinions true or false» ([1984] 2001, p. 198). Ifwe (not-so-radicaIly) 
translate, what this statement boils down to is that the radical translation narrative 
avowedly has no practical bearings; if consistently pursued, it comes full circle 
(despite his speculative extravagance on topics of meaning and reference, Quine 
himself ends up advocating a very conservative world-view). 
Yet the need for a drastic theoretical reworking of our conception of 
representation in terms of wholism is felt only on the assumption that the ad hoc 
creation of referential noise (of the sort which can be prefixed by a "But what iL." 
clause) is itself warranted. Seeing as how the rationale at work here is eratetic, it 
remains for us to uncover what sort of party is perpetually questioning the linguist' s 
claims to objectivity-to uncover what are ils standards in this regard. For if we 
want to put an end to Antreus' winning streak, we must deprive him of the ground 
whence he draws his powers. 
1.2.5 The true instigator revealed 
At the start of the chapter, we praposed that inquiry can be understood as either 
speculative or mundane in origin. To the extent that the catalyst is mundane, one is 
confronted with what Peirce called real or "genuine" doubt: « [G]enuine doubt 
always has an extemal origin, usually fram sm-prise; and [...] it is as impossible for a 
man to create in himself a genuine doubt by such an act of the will [...] as it would 
be for him to give himself genuine surprise by a simple act of the will » (1998, p. 
348). This last impetus, triggered so to speak by an immaculate conception of the 
creative mind, is what we term speculative. In light of this typology, we can 
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summarize our indictment of Quine and Davidson's negative influence on Mind and 
World's project by saying that they effectively introduce in it a harmful element of 
speculative scepticism. Specifically, their wholistic arguments unwarrantedly 
initiate reflection on a topic hitherto unproblematic (by naturalist standards) and then 
bring to bear on that topic a policy of doubt limited only by ruminative acumen. 
Despite its scientific (linguistic) tone, the scenario of radical translation exhibits two 
very important traits: 1) it is not a genuine problem in the Peircean sense (i.e., it is 
speculative in origin); and 2) it requires that we supplY a steady amount of doubt 
throughout (i.e., it is sceptical in gait, if not in destination). 
When we think of scepticism, we tend to associate it with the classical 
scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis or the modern avatar of Hume. But scepticism as such 
is not a historical school but an approach, on which no one thinker has a monopoly. 
It is a general stance (ta qualify it as "philosophie" would be to beg the question in 
its favour) which anyone at any time can adopt. Sorne say it represents the pinnacle 
of wisdom while sorne argue it is nihilist in gait and self-defeating in destination. 
Still others see it as a kind of necessary expedient, a "ladder" which one discards 
after use. The problem with scepticism, however, is that once one has adopted it, 
there's not much else to do or say (save perhaps rambling on in print about that fate). 
And so arises the instrumental variety, pioneered by Descartes in the seventeenth 
century and nowadays found under the rubric of "methodological scepticism". 
The narrator of the Cartesian Méditations has been canonized in Western culture 
by the plastic terms of Rodin's Thinker: aloof, decontextualized, and self-absorbed. 
What this picture leaves out, however, is that shortly after having cast himself into 
the void by (provisionally) taking as completely false whatever he deemed in the 
least degree susceptible to doubt, the Frenchman hit upon rock-solid ground: his 
own (ideational) existence, thought he, adrnits of no such doubt. As Descartes 
writes: « Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to 
shift the entire earth; so l too can hope for great things if l manage to find just one 
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thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable » (Second Meditation, in 
Pojman, 1998, p. 467). What ensued was no longer scepticism, but rather an almost 
too-optimistic belief in one's ability to know (science-fiction satirist Douglas Adams 
was not doing injustice to Cartesian rationaIism when he wrote of a super-computer 
being programmed with the "Cogito" and then deducing from it the existence of 
"rice pudding and income tax"). 
Contemporary adherents to instrumental scepticism like Quine and Davidson 
tend to lack Descartes' system-building fervour. But that should not blind us to the 
fact that they nonetheless embrace a quintessentially Cartesian attitude towards 
inquiry. Ali toId, the crucial feature is not so much the particular way in which a 
given sceptic policy expands hairline fissures of doubt into veritable canyons, but 
rather the manner in which one ascertains the presence of such fissures in the first 
place. If the enterprise is rooted and sustained by real doubt in the Peircean sense, 
then the criteria for the detection of fissures is the disruption of habit. By this 
mundane standard, opportunities for wedging fissures open would be rare (the 
rational animal is not so maladapted to its environment). In contrast, when the 
impetus and drive is speculative, the criteria is one' s creative imagination (or lack 
thereof). By this lax standard, to ponder the possibility of a fissure is to detect one. 
On the mundane view we advocate, doubt cannot arise from discourse 
speculatively folding onto itself. Instead, the disruption of habit cornes from 
beneath the realm of discourse, from the brutality of a clash with the world: « 
Besides the lower consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness [...] this 
direct consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into aIl cognition and serves 
to make it mean something real » (Peirce, 1992, p. 233). Yet when Samuel Johnson 
struck his foot against a large stone and declared that he had "thus" refuted 
Berkeley's idealism, we believe his appeal to brutality came too late. Properly 
construed, such impacts are not only potent arbiters of epistemic affairs; they should 
also be the instigators of inquiry. In this view, Davidson's ([1984] 2001, p. 125) 
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demand that speakers of a same language justify their assumption that their language 
is the same can be rejected as without grounds-what is in need of justification is 
Davidson's demand. 
In the case of radical translation, the instigator of inquiry could be genuine: the 
science of linguistics is indeed called upon to catalogue languages foreign to its 
disciplinary encyclopaedia. In such cases, mis- or non-communication is the 
legitimate trigger, setting theoretical inquiry into motion. Yet when such is the 
motive, the matter is eventually settled: detailed observations, a few well-chosen 
conjectures, tentative attempts at employing the vocabulary gleaned therefrom, 
establishment of an investigative rapport with the object-population, cross­
verification of manuals for accuracy and consistency-and, by all reasonable 
standards, the task pressed upon the linguist is resolved. Upon completion, more 
theoretically-minded linguists could generalize the methodology (notepad and all) 
employed in successful cases and prescribe a working set of guidelines for the 
practice of their science. Just as mis- or non-communication was the legitimate 
trigger setting inquiry into motion, effective communication would bring that 
endeavour to rest. The official end of hostilities with mundane disruptions would be 
marked by the publication of a textbook, that peace treaty of habit-taking which 
canonizes what Kuhn ([1962] 1996) called "normal science". Recognition that rival 
publications could diverge in "countless places" would be seen as a trivial side­
effect of the collective scale of the enterprise and would in no way undermine 
confidence that the job is done. In any event, divergences big enough to matter 
would be dealt with if and when they would arise-the mere suggestion of an 
imaginary permutation or new variable would not suffice. What's more, should 
important divergences arise, the attempt to remedy them would rest on the premise 
that there is but one domain of reference (to wit, the world), and that as a result we 
should not rest with conflicting (overlapping) theoretical accounts. As Kirkham 
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writes, « a pure coherence theory of justification does have some surface plausibility 
on a Realist theory of truth. The reasoning would be that since the world itself is 
consistent, two or more inconsistent beliefs cannot aIl be true [...] »(1997, p. 216). 
But that is not the rationale which guides a Quinean epistemology. In short, 
indeterminacy of translation entails the repudiation of any appeal to "Word and 
Object" correspondence, in no plausible sort of correspondence however loose. In 
terms of Charles Morris' tripartite typology (1971, p. 28-54), the semantic relation 
binding sign-to-object is undermined to the point of epistemic impotence by the 
speculative assumptions of the radical setting. As the stipulations raise the bar at the 
philosopher's leisure, when and where sign-to-object couplings seem to hold, the 
intervening variables are made more radical ad hoc (going all the way back to the 
intervention of the senses, if need be), thereby effectively cutting us off fram our 
(erstwhile unprablematic) recourse to ostension. 
Obviously, wholists have always had to find a way to reincorporate sorne kind of 
substitute for receptivity. Thus, once experience has been held to an impossible 
standard of precision and been found wanting, the shackles of instrumental 
scepticism are removed so as to clear the way for a renewed confidence in the 
mind's ability. The possibility of appealing to semantic sign-to-object references 
having been purged, radical translation rebuilds a recognizable world-view upon the 
remaining serniotic options, namely the syntactic and pragmatic axes. The theoretic 
account which traditionally emerges in the aftermath is thus one of wholistically 
managing representations along the sign-to-sign axis so as to pragmatically foster a 
sign-to-agent heuristic. Quine captures the essence of this kind of economical 
wholism when he writes: « Our boat stays afloat because at each alteration we keep 
the bulk of it intact as a going concern. [...] We warp usage gradually enough to 
avoid rupture» ([1960] 1999, p. 4). 
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Yet the radical translation framework whence this wholism emerges effectively 
begs the question against the representational atom: given the stringent scepticism it 
brings to bear on sign-to-object couplings, syntactic relations and pragmatic 
imperatives (like charity) have to win; the former because reference must be made to 
something other than our minds, the latter because the sign-to-sign axis cannot by 
itself provide any gauge by which to decide which self-consistent fabric we should 
adopt. The dialectic dice had thus been weighed against receptive atomism all along 
(as was ominously presaged by Quine's preliminary formulations). However, if we 
are to seriously heed McDowell's caU for the elaboration of a viable way out of his 
oscillation, then speculative settings like radical translation are no ally to the 
enterprise. 
In the thesis that translation is indeterminate, which is meant to elaborate the 
moral of "Two Dogmas", [Quine's] aim is to stress "the extent of man's 
conceptual sovereignty" in the formation of world-views: that is-to put in a 
way that brings Quine into explicit contact with Kant-the extent to which the 
content of world-views is a product of spontaneity operating freely, uncontrolled 
by the deliverances ofreceptivity. (McDowell, [1994] 2002 p. 132; italics ours) 
Granted, a naive construal of the role of experience in representation benefits 
from a thorough elucidation of the various conceptual elements which inherently 
accompany receptivity. It is precisely because receptivity is often an insufficient 
contributor to knowledge that philosophers as far back as Plato have rightly felt the 
need to posit the interplay of faculties that answer to modalities far different from 
perception. The point is that from an aetiological perspective, such additions can 
never be permitted to undermine the natural landscape which might have 
legitimately suggested their need. In other words, philosophie inquiry is not allowed 
to endanger the experiential episodes of receptivity in eontrast with whieh the very 
notion of "spontaneity" finds its meaning. Whatever insights have been generated 
by the wholists' speculative probings of seemingly straightforward attributions of 
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referential content-and there are indeed many such insights-surely it is plausible 
to assume that a third way must have something to learn from the option of receptive 
atornism as weIl. 
The sceptic posture and the speculation which sustains it conflicts with 
McDowell's project in ways far beyond this petitio neglect of receptivity. A mode 
of inquiry which takes as its starting point the daim that our representations can be 
efficacious and then subrnits this daim to doubt to see if it can withstand ad hoc 
criticism should in principle be totally foreign to McDowell's inquiry. Charles 
Taylor, in recapping of the rationale which leads to the wholist option, provides us 
with a rare and lucid glimpse into the motive force which fuels scepticism: 
What if someone does not "see" the adequacy of our interpretation, does not 
accept our reading? We try to show him how it makes sense of the original non­
or partial sense. But for him to follow us he must read the original language as 
we do, he must recognize these expressions as puzzling in a certain way, and 
hence be looking for a solution to our problem. If he does not, what can we do? 
The answer, it wouId seem, can only be more of the same. We have to show him 
through the reading of other expressions why this expression must be read in the 
way we propose. But success here requires that he follow us in these other 
readings, and so on, it would seem, potentially forever. We cannot escape an 
ultimate appeal to a common understanding of the expressions, of the "language" 
involved. [...JThe cirde can also be put in terms of part-whole relations: we are 
trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings 
of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with 
making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the 
readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the 
whole. 
Put in forensic terms [...J, we can only convince an interlocutor if at sorne 
point he shares our understanding of the language concerned. If he does not, 
there is no further step to take in rational argument; we can try to awaken these 
intuitions in him or we can simply give up; argument will advance no further. 
But of course the forensic predicament can be transferred into my own judging: 
if l am this ill equipped to convince a stubborn interlocutor, how can l convince 
myself? how can l be sure? Maybe my intuitions are wrong or distorted, maybe l 
am locked into a circle of illusion. (1971, p. 6) 
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This passage gives voice to the speculative keystone at the heart of the entire 
wholistic edifice. Indeed, if aIl thought is dialogic in form, then arguments for the 
indeterminacy of translation can be said to conceal an incredulous interlocutor of 
sorts who, at every tum of the narrative, marshals a slew of fresh new objections. 
Here is the co-conspirator hinted at earlier; the enthymematic premise which sees 
hairline fissures of doubt everywhere by constantly assuming (without basis) that 
perhaps yet another factor muddles our attempts to pin down what others mean by 
their utterances. He is manifest, for example, in Davidson's aforementioned 
comment to the effect that the burden of proof rests on those speakers who "assume" 
they share a language. In fact, the above disclosure by Taylor even takes Davidson's 
inference to its logical conclusion: not only should speakers of a same language 
doubt whether they are really in touch with each other, but a same speaker should 
doubt whether she is really in touch with reality at aIl (!). 
The leitrnotif in aIl these cases is the same: what can be daubted in the least is 
daubted ta the utmast. We submit that to embrace such a standard is to engage in a 
Cartesian meditation, regardless of whether the place-holders are given less 
conspicuous contemporary terms. 
1.3 Finding the right balance: towards a full-headed worldliness 
1.3.1 Anchoring inquiry in real doubt 
Our investigation into the speculative origin of McDowell's problem has yielded 
hard-earned intellectuai capital we can now put to good use. As we saw, if we allow 
speculation to sustain sceptical criticism, in other words, if we give voice and/or 
audience to the stubborn interlocutor, then the "option" of an atomic contact with the 
world is for aIl intents and purposes ruled out from the outset by the terms of the 
investigation. To be sure, receptivity-based theories may rhetorically be called upon 
in wholist narratives to serve as foils, but such theories are nonetheless excluded 
from exerting a genuine force by the very speculative conditions of the inquiry. In 
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the absence of any competition, the way is cleared for wholism to hold a sort of 
hegemonic monopoly. Yet if this is so, there can be no genuine oscillation between 
the poles of atomism and wholism; syntactic relations guided by a pragmatic concern 
for the integrity of the whole are aIl there ever was to begin with. 
However, if we uphold the policy of not allowing speculation to create ad hoc 
fissures of doubt, the option of wholism loses a great deal of its initial plausibility. 
By that same token, there appears to be no prima facie reason why we should rule 
out the possibility of efficacious punctate appeals to the world. In short, acceptance 
of our first policy towards the interlocutor teaches us to not beg the question in 
favour of wholism by pre-empting the possibility of atomistic justification. 
Curiously, by not letting our philosophic imagination run wild, the problem recovers 
its vitality and renews hope for a tenable way out. 
Clearly then, when one is consistent in refusing to give the stubborn interlocutor 
a voice, hypotheses are not aIl born equal-some premises are just not subject to 
doubt. If we are to be consistent in our goal to eradicate speculation so as to pre­
empt scepticism, we must also forgo the possibility of an aetiologic inquiry triggered 
by likewise musings. In other words, the price to pay for stifling the stubborn 
interlocutor is that philosophy can no longer begin in wonder (i.e., Rodin's Thinker), 
but must rather follow a three-fold sequence of 'real doubt, conjecture, and 
refutation' . 
According to a twofold (Popperian) epistemology of 'conjectures and 
refutations', progress is best achieved when these respective movements are held to 
sharply diverging standards of laxity and rigour; that is, when the generation of 
hypotheses is completely unimpeded and the criticism levelled at them totally 
merciless. But under such a policy, we believe the domain of speculative possibility 
will always overrule that of intuitive plausibility. Granted, the contentions brought 
forth by speculation are likely of unequal merit and could for the most part be easily 
defeated. What matters here is that the domain of speculative rambling, if left 
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unconstrained, is properly infinite. Yet since the refuting party of dialogic thought is 
limited in not being able to engage in a likewise flood of unmotivated speculation, 
the conjecturing party has an inestimable advantage. To dog a computer, better to 
ask it an infinity of small tasks then one very difficult one (which is why 
thoroughgoing speculative enterprises never make it past their sceptical 
propaedeutics). Virus-elimination at the output level is thus more than useless 
without virus prevention at the input (we say "more than", because an expenditure of 
resources is involved). We can therefore see how the epistemological respect for the 
mundane called for in our aetiological stance goes much deeper than an appeal to 
"folk-theory": once we grasp the symbiosis which logically binds speculation and 
scepticism, we realize that unconstrained conjectures are scepticism. 
No doubt recognizing that a method of (infinite) trials and (finite) errors would 
cripple inquiry to a standstill should it be consistently applied, Popper attempted to 
constrain the domain of hypothesis-or rather, the flow of hypotheses from that 
domain-via a "rational theory of tradition". Of course, it makes perlect sense to 
recognize that a traditional construct presents a better case than one with no track 
record of its own. Like explicit scientific theories, traditions can indeed « bring 
sorne order into the chaos in which we live so as to make it rationally predictable » 
(Popper, [1963] 2002, p. 175). Yet an epistemology cannot daim to recognize the 
import of epistemic patrimony in inquiry while applauding the service rendered by 
the stubborn interlocutor-in effect the Popperian's ideal scientist-as he 
endeavours to subvert that patrimony by pure speculation. What's more, if 
submission of hypotheses is to be completely unobstructed, then where should 
attempt at refutation begin? An infinite domain is a pretty big place; to recognize 
the prima facie merit of a nearby construct without testing it is to appeal to induction 
(i.e., "it worked in the past, ergo, it is more likely than others to work in the 
future")-a type of inference which the falsificationist system was designed to 
supplant. 
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It may very well happen that what is gleaned upon completion of a well­
conducted inquiry into causes shatters many strongly held assumptions. But such 
results, if and when they occur, must not only be reached through adversity-as 
Popper advocates-they must also have been pushed (not pulled) into the gauntlet of 
criticism because of real (i.e., non-speculative) adversity. As the old adage goes; 
"Cross the bridge when you get there". The proper reply to departures from the 
mundane is not to veto any result which happens to stray from dogmatically 
projected conclusions; such would make the exercise mere rationalization and 
question-begging. On the contrary, if what we saw atop the ladder was always what 
we saw at its bottom, then, all resources being equal, there wouldn't be much point 
in climbing. In fact, it is in virtue of that same principle that unlikely insights yield 
the greatest entropy. Popper is thus quite correct when he points out that the greater 
a theory's probability of corroboration, the lesser its explanatory power-and vice 
versa ([1934] 2006, §§ 82 and 83). But, under such a schema, what is the 
explanatory power of something explained? Curiously, none. Yet if explanation is 
fundamentaUy a process fram the known to the unknown, what are we to make of a 
"movement" from the unknown to the unknown? 
Granted, what we know now might avail itself untenable as inquiry expands its 
scope. But an epistemology of conjecturalliberalism and perpetuaI distrust overdoes 
this truism by advocating the notion of a "successful hypothesis", which is a 
contradiction in terms. Of course, one couId omit the prefix "hypo" when describing 
successful theses, but in such a case one would be forced to replace the hyponymy of 
"tentative and less-tentative" by the more accurate antonymy of "falsehood versus 
truth". In contrast, by the speculative standard, aU legitimate items of knowledge 
must present at least one fissure, without which they are dogma (cf Popper, [1963] 
2002). Yet this is the hallmark of the sceptical attitude we wish to eschew. For once 
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speculation is allowed to open the door of doubt (no matter how slightly) there is no 
principIed ground left on which to stand to refute the sceptic; nay, to refute the very 
task of refutation. 
1.3.2 A revision / dismissal of the traditional program 
According to the mundane-cum-aetiological view we advocate, philosophy should 
busy itself with legitimate mundane "how" problems instead of open-ended 
speculative "what if' questions. By ruling out speculative genesis and anchoring 
itself in real doubt, such a "naturalized" (we would prefer simply "well-conducted") 
epistemology dramatically alters the playing field and departs from many hitherto 
important issues and "problems". Someone like Barry Stroud (1981) is both conect 
and inconect when he affmns that a naturalized approach does not so much answer 
traditional sceptical questions as it changes the tapie. According to a widespread 
gloss, traditional epistemology is an ill-posed and ill-conducted forebear: «Thus the 
death-of-epistemology theorist holds that there is no barrier in principle to 
epistemology's going the way of, say, demonology or judicial astrology » (Dancy 
and Sosa, 1999, p. 88). Stroud's statement is therefore COITect for those whose 
dialogic thought involves a stubbom interlocutor; and inconect for those whose 
thought does not (in voice and/or audience). If ever there was a valid case for 
pleading "paradigmatic incornrnensurability", surely this is it. 
But by employing dactrina instead of scientia, naturalized philosophy can carve 
out a unique niche for itself in the intellectual market. In fact, it may yet be able to 
catch an object notorious for escaping the grasp of science: meaning. For it seems a 
complete account of meaning perforce involves attributing humans with a faculty of 
spontaneity that allows them to dabble in the fabric of their representations in a way 
relatively autonomous to the make-up of the world. As McDowell writes: « [P]art of 
the point of the idea that the understanding is a faculty of spontaneity-that 
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conceptual capacities are capacities whose exercise is in the domain of responsible 
freedom-is that the network, as an individual thinker finds it goveming her 
thinldng, is not sacrosanct » ([1994] 2002, p. 12) 
We have already seen how unconstrained speculation weighs the dice in favour 
of a receptivity-free wholism. Yet science also has much to learn from philosophy. 
Drastic reductionism begs the question against spontaneity by assuming from the 
outset that law-like behaviour is the hallmark of the real. As a result, just as 
receptivity' s voice is ultimately lost in the cacophony of speculation, so 
spontaneity' s case goes unheard when the ontological spectrum is made too narrow. 
Discourse on a given topic can be rather straightforward, as is the case with natural­
scientific discourse about geological fissures. But when trying to understand 
understanding or represent representation, new difficulties arise, as the inquiry 
becomes akin to putting the universe in a bag and closing it from the inside. To the 
extent that natural scientific discourse is methodologically less problematic, it also 
lacks a certain richness of insight which humans naturally crave. As a result, it 
seems fair to say that natural science has a hard time countenancing the possibility 
that freedom may guide the organic integration of received empirical contents in a 
non-deterrninist way. But countenance we must, for wholistic philosophers are right 
on this point: the rnind can engage in reworkings of its materials-reworkings the 
logic of which will likely escape the grasp of an idiom tailor-made to account for 
geological fissures. McDowell is thus largely correct in his general assessment that 
we need to distance ourselves from the "bald" scientism bequeathed by modemity if 
we are to gain a thorough and rigorous understanding of the freedom inherent in our 
construction of meaning. 
Explicitly echoing Kant's credo vis-à-vis the interdependency of thought and 
intuition, McDowell thus rightfully insists that « intentions without overt activity are 
idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not 
expressions of agency » ([1994] 2002, p. 89). As a result, he pushes for a 
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fundamental "re-enchantment" of our world-view which glves science its 
explanatory due aIl the while admitting our (non-nomological) faculty of spontaneity 
as a fully legitimate denizen of nature: 
In a common mediaeval outlook, what we now see as the subject matter of 
natural science was conceived as filled with meaning, as if aIl of nature were a 
book of lessons for us; and it is a mark of intellectuai progress that educated 
people cannot now take that idea seriously, except perhaps in sorne symbolic 
role. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 71) 
If we acquiesce in the disenchantment of nature, if we let meaning be expelled 
from what 1 have been calling "the merely natural", we shall certainly need to 
work at bringing meaning back into the picture when we come to consider 
human interactions. (Ibid., p. 72) 
As 1 have acknowledged, this can seem to express a nostalgia for a pre-scientific 
world-view, a call for a re-enchantment of nature. And certainly it requires that 
we resist the characteristically modem conception according to which 
something's way ofbeing natural is its position in the realm oflaw. (Ibid., p. 74) 
McDowell is thus convinced that if we are to successfully dismount the seesaw, we 
must first eliminate the gap separating mind from world. An awkward way to 
describe the position he his driving at would be to label it a "monism of mind and 
word" (note that it is patently not a "neutral" variant, a fact which will have great 
importance later in the second chapter, especially sect. 2.5.3). 
1.3.3 Philosophy and science's divergent propensities 
In contrast with science, philosophical discourse is more at ease dealing with our 
faculty of spontaneity. The flip side, however, is that philosophers seem to have 
serious problems coping witb the idea of receptivity. For to understand the 
peculiarity of atomic receptivity means accepting that if is limited; i.e., that whatever 
information experience deliverers is final and cannot be subjected to an endless 
hermeneutic (on pain of no longer being what it is). A paradigm case of this 
tendency to relapse into speculation is Russell's notion of "knowledge by 
acquaintance", which offers no principled way to haIt the atomistic reduction of 
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analysis: « [1]t is perfectly possible to suppose that complex things are capable of 
analysis ad infinitum, and that you never reach the simple» (Russell, [1918, 1924] 
1998, p. 64)-a thesis David Pears aptly calls the "No Terminus Them'Y" (Ibid., p. 
6). If ever one did reach a point where one could lay claim to an irreducible contact 
between mind and world, Russell argues, the find would properly be ineffable. 
Whatever information it would convey would be so brute and immanent that one 
would not have any inkling what that atom pertained too-save, of course, by 
contaminating it with "descriptive" imports. As Russell remarks, « The only words 
one does use as names in the logical sense are words like Othis' or 'that'. [...] But if 
you try to apprehend the proposition that 1 am expressing when 1 say 'This is white', 
you cannot do it. [...] It is only when you use 'this' quite strictly, to stand for an 
actual object of sense, that it is really a proper name» ([1918,1924] 1998, p. 62). 
To execute such a Russellian Othis' without grafting it to an informational 
content like Othis is such and such' is to exhibit a skill of little cognitive merit and 
epistemological usefulness, insofar as such pointings never fail (cf. Kripke, [1972] 
2001, to witness this feature of indexicality pushed to its absurd "come-what-world­
may" conclusion). In any event, we believe radically atomistic theories like the one 
we have just sketched are as speculative as their wholistic competitors. Since the 
entities which populate the world ostensibly come equipped with their own gestalt­
like buffer, reduction into 'colour patch time-slices' and their ilk is clearly the work 
of the stubbom interlocutor. In that sense, whether the stubborn interlocutor persists 
in calling attention to the bark or the forest, superscrutability reveals itself to be as 
philosophically unnatural as inscrutability. 
Unable to rid itself of the stubbom interlocutor' s speculative verbosity, 
philosophy's most sincere attempts to make sense of our Kantian faculty of 
receptivity thus tend to fall back into familiar modernist territory. Just as radical 
translation constantly brought into the picture extraneous factors and variables, 
radical atomism constantly breaks down what is presented in experience. Since in 
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both cases the interventions are without warrant, the goal of successful apprehension 
is perpetually postponed. Science may be "bald", but philosophy is a bit too lush 
and enchanted for its own sake. 
It is harder to adhere to a noble desire to "not refute the sceptic" when the 
scepticism in question does not push for any specific program and reveals itself only 
after having appealed to a more sober world-view. Indeed, the sceptic posture is 
usually thought to intervene most poignantly at the very beginning of speculative 
inquiries, insisting on the need for an in-depth propaedeutic establishing the 
absolutely certain grounds whence inquiry proper can proceed. But, as many such 
attempts never make it past this anteroom, more scientifically-sounding sceptical 
inquiries provisionally take a certain number of claims for granted, preferring instead 
to submit these to speculative doubt at a later stage. Thinkers like Quine and 
Davidson thus differ from Descartes in two ways. First, they diverge in not 
declaring their thoroughgoing incredulity upfront. Second, they leave to others 
(preferably scientifically-minded persons) the task of supplying the "paradigms" 
which are to be wholistically built on the rubble of their anti-foundationalist critique. 
This last take on scepticism has the rhetorical virtue of seeming less artificial 
than the first. The "native", the "field linguist", an established "linguistic science" 
(in fact, an entire stable world-view): these are the familiar terms with which the 
radical translation dialectic begins. We begin midway, we are told; thus apparently 
sharing with the aetiological posture a healthy reliance on a patrimony which has 
proven its worth. But sooner or later, when speculation deems the time has come, 
those claims provisionally accepted receive their full sceptical due; i.e., if they can 
be subjected to doubt in the least, they are doubted altogether. And so, at the close 
of the sceptical argument, we see that our reliance on a seemingly stable world-view 
was a paradoxical act of faith, and there is no principled reason beyond 
impracticality (pace Quine and Davidson) or faith (pace Descartes) why we should 
hold onto these. 
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Another factor which might lend credence to the stubborn interlocutor's ad hoc 
grievances against receptivity is our common-sense grasp that human representations 
are indeed malleable. But one must be on guard against this; Quine and Davidson 
are not merely rehashing platitudes. Rather, one must take wholism seriously when 
it asserts that any representation can be altered, so long as the change is kept 
grammatical within the whole (including most emphatically the rules by which such 
grammaticality is ascertained). Once this is done, the ex nihilo and in media res 
approaches to scepticism reveal themselves as species of a common genus: whether 
certainty is discarded at the beginning, middle, or end of argument, doubt is non­
negotiable and nothing else is beyond priee. 
Granting validity to the enthymematic interlocutor's queries, however, goes 
against McDowell's laudable conception of philosophic inquiry. As he writes: 
There is a tendency to conclude that even a non-misleading experienee cannot 
genuinely be a case ofopenness to reality. [...] 
But this misses the point. An objection on these lines would be appropriate if 
l were aiming to answer traditional sceptical questions, to address the 
predicament of traditional philosophy. [...] But my talk of openness is a 
rejection of the traditional predicament, not an attempt to respond to il. 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 111-112; italics ours) 
[T]he sceptical questions lack a kind of urgency that is essential to their 
troubling us, an urgency that derives from their seeming to point up an unnerving 
fact: that however good a subject' s cognitive position is, it cannot constitute her 
having a state of affairs directly manifest to her. There is no such fact. (Ibid., p. 
113) 
Yet however intellectually sincere McDowell is in wanting to adopt his principled 
stance against scepticism, he does not secure his inquiry as firmly as we would have 
hoped. By our lights, his wilful "ignorance" of the sceptic is not radical enough: not 
only should philosophy henceforth forgo that futile task, it should retroactively 
expurgate those sceptical premises which have unduly managed to infiltrate its 
discourse, regardle5s of whether they are deployed in a plausible setting or a 
vacuum. 
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1.3.4 Towards a reconciliation via the eviction of speculation 
We must credit McDowell for insisting that neither the scientific predilection for 
receptivity nor the philosophie penchant for spontaneity provides an adequate picture 
of the interface of rnind and world. But what McDowell's revisionism tends to 
forget is that modemity has given us a twin heritage. The abandonrnent by modern 
science of philosophical matters was effected at the price of setting aside sorne of the 
topics of inquiry hitherto most revered. By impatiently departing the anteroom of 
speculation without the philosopher' s blessing, science effectively had to commit 
itself to a self-imposed ban on a small set of problematic objects of study, most of 
them related in sorne way to the rnind. 
Granted, if we revisit our assumptions about what it means for something to be 
real we may yet accord our faculty of spontaneity the rightful place in nature it has 
long been denied. But to do so also requires that we review the other party' s role in 
the schism. For while the scientific rnind' s disregard of the medieval "book of 
lessons" is today widespread, it nevertheless took centuries before the yearning for 
deep philosophie meaning could be suppressed (Newton, that paragon of "hard" 
science, spent most of his free time pursuing more occult studies). If science felt the 
need to leave philosophy, we may be assured that it had good cause to do so. As it 
turns out, a considerable portion of the blame rests on philosophy's shoulders. The 
culprit, in short, is its stubborn interlocutor. 
McDowell is keen ta the prospect that adopting a "re-enchanted" conception of 
nature would broaden the ontological spectrum of the admissible so as to include 
spontaneity. Yet doing so also entails an epistemological constriction of discourse 
so that Descartes' cunning deceiver can wreak no havoc. The same broad construal 
which admits the mind as an integral part of nature makes human beings invested 
members of their environment who could never even dream of such a fate as 
relativism or scepticism. Therefore, if we are ever to successfully rid ourselves of 
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the negative influences handed down to us by the modern schism between science 
and philosophy, we believe it is not so much philosophy we should "scientize" (pace 
scientifically-minded philosophers) nor science we should "philosophize" (pace 
McDowell) but rather the interlocutor we must evict. 
Popper ([1963] 2002) has famously suggested falsifiability as a criteria by which 
to demarcate science from pseudo-science. To impose a likewise standard on 
philosophy would no doubt be to commit a gross error, inasmuch as this would mIe 
out any topic where our faculty of spontaneity might be in play. Yet we will be 
committing an equally grave error if we "philosophize" science and fallaciously infer 
that since our object of study involves spontaneity we have carte blanche as to how 
we conduct our meta-discursive investigation. The lot of inquiries into meaning and 
mind will be weIl served-and their transcendental predicament alleviated-if we 
can muster enough normative self-confidence to make the unwarranted raising of 
doubt on the sole basis of imagination a criterion demarcating philosophy and 
pseudo-philosophy. 
Unfortunately, McDowell the philosopher manifests a certain morbid fascination 
with speculative arguments. We have already seen how wholism rests on a critique 
of receptivity that could never have achieved any plausibility on non-speculative 
grounds. Sadly, instead of dismissing these contrived arguments as unworthy of 
serious consideration, McDowell finds wholistic theories to be philosophically 
"disastrous" ([1994] 2002, p. 144). Convinced that « Davidson manages to be 
cornfortable with his coherentism [... ] only because he does not see that emptiness is 
the threat » (Ibid., p. 68), McDowell sees it as his foremost task to convince the 
patient that she needs the cure he has developed. Ironically, his remedy consists in 
showing that the speculative malady should never really have been there to begin 
with: 
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We ought to have no problem about how an exercise of "conceptual sovereignty" 
can bear on the empirical world-can constitute taking a stand on how things 
are, a posture correctly or incorrectly adopted according to the way the world is 
arranged-if "conceptual sovereignty" is rationally answerable to how the world 
impresses itself on the subject in experience. (Ibid., p. 141-142) 
It is hard for us to make any sense out of this proposal-to reconcile the notion of 
"sovereignty" with "answerability". In any event, McDowell's semantic concoction 
suffices to help him cope with the lack of friction entailed in the coherentist credo: 
From this angle, we can see that there is more than an excess of simplicity in 
Davidson's formulation "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief'. 1 suggested this emendation: nothing can count as a 
reason for holding a belief except something else that is also in the space of 
concepts. In fact the emended wording is fine by my lights. (Ibid., p. 143) 
One can wonder whether a timid rewording is up to the considerable task of 
satisfying our « craving for rational constraint from outside the realm of thought and 
judgement» (Ibid., p. 18). In our opinion, McDowell's "emendation" of Davidson's 
position is like fighting speculation with speculation (Christopher Hookway and 
Aryeh Frankfurter had good cause to suggest to McDowell that he is closer to the 
Davidsonian brand of "anti-relativism" than he might realize or Care to admit; cf 
McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 138). If nothing else, the portrayal of frictionless 
wholistic theories as "disastrous" is inconsistent with McDowell's professed refusaI 
to grant the sceptic's worries any urgency. It is hard to believe that with such a 
policy in place one could ever find any genuine suggestion that the mind somehow 
holds a fully sovereign dominion over the content and structure of its 
representations. Perhaps in the course of an investigation into causes one could be 
called upon to allocate the mind sorne form of leeway analogous to that espoused (in 
the extreme) by wholism. Yet, if and when this wouId occur, it would not be to 
palliate speculative doubts, nor would it obliterate the faculties which it is called 
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upon to explain. Undermining the strong premise of experiential input on the basis 
of a speculative narrative is a manoeuvre impossible on the aetiologic posture we 
advocate. 
Behold, then, a dilemma: if we are right in our characterization of radical 
translation as inherently scepticai and correct in answering McDowell's calI to not 
refute the sceptic retroactiveiy as weIl as prospectively, does this not mean that the 
wholistic alternative which that narrative spawns should never have been a viable 
option to begin with? 
Despite sorne well-intentioned moments of mundane sobriety, McDowell 
ultimately gives in to the stubborn interlocutor's daim that since the relational 
dispositions of a given representation couid potentially link it to the whole system of 
which it is part, they do link it: 
No doubt there is no serious prospect that we might need to reshape the concepts 
at the outermost edges of the system, the most immediately observational 
concepts, in response to pressures from inside the system. But that no-doubt 
unreal prospect brings out the point that matters for my present purpose. This is 
that although experience itself is not a good fit for the idea of spontaneity, even 
the most immediately observational concepts are partly constituted by their role 
in something that is indeed appropriately conceived in terms of spontaneity. 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 13) 
How can a "no-doubt unreal prospect" becorne threatening, save on the speculative 
proviso that the imagination' s ability to project a situation somehow lends that 
situation a certain epistemic weight which one is subsequently unable to fully 
dissipate? Such a stance is hardly reconcilable with the thesis that « thought can be 
distanced from the world by being false, but there is no distance from the world 
implicit in the very idea of thought » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 27); or again that « 
when we acknowledge the possibility of being misled, we do not deprive ourselves 
of "taking in how things are" as a description of what happens when one is not 
misled » (Ibid., p. 26). 
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It seems to us that McDowell cannot have his mediaeval cake and eat it too. If 
he is to be true to his call for re-enchantment, he cannot in typical modernist fashion 
appeal to an "unreal prospect" so as to "bring out" that our "most immediately 
observational concepts" may in fact be answerable to no observation at aIl. As 
Daniel Dennett writes, 
[W]hile striking the Naturalistic Pose is as agreeable and welcome as it is easy, 
actually doing naturalized philosophy has proved difficult-indeed a very un­
natural act for a philosopher to perform-and contemporary philosophy of 
meaning, even where it is most brilliant, has been inconstant in its commitment 
to naturalism. [...] [Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, Putnam, and 
Fodor] can be seen to be failed naturalists, unwitting "Meaning Rationalists" 
who have never quite managed to wean themselves from their Cartesian heritage. 
(foreword to Millikan, 1984, p. ix) 
Although we have considerable reservations with the label "Meaning Rationalist" 
(cf sect. 4.3.4), we do believe John McDowell qualifies as a "failed naturalist". 
This is especially unfortunate as we think he has at his disposaI all the necessary 
materials to assemble a truly mundane stance. But just as McDowell's commitment 
to eschew refutation of the sceptic is not drastic enough for him to retroactively 
weed out Quine and Davidson's incredulity vis-à-vis reference, so his commitment 
to a re-enchantment of nature avails itself not consistent enough for him to 
completely sever relations with the modern thesis that the space of reasons can 
somehow show the book of nature to be illusory. Had McDowell done so, not only 
would he have discovered that a theory like wholism is uncalled for, but that, in an 
enchanted world, the Given is the furthest thing from a myth. 
1.4 Closing ourselves to our openness: a case study in wheat and chaff 
1.4.1 Bypassing intentionality 
It could be argued at this point that we have been painting a rather lopsided portrait 
of McDowcll's philosophy. Our attempt to bring out various sceptical elements 
which we believe obscure the path for tenable third way has largely neglected the 
48 
fact that, if anything, McDowell' s project is not of Cartesian but of Wittgensteinian 
descent. Granted, that bloodline loses sorne of its supposed purity by the fact that 
McDowell's own therapeutic style departs from its forebear, in paying detailed 
attention to the arguments woven by such figures as Quine, Davidson and Sellars (cf 
Thornton, 2004, p. 20-21). Nevertheless, there is much in McDowell's corpus 
which seems to tug in a direction opposite to the scepticism we have been 
emphasizing. What we want to do now is give those laudable elements their 
expository due-and this in the most advantageous light possible. Such a gloss will 
only serve our contentions, inasmuch as the better (i.e., non-sceptical) elements of 
McDowell's thought are in the end rendered impotent by his mixed sympathies. 
McDowell is distinguished in Wittgensteinian scholarship by his bid to reorient 
theorizing away from what he calls the "criterial" (or "criteriological") view of 
intentional ascription. Born of the handy mantra that «An 'inner process' stands in 
need of outward criteria» (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2001, § 580), this view holds that 
agents ascribe intentional states on the basis of criterion-based inferences. However, 
McDowell argues that such an interpretation pours Wittgenstein's reflections into a 
quite farniliar modern mould: 
The predicament is as follows. Judgements about other minds are, as a class, 
epistemologically problematic. Judgements about "behaviour" and "bodily" 
characteristics are, as a class, not epistemologically problematic; or at any rate, if 
they are, it is because of a different epistemological problem, which can be taken 
for these purposes to have been separately dealt with. The challenge is to 
explain how our unproblematic intake of "behavioural" and "bodily" information 
can adequately warrant our problematic judgements about other minds. ([1982] 
1998,p.382) 
On a purely exegetical front, McDowell has defended the view that, in 
illustrating various cases where criteria are applied, Wittgenstein was not providing 
a mass of evidence whence to generalize sorne transcendent method of criteria 
application-much less a ubiquitous criterion (McDowell, [1982] 1998, p. 376-380). 
Rather, says McDowell, Wittgenstein was attempting to show how different criteria 
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are used in different settings. According to this interpretation, it was patently not a 
concern of Wittgenstein's to bridge non-problematic bodies of data like observable 
behaviour with more problematic ones like intentional states, but rather to argue by 
implication that no such bridging is needed to begin with. McDowell daims this 
much has been missed or at least downplayed by contemporary advocates of the 
criterial reading like Crispin Wright (1980) and Saul Kripke (1982) because, on the 
one hand, they are not fully receptive to the oblique statement of Wittgenstein's 
"quietist" method and because, on the other hand, their steadfast resolve that the 
only valid criteria would have to be empirical in nature (and concomitant lack of 
imagination) forbade them ta seriously consider alternative modes of apprehension 
(cf McDowell, (1984] 1998; as weIl as (1994] 2002, p. 92-93,175-180). Convinced 
that multifarious epistemological criteria should be marshalled to suit equally plural 
cases, McDowell is thus devoted to the task of debunking the widespread 
assumption that different ontological 1evels admit different degrees of inferential 
access; the orthodox declension holding that contents are nested in beliefs which are 
in tum nested in outward behaviour-the passage from one level to the next 
supposedly entailing a necessary loss of epistemological certainty. 
McDowell's grievance with the criterial view goes much deeper than an 
exegetical dispute. His epistemological objection to this view is grounded in an 
argument from priority. Much like Jerry Fodor ([1975] 2002) insists that the 
systematicity of thought could not possibly be drawn from naturallanguages because 
the acquisition of these very languages is dependent on a prior systematicity, 
McDowell argues that an agent being trained into a language-game of intentional 
ascriptions could not possibly induce a given criterion from context-sensitive 
mentions without first using that criterion. As he writes: 
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[W]e should not jib at, or interpret away, the common-sense thought that, on 
those occasions that are paradigmatically suitable for training in the assertoric 
use of the relevant part of a language, one can literally perceive, in another 
person' s facial expression or his behaviour, that he is in pain, and not just infer 
that he is in pain from what one perceives. (McDowell, [1978] 1998, p. 305; cf 
[1982] 1998, p. 370) 
McDowell thus wants to make allowances for the transparent use of criteria, not 
only by agents possessing full (operational) mastery of a given criterion, but most 
importantly by those being inculcated into that mastery-a stance which obviously 
flies in the face of the indeterrninacy of translation thesis. 
To illustrate, suppose someone says that a sentence, in and of itself, participates 
in sorne sort of truth-value attribution only upon entering into a greater system of 
human agents and social norms-in other words, a language-game. This view 
would concord with the contemporary criterial gloss. In essence, it would take 
Wittgenstein's Investigations to be providing an answer to the standard modernist 
project of establishing an algorithm of sorts going "from sound to significance", that 
is, of « compendiously describ[ing] the extra contribution, over and above the 
sharable sensory intake, that [someone's] competence with the language makes to 
his cognitive position on any of the relevant occasions» (McDowell, [1980] 1998a, 
p. 32). However, the openness thesis propounded by McDowell asks us to keep 
firmly in mind what we are dealing with and where we are discursively standing 
when we deal with it. When we speak of a "sentence", we are not just speaking of a 
string of sounds or a set of nomological buccal movements, which would be best 
described in a physical or medical idiom. Rather, the moment we opt for the term 
sentence, we have already imbued the object of our concern with the significance in 
virtue of which a sentence is properly a sentence. If one were to place a piece of 
organic matter on a plate, it would not make much sense to puzzle over the fact that 
this tissue is able to sustain life: qua organic matter; it would already be framed as 
capable of this feat. Similarly, a givln linguistic item is linguistic; to mobilize 
amazement at this fact, one must contrive sorne sort of artificial doubt. Much like 
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how N. R. Hanson (1961, p. 4-19) called attention to the fact that the physical 
objects of scientific observation are theory-Iaden, we can say that McDowell heeds 
Wittgenstein' s insight that the humane objects of philosophic investigation are 
meaning-laden. 
In contrast, the criterial view loses sight of this and asks how this could be so. 
Yet in so doing, theories of the criteria! bend confess their dis trust of content as 
somehow inherently more mysterious than whatever sUITogate they deem adequate 
to act as a support for semantic value. However, according to McDowell, the project 
of a "full-blooded" theory capable of explicating meaning in a meaning-free idiom 
(cf Dummett, [1976] 2005) has about as much hope for success as that of an 
anthropology from a non-human perspective. Alluding to the basic schema which 
typically underpins such a project (cf Tarski, 1944), he writes: 
When we say '''Diamonds are hard' is true if and only if diamonds are hard", we 
are just as much involved on the right-hand side as the reflections on rule­
following tell us we are. There is a standing temptation to miss this obvious 
tru th, and to suppose that the right-hand side somehow presents us with a 
possible fact, pictured as a unconceptualized configuration of things in 
themselves. (McDowell, [1984] 1998, p. 255) 
Such an attempt to account for meaning thus engages in what McDowell calls the 
"sideways-on view". However, since no such transcendental fulcrum is available to 
us, philosophy should proceed instead from what he caUs a "heads-on view". As 
McDowell writes, 
[W]e can understand the protest differently: not as making the theorems into 
promissory notes for sorne pictured explanation of the contents in question, "as 
from outside", in a theory of thought, but as insisting that the theorems give 
those contents, not "as from outside", by uses of an intelligible language. Our 
attention is indeed drawn to the contents of the used sentences, rather than the 
mere words (which are possible objects of attention even for someone who does 
not understand the language they are in): but not as something "beneath" the 
words, to which we are to penetrate by stripping off the linguistic clothing; 
rather, as something present in the words-something capable of being heard or 
seen in the words by those who understand the language. ([1987] 1998, p. 98-99) 
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In short, the upshot of this construal of representation is that the ability to fix 
references is not dependent on the ability to ascribe intentions. McDowell 
encapsulates this independence when he writes: « It is not that [indicative 
sentences'] capacity for use as expressive of belief breathes into them the life that 
enables them to represent reality, but rather that their antecedent capacity to 
represent reality is what makes them capable of expressing beliefs » ([1980] 1998a, 
p.48). 
If contents make themselves manifest to hearers, McDowell argues, then it is 
only normal that speakers communicating within a common language should grasp 
the objects of their discussions without having to engage in complex transitive 
inferences going from behavioural observations to conjectures about possible 
doxastic states to whatever contents should in principle be nested therein. In terms 
foreign to McDowell's lexicon (cf Austin, 1962), we could say that he holds the 
locutionary contents of second-hand testimony to be accessible in abstracto of their 
illocutionary enunciations or perlocutionary effects. 
McDowell remarks that « [c]hildren start acquiring knowledge by being told 
things, long before they are capable of so much as raising questions about the 
sincerity and reliability of their informants. Thus the utterances that they hear on the 
relevant occasions impinge on them with content, so to speak, in advance of being 
taken as expressive of belief [... ] » ([1980] 1998a, p. 48). Surely McDowell is 
correct to point out how it is a form of sophisticated incredulity for philosophers to 
subsequently be puzzled at this fecundity and doubt that once that child grows up 
into a fully competent English-speaking adult, she can still see the referential 
contents of any given statement. In any event, it is clear that if one is committed to 
not following Davidson's stubborn interlocutor in sceptically upholding that 
indeterminacy of translation is domestic as well as foreign and that « [s]peakers of 
the same language can go on the assumption that for them the same expressions are 
to be interpreted in the same way, but this does not indicate what justifies the 
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assumption » ([1984] 2001, p. 125), one must acknowledge the broad principle that, 
when dealing with significant items, transparency is the default setting. For if one 
dismisses Davidson's speculative fears as philosophically unwarranted and grants 
that an agent (field linguist or otherwise) can indeed see her way into the content of a 
native's hitherto unheard utterance of "Gavagai!" in virtue of a shared membership 
to humanity, surely one must also grant that this applies to those who enjoy shared 
membership to a conunon language. 
1.4.2 Adding a standing policy of distrust 
As stated, we believe McDowell's apparent anti-scepticism is for all intents and 
purposes annulled by his other philosophie conunitments. While we agree in spirit 
with any attempt to undermine the largely unquestioned security of the concatenation 
of <behaviour, beliefs, contents> (with accompanying losses in certainty at each 
step), we think McDowell's reversaI of the accepted wisdom on intentional content 
is in no way compatible with his insistence-in Mind and World and 
elsewhere-that our finite human nature entails « a standing obligation to reflect 
about the credentials of the putatively rational linkages that govern [empirical 
thinking] » ([1994] 2002, p. 12); and that, consequently, « [t]here must be a standing 
willingness to refashion concepts and conceptions if that is what reflection 
recommends » (Ibid., p. 12-13; italics ours). We argue that the scepticism inherent 
in this normative policy runs counter to the epistemic optimism of the openness 
thesis. 
Whereas McDowell's standing obligation can appear benign on the surface, like 
sorne boy-scout creed to "Always stay alert", we must be on guard against 
trivializing its incorporation, for it has far-reaching consequences. The tension gains 
a deeper resonance when we consider it in light of McDowell's (failed) attempt at 
naturalism. McDowell' s declared anti-Cartesian motto is that « it is 
epistemologically disastrous-to suppose that fallibility in a capacity or procedure 
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impugns the epistemic status of any of its deliverances » ([1986] 1998, p. 232). 
McDowell has even gone as far as arguing that the transparent contents delivered in 
our open access to the world are patently not defeasible ([1982] 1998). 
The challenge his philosophy faces, then, is to show how this epistemological 
optimism can be made consonant with its insistence that we rational animaIs should 
perpetually reflect on the warrant of our beliefs because « [t]he best we can achieve 
is always to sorne extent provisional and inconclusive [...] » ([1994] 2002, p. 82). 
By our lights, the problem with such a stance is that it considers critical scrutiny to 
be epistemologically virtuous regardless of the particular circumstances in which it 
is applied. Questioning the grounds of our beliefs thus becomes a primitive not to 
be questioned. We will examine more fully the rationale behind this prescriptive 
tenet in the next chapter. What we want to focus on for the moment is the fact the 
policy advocated by McDowell endorses exactly the same basic premise as the one 
that drives the sceptic. 
It seems we are faced with a choice: either we discard or weaken McDowell's 
openness thesis and keep his standing obligation intact, or we keep his openness 
intact and discard or weaken his obligation. Obviously, that disjunction dissipates 
the moment we construe rational scrutiny as answerable, not to any inherent 
virtuousness, but to the genuine disruption of habit by the world. ln this perspective, 
one engages in verifications or revisions of one's concepts and conceptions only 
when those have failed to fruitfully guide one's conduct. ln keeping with the 
mundane-cum-aetiologic posture we have adopted, we believe the scrutiny alluded to 
in McDowell's standing obligation should be construed rather as an occasional 
measure triggered only upon substantial disruption of habit-not mere speculative 
acumen. According to this view, refashioning beliefs and other representations is at 
best an imposition, not an obligation. 
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1.4.3 Two very different reasons to trust 
Richard Bernstein has pointed out that, despite McDowell's extensive historical 
scholarship, he wouId have profited greatly from being « better acquainted with the 
American pragmatic tradition, especially the work of Charles Sanders Peirce» and 
that Peirce « anticipates, and is in agreement with, the letter and spirit of 
McDowell's daims» (2002, p. 18-19). While there is much in Peirce's systematic 
philosophy which does not garner our assent, we do concur with Bernstein's 
assessment to a certain extent. For although Bernstein (generously) suggests that « 
Peirce was also concerned to dismount from the oscillating seesaw between the 
Myth of the Given and unconstrained coherentism » (2002, p. 19), we believe that 
"seesaw" cannot gather any momentum if one is consistent in avoiding the kind of 
"self-deception" described by Peirce (we will remain silent on whether Peirce 
himself stays true to his repudiation). Indeed, whatever his failings, Peirce was 
correct to insist that philosophical inquiry must be guided by the recognition that 
scepticism is « a mere self-deception, and not real doubt » (1992, p. 29), and that 
while one may « find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he 
doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian 
maxim »(Ibid.). The alternative which sets the revision of our beliefs into motion, 
according to this view, is the forceful rupture of those expectancies we took, up until 
that point, to be a faithful representation of what is "thus and so". 
Unfortunately, of the many doctrines originated by Peirce, it is not to this more 
sober one which McDowell turned. He writes: «There is a tendency to stop short of 
accepting that the obligation [to criticize beliefs] is perpetuaI. One imagines the 
obligation' s ceasing to apply if one contemplates a state of affairs that would deserve 
to be called "the end of inquiry" » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 40). This last 
statement is quite revealing, as it offers us a glimpse into the landscape of 
possibilities considered in McDowell's investigations. What is telling is that 
contemplation of an "end of inquiry" is invoked matter-of-factly by McDowell as the 
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chief philosophical obstacle in the way of accepting that his critical obligation is 
perpetuaI. That, as it stands, is simply a non sequitur: why should an end-of-time 
state of collective omniscience be considered the prime alternative to accepting a 
perpetual obligation to question one's beliefs about the layout of the world? 
By focusing exclusively on this asymptotic reluctance to accept the perpetuity of 
his policy, McDowell shows us that another-far less remote-alternative was 
entirely outside the reach of his philosophic imagination, namely the fact that one 
can be content with a given item of knowledge here and now. Indeed, his polemic 
completely overlooks the mundane possibility that one can reject the idea of 
continual stringency based on the de facto success of one's representations in the 
context that makes them relevant, i.e., one's actual life in a finite worldly 
environment today (we will have the opportunity to develop this idea of an 
immanent basis for certainty later on; sect. 4.3.2). In keeping with the thesis that the 
world makes itself manifest to subjects in a way quite natural to them, perhaps it is 
only fitting that McDowell had a blind spot for so obvious a response. 
1.4.4 Attempting to reinstate a discarded benefit 
In light of the preceding, the question left dangling is why McDowell would want to 
introduce into his system a policy of perpetuaI doubt which, for aIl intents and 
purposes, saps aIl the philosophical benefits afforded by his "openness to the world" 
thesis? The answer is that McDowell foists the standing obligation as a balm to 
alleviate the "discomfort" generated by his advocacy of an "unbounded" conceptual 
domain. Upon rejecting the image of conceptual representations as a wholistic 
fabric terminating in an outer boundary of experiential impingements, he recognizes 
that his revised picture risks looking like a space « within which our exercises of 
spontaneity run without friction» ([1994] 2002, p. 39). In an attempt to forestall the 
objection that the picture he recommends embodies « an arrogant anthropocentrism » 
(Ibid.), McDowell calls in the standing obligation to normatively chaperon our 
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subjectivity from within by « [e]nsuring that our empirical concepts and conceptions 
pass muster » (Ibid., p. 40). Thus, in sharp contrast with the view we advocate, it is 
paramount to the success of McDowell's enterprise that the standing obligation not 
be triggered by any particular worldly friction, as its raison d'être is to supply that 
very friction. Mind and World may not make much of the fact, but it must be 
remembered that the friction which McDoweli seeks to reinstate was not so much 
lost as discarded. In any case, it should be noted that McDowell's addition of this 
policy is completely ad hoc: while a tacit ethic of humility is expected, there is 
nothing to vindicate it in principle (though there is obviously much to motivate it). 
Rather than dwell on the merits of McDowell's normative balm, let us go 
straight to the malady which it is called in to heal-or at least, curb-from the top 
down. For if an attempt is made by McDowell to capitalize on a (putatively shared) 
system of values, that attempt, in tum, stems from a properly epistemological 
concem. Indeed, only once McDowell's seesaw has recoiled away from atomism for 
purely technical reasons (towards the opposite dead-end of wholism) does the need 
for a more ethical / humanistic appeal begin to be felt. If we are to understand why 
McDowell chooses to nullify the advantages afforded by his openness thesis, it is 
therefore to the attack upon receptivity that we must tum. 
Of the three main critics of atornism considered by McDowell, it is Sellars who 
has the greatest hold on his thinking. Quine and Davidson's writings may compete 
with Sellars' talk of a "logical space of reasons" in supplying McDowell with 
wholistic imagery, but the third' s critique of the Given exerts a markedly greater 
influence on McDowell's reflections about the receptive side of Kant's twin 
faculties. Although the relativistic predicament which ensues from the rejection of 
receptivity is eventually deemed undesirable, McDowell's disrnissal of the viability 
of an atomic contact maintains an almost axiomatic status throughout his attempt at 
a dismount. In a tug of war between McDowell's mixed influences, the 
Wittgensteinian side may sometimes overrule Quinean / Davidsonian scepticism vis­
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à-vis the opacity ofutterances (cf. McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 18-23, 27-29),just as 
Aristotle may sometimes overrule Rorty (Ibid., p. 85-86). But in all the matches one 
finds in McDowell's corpus, Sellars' critique of the Given emerges an unscathed 
victor. In fact, McDowell's acquiescence to the argument put forth in Sellars' 
seminal "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" ([1956] 1963) is so strong that 
we even find the « faithful student » (McDowell's own words) fearing that the 
master himself may at times be « dangerously close to a lapse into the Myth of the 
Given » in his later work (cf. McDowell, 1998, p. 467). McDowell's philosophy 
may be dizzying in its eclecticism, but if it has one oven'iding concern, it is to avoid 
being found on the receiving end of that accusation. 
Above and beyond exegetical predominance, Sellars' argument is all the more 
formidable in that one need not be overtly sceptical or speculative to follow its 
reasoning. Whereas Quine and Davidson present their pleas for wholism in a 
pseudo-empirical setting concerned with trans-linguistic acquisition and the like, 
Sellars' own attack is more fundamental, touching at the very structure of 
representation. A reply to Sellars therefore cannot be purely meta-philosophical, as 
is the case when we choose to reject the stubborn interlocutor. We will present a 
substantial reply to Sellars' argument in the third chapter. For now, let us examine 
the rationale behind his celebrated critique of the "myth" of the Given. For without 
a firm grasp of the inner logic of this philosophical argument, it is doubtful one can 
fully appreciate the recoil away from receptivity which triggers McDowell's 
dialectic. 
1.5 Under the spell of Wilfrid Sellars: the mind's one-way door 
1.5.1 The broad scope of Sellars' investigation 
Much like Quine's "Two Dogmas" ([1953] 2001, p. 20-46) or Kuhn's Structure 
([1962] 1996)-two wholist manifestos once seen as alternatives to a declining 
atomistic "paradigm"-historiography has looked down rather benevolently upon 
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Sellars' critique of the receptive atom. Yet if the winds of the Zeitgeist sometimes 
hasten discursive propagation, they often do so at the priee of lessening the load of 
the vehicle, the result being that today it is not so much "Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind" itself which has currency in philosophical culture as its oft­
repeated slogan, the "Myth of the Given". Nevertheless, as deVries and Triplett 
(2000, p. xv) point out in highlighting the fact that "Empiricism" is of greater length 
than Descartes' Méditations or Wittgenstein's Tractatus, a very specifie argument 
underlies that tag line. 
As Sellars' "Empiricism" is a piece of fundamental philosophizing, it is of 
relevance to a host of issues. Most notable among these is the debate surrounding 
the role, if any, of sensory experienee in knowledge and c1aims about knowledge. 
Yet it would be a grave mistake to interpret Sellars' seminal reflections on the 
putatively "mythical" status of the Given as pertaining mainly to issues of 
perception, with discussions about language, science, and psychology as mere case 
studies or applications. Granted, as the essay' s title testifies, the doctrine of 
empiricism does provide Sellars with a relatively stable and well-known platform 
whence to lay out his argument. But his philosophical probings go much deeper and 
have a much broader scope, as signalled by the fact that he chooses to identify his 
target with the fairly nondescript label of "the Given". 
Sellars, work attempts to present its central tenet by means of successive 
sketches. As Sellars himself unequivocally states: «If [...] l begin my argument with 
an attack on sense-datum theories, it is only as a first step in a general critique of the 
entire framework of givenness » ([1956] 1963, § 1). Like a museum built over a 
church built over a dolmen, we find this basic "framework of givenness" reflected in 
a number of technical dualisms throughout the history of philosophy, among which 
we can name description and (Given) acquaintance, conception and (Given) 
intuition, scheme and (Given) content, theory and (Given) observation, 
understanding and (Given) sensibility-and, of course, spontaneity and (Given) 
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receptivity. These pairings were obviously posited in their own peculiar contexts 
and, as such, are very different from one another. Nevertheless, they do overlap in a 
way that points to a cornmon underlying object-one which ostensibly manifests a 
reality compelling enough for thinkers to have seized upon it time and time again 
with a fair degree of consistency across synchronic debates and diachronic traditions. 
Still, Sellars' own philosophic contribution does not consist in merely grouping the 
latter terms of the above couplings under yet another rubric. Rather, his attempt at 
describing the Given is subsidiary to a larger, much more complex logical argument 
vis-à-vis the relation which that supposedly "mythical" notion would have to 
entertain with its opposite party (i.e., the complementary class of things non-Given). 
1.5.2 The Given's essential features 
In their extensive and careful study of Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind", deVries and Triplett arrive at the following characterization of the Given: « 
The general framework of givenness consists of the assumption that there are 
epistemic primitives-beliefs or other mental states that have some positive 
epistemic status but that are noninferential, conceptually simple, and 
epistemologically independent and efficacious » (2000, p. 7; italics in original). By 
and large, this formulation seems to us quite accurate. Nevertheless, we believe it 
can be made even more precise by a few choice emendations. In keeping with our 
desire not to beg the question against the option of atornic receptivity, our guiding 
concern is to not confuse a description of the Given with Sellars' own philosophical 
critique of the Given. In an effort to establish a set of neutral notions whence the 
debate proper can proceed, we therefore propose to employa more overtly technical 
nomenclature, preferring for example the neutral terrn atomic to "conceptually 
simple" or "epistemologically independent" (indeed, the question whether the Given 
can even be a "belief' or "mental state"-and an "efficacious" one at that-is the 
very crux of the issue). 
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In sum, if we break down the Given into its essential features, we gather that it is 
1) indexical, 2) atomic, and 3) noninferential. These three features are the key 
targets of Sellars' negative thesis to the effect that there is no such thing as the 
Given. By that same token, the trichotomy entails an opposite set of features which 
make up Sellars' implicit positive thesis. While his polemic presents this logical 
alternative to the Given with considerably less force, it can nonetheless be deduced 
that the non-Given must be symbolie, anatomie, and inferential. 
The appellations at play in our typological decomposition of the Given obviously 
cut across disciplinary boundaries. Any attempt at a stable description of the Given 
thus runs the risk of diverting our attention away from our intended target. When 
employing a certain vocabulary or making use of certain examples, one should 
always add a dash of semantic salt, as the distinction between the Given and the non­
Given-mythical or not-aims at something fundamental to the human condition 
and about which no one academic field of inquiry has a monopoly (it could be 
argued, for instance, that the religious notion of an unmediated divine revelation 
gestures at a form of Givenness). Moreover, it should be duly noted that in 
distinguishing various traits of the Given, we are considering as apart attributes 
whieh can not really exist apart, as one considers a geometrical shape apart from its 
colour. It has been said of Sellars' work that « one is presented with a web of 
interrelated concepts and issues, such that one feels that one could grasp what Sellars 
had in mind by concept A if only one had a clear grasp of what he meant by concept 
B, and that understanding B would in turn be an easy matter if only one had a handle 
on A » (deVries and Triplett, 2000, p. xi). This hints at the fact that the features we 
have identified are bound by a certain logical ordinality. Although noninferentialism 
is arguably the epistemic cash value of the Given, that benefit is tributary to an 
atomistic makeup which in turn flows from an indexical nature. In order that we 
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may be better equipped to fully understand Sellars' notoriously difficult argument 
against the Given, let us then dig our way down from its most overtly 
epistemological trait to the core structural and semiotic features whence it springs. 
Noninferentialism is perhaps the least abstract of the Given' s features. In any 
event, it seems fair to say that it is the one which philosophers typically focus on. 
It's easy to understand why. If inference involves a transfer of (alethic, semantic, 
and/or doxastic) value from one set of objects to another, the merit of that latter set 
is dependent on the former in a way that may lead to an infinite regress. A robust 
validation of inferential knowledge must therefore extend beyond a myopie (type­
theoretical) range and ground itself in sorne "self-authenticating episode" which « 
would constitute the tortoise on which stands the elephant on which rests the edifice 
of empirical knowledge » (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 34). The first task, then, is to 
determine what such a noninferential object might be (there is, of course, a second 
and more demanding task which we will leave aside until the final chapter, namely 
that of explaining how such a Given item could transmit its self-authenticated value 
upwards). One obvious and recurrent historical candidate in this regard has been the 
impingement which the world seems to make upon our senses. Yet as Sellars points 
out, several other candidates fit the bill: «Many things have been said to be 'given': 
sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first 
principles, even givenness itself » ([1956] 1963, § 1). Despite this eclecticism, for 
an object to serve as a plausible dam to the infinite regress of inferences, it must 
possess one non-negotiable trait: it must not owe a debt to something other than 
itself. In other words, it must be atomic. 
While the term "atomism" has been associated with sundry schools of thought 
(with prefixes like "logical", "semantic", etc.) that have ascribed it a host of 
meanings of varying philosophie worth, it is here deployed in its purely technical 
sense. Strictly speaking, a thing can be said to be atomic (from the Greek "tomos" 
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or 'eut') just in case it can not be divided further; on pain of no longer being (or no 
longer being what it is). For things which can be so divided, we shall reserve the 
double-negating terrn anatomie: 
A property is anatomie just in case if anything has it, then at least one other thing 
does. Consider, for an untendentious example, the property of being a sibling. If 
1 am a sibling, then there is someone whose sibling 1am; someone other than me, 
since no one can be his own sibling. [... ] So the property of being a sibling is 
anatomie; 1 couldn 't be the only person in the world who instantiates this 
property. (Fodor and Lepore, 1992, p. 1) 
In asking whether something is atomic or anatomie, we naturally exclude a middle 
ground between the two options, such that 'if not atomic, then anatomie', and 'if not 
anatomie, then atomic'. As a result, barring the unlikely event that something would 
be neither atomic nor anatomie, theories that conclude in a definite and covering 
way that 'nothing can be atomic' or that 'nothing can be anatomie' ipso facto settle 
the matter with regards to their opposite. 
The link between atomism and noninferentialism is perhaps made clearest when 
we consider how these features play out in a theory of concepts. In keeping with the 
definitions just offered, an anatomie construal perrnits one to divide a concept into 
sub-components in order to account for that concept's individuation, i.e., what it is a 
concept of. Thus, to use one of philosophy' s most shop-wom example, the concept 
'Bachelor' is typically broken down into 'Unmarried' and 'Male'. On this classical 
anatomistic view then, to have a concept is to have those sub-components. Several 
advantages ensue from this. For one thing, semantic evaluability can be achieved by 
breaking down a concept into its constituents. If one who wants to know if a given 
thing is a 'Bachelor'-that is, if a given object belongs to the class presumably 
categorized by that concept-then one need only ask whether that thing is unmarried 
and male. Another boon of construing concepts as anatomie compounds is that it 
provides as general account of learnability. If one is aIready a competent possessor 
of the concepts 'Male' and 'Unmarried', then learning what a bachelor is is a matter 
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of being told and/or discovering that there is good grounds for warranting the 
conjunction of those two concepts under a new one. No doubt this general picture 
calls for many additional details, but it pretty much sums up a typical anatomie 
theory of concepts. 
The play of inference becomes readily apparent in such anatomic linkages. For 
instance, the passage from 'Male' and 'Unmarried' to 'Bachelor' is typically 
construed as an induction, whereas the movement from 'Bachelor' to 'Male' and 
'Unmarried' is seen as a species of deductive reasoning. Once we recognize that 
these inferential passages can be subject to transitivity, we see how anatomism can 
potentially lead to wholism: 
Consider, for an untendentious example of a holistic property, being a natural 
number. [...] [N]obody could coherently doubt-and, so far as we know, nobody 
has ever sought to do so-that if there any numbers, then there must be quite a 
few. One couldn't, for example, coherently wonder whether there is only the 
number three. (Fodor and Lepore, 1992, p. 2) 
Of course, none of this applies to atomic concepts, which are held to be what 
theyare (or are about) independently of any other concept. To continue wearing out 
our example, 'Bachelor' may be an inferential product of (two) other concepts, but 
'Male' can be thought of as answerable to no other. In such a case, the concept 
'Male' would be atomic in that it would be essentially-not 
inferentially-individuated. Thus, if the possession of a concept by an agent is such 
that it is fundamentally unaffected (both during and after its acquisition) by the 
possession (or acquisition) of other concepts or lack thereof, then this is because 
there is something which alone makes that concept what it is (or is about). In the 
case of 'Male', that something would likely be worldly males (or "malehood", 
depending on the metaphysic). It may very well turn out that sorne things are 
anatomic while sorne others are not. As such, there is nothing in principle to prevent 
an anatomic object from breaking into parts which themselves are atomic-in fact, 
that situation must exist if an atomic Given is to dam inferential regress (there is no 
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necessary induction going from anatomism to wholism). If we want to understand 
whence come the values of atomic representations, it is therefore not to other 
representations that we must tum but rather to sorne autonomous punctate force 
which needs no inferential assistance. This brings us to the last feature of the Given 
on our roster: indexicality. 
As with atornism, a variety of schools claim the notion of index as their own. 
One deplorable consequence of this in philosophic circles has been the reduction of 
indexicality to subjectivity or "context-sensitivity"; as manifested in the oft-repeated 
error of naively equating the index with "egocentric particulars", "rigid designators", 
and their kin. Yet the index can be aIl these things and much more CT', "you", and 
"there" do not exhaust the class of possible indices). While attempts by truth­
conditional semantics and logic to rigorously incorporate an indexical dimension 
obviously have their place, one must bear in rnind that those endeavours employa 
notion of fairly lirnited scope, both relative to the index's semiotic origins and to the 
concem with Givenness generally. That said, wholesale adherence to the Peircean 
system, which originally spawned the notion of index (cf Peirce, 1992, p. 1-10), 
would do more harm than good to an account of the Given. Contrary to the analytic 
tradition in philosophy, the problem is not that serniotics is lirnited in scope, but that 
it is too encompassing. Indeed, from a strict semiotic point of view, there is no 
controversy regarding the play of Givenness in our sign-economy (cognitive or 
otherwise); as a "triadic" realist (cf Champagne, 2006), the serniotician of Peircean 
descent is afortiori comrnitted to a rich ontoIogy which gives Sellars' position about 
as much credibility as using semiotics to address the controversy opposing 
norninalism versus realism: in both instances, the debate would be so thoroughly 
question-begged towards one camp that there would be no substantial polemic left to 
address. 
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Disregarding the overbearing weight of particular traditions, we can begin to 
capture the indexicality proper to the Given if we liken it to a gift. The worth of a 
gift may vary greatly, from a long sought-after item to a trite knickknack one has no 
use for. Yet in essence, a gift is something which one does not earn in the same 
fashion as one earns one's salary, for example. Likewise, we say a person has a gift 
for a certain task when that person manifests a competence which she has not earned 
through normal training. What is cornmon to both instances is that a value cornes to 
a receiver at a relative lack of expenditure on her part, in contrast to the 
complimentary class of non-gifts. We can thus say that the Given is an atomic 
"chunk" of non-inferential knowledge which indexically "falls on one's lap", so to 
speak. 
As we will see in the second chapter, it will be of crucial importance to 
McDowell's attempt at resolving the tension between receptivity and spontaneity 
that someone must "Accept" a gift for it to be properly Given (we can think of the 
loafing genius who refuses to marshal his talent, or again a woman who refuses an 
admirer's bouquet of flowers). As he writes, « How one's experience represents 
things to be is not under one's control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the 
appearance or rejects it » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. Il). This undermines the idea 
that receptivity absolves one of agency; an (albeit minimum) premium of sorts must 
be assumed by the accepting party ta sustain that very act. Yet even if this argument 
should avail itself correct, it would not affect the fact that the burden of producing a 
Given must by and large be assumed by something which is not the receiver. In its 
broadest form, the giving party can thus be construed as the non-ego, a role which 
we naturally see fulfilled by the world (of the infamous "external" variety). Seen in 
this light, the Given can be said to involve sorne kind of causal-like force-of which 
we are subject. 
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A characterization of indexicality as involving causality is rather deficient. For 
if we ascribe the index a straightforward kind of worldly causality, like dominoes 
striking each other or a vial of mercury dilating in step with its ambient temperature, 
then it becomes hard to explain how such brute events could have any epistemic 
relevance. We are thus tempted to augment the notion by saying that the force at 
play is imbued with significance. Yet if the linking of events is essentially an act of 
thought, it seems we have left the realm of causality and entered right into that 
which we wanted to contrast from the start: inference (for a conflation of 
conventional codifications and indexical correlations, cf Eco, 1976; and the critical 
discussion in Deely, 2001, p. 712-719). If our grip begins to get slippery at this 
point, it is because we are nearing the nexus where receptivity and spontaneity cross 
swords. 
1.5.3 Assigning the Given a task it cannot fulfil 
We now have at our disposaI all the necessary tools to understand Sellars' argument 
to the effect that the Given is a "myth". Once again, it is important that we 
formulate our exposition of Sellars' case against the Given in the broadest terms 
possible. First, as with the umbrella-terrn "Given", the philosophie thesis presented 
in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" has (and was intended to have) bearing 
on issues beyond empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Another reason to go the 
generalized route is that only the most fundamental aspects of the critique presented 
in Sellars' essay end up exerting an (albeit very pronounced) influence on 
McDowell's work. The need is thus fell for a summation which does justice to its 
source, aIl the while disregarding particular technical squabbles (e.g., over "sense­
data" theories) which have no relevance whatsoever to McDowell's grand 
philosophie reflection on the interface of mind and world. Let us then extract what 
is most vital to Sellars' celebrated attack-a core tenet we will calI the "asymmetry 
of indexicality thesis". 
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Sellars argues that the notion of a Given, be it a sense datum or any other, is in 
effect a « mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two ideas », namely: 
1) The idea that there are certain inner episodes [... ] which can occur to human 
beings (and brutes) without any prior process of learning or concept formation; 
and without which it would in sorne sense be impossible to see, for example, that 
the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, or hear that a certain 
physical sound is C#. (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 7) 
and, 
2) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are non-inferential 
knowings that certain items are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes 
are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing the evidence 
for aIl other empirical propositions. (Ibid.) 
Sellars believes that « as far as the above formulation goes, there is no reason to 
suppose that having the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or episternic fact » 
(Ibid., § 7). The pivotaI issue here lies in deterrnining exactly the conditions that an 
experience must satisfy so it may rightfully daim ta serve as an item of knowledge. 
To this query, Sellars answers that aIl items of knowledge must in sorne way 
demonstrate epistemic authority ([1956] 1963, § 34). The question which flows 
from this is whether it is logically possible for something to impose epistemic 
authority by its very act of being-that is, whether it is possible for something to be 
"self-authenticating". The Given, it is held, can atomically stand on its own feet 
thanks to its indexical force. According to this view, a green thing authoritatively 
imposes the truth of its greenness; there is no need to go beyond one's atomic link to 
that thing and seek out other reasons to confirm or justify the epistemic warrant that 
the thing in question is indeed green. 
However, Sellars argues that this primitive knowledge can seem plausible only if 
we ignore a slew of inferences which are anatomically bound to the authentification 
of any belief. Of these linkages, the most obvious is the collateral knowledge one 
must possess (and mobilize) in order to correctly frame an encounter with a Given: « 
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Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate for determining the 
colour of an object by looking, the subject must know that conditions of this sort are 
appropriate » (Ibid., § 19). In essence, the argument is that unless one can 
authenticate the framing conditions of an indexical episode, one cannot authenticate 
the content purportedly delivered in that episode. This contention parallels the 
previously-discussed argument to the effect that a translation manual's episternic 
authority is only as strong as the initial conjectures of a field linguist. However, 
Sellars is not denying a priori that framing conditions could in principle be 
adequately specified (the stubbom interlocutor murmuring dimly in the background, 
Sellars does warn that such conditions would be subject to « the vagueness and open 
texture characteristic of ordinary discourse »; ibid., § 18). His point is only that 
should such precise specification of framing conditions be achieved, we would have 
to recognize that the warrant of our observations no longer "stands on its own feet" 
but is inferentially "joined at the hip" with the warrant of our stipulations. 
Sellars identifies another, much more subtle, anatomic linkage which seerningly 
ruptures the atornicity of a noninferential Given. It is part and parcel of the notion of 
a Given that the indexical force which delivers its content to the rnind simply cannot 
be rnistaken. As H. H. Price-arguably one of the most sophisticated defenders of 
the Given the empiricist tradition has produced-writes: 
When 1 see a tomato there is much that 1 can doubt. 1 can doubt whether it is a 
tomato that 1 am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. 1 can doubt 
whether there is any material thing there at aIl. Perhaps what 1 took for a tomato 
was really a reflection; perhaps 1 am even the victim of sorne hallucination. One 
thing however 1 cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and 
somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, 
and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly 
present to my consciousness. What the red patch is, whether a substance, or a 
state of a substance, or an event, whether it is physical or psychical or neither, 
are questions that we may doubt about. But that something is red and round then 
and there 1 cannot doubt. [... ] And when 1 say that it is 'directly' present to my 
consciousness, 1 mean that my consciousness of it is not reached by inference, 
nor by any other intellectual process [... ]. (1932 [1981], p. 3) 
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Contrary to this view, Sellars argues that for the Given to yield something which 
could rightly lay claim to being an item of knowledge, it would have to manifest one 
important trait proper to all things epistemic: it would have to open itself to the 
possibility of falsity. As part of his polemic against empiricists, Sellars astutely 
observes that while « it is the fact that it does not make sense to speak of unveridical 
sensations which strikes these philosophers, though for it to strike them as it does, 
they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experienee as 
veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical » ([1956] 
1963, § 7). If we understand this correctly, it means Priee' s infallible bulgy colour­
patch could never serve as knowledge. 
According to deVries and Triplett, « fallibility of belief [...] actually plays no role 
in Sellars' argument» (2000, p. xxvii). Indeed, Sellars' comment about the link 
between the veridica1 and unveridical does not go on to do much work in his essay, 
although we are not alone in having seized upon this passage (cf for example Dancy 
and Sosa, 1999, p. 160). In any event, the difficulties which Sellars apparently 
wants to draw attention to are analogous to Parmenides' law. The affirmation that a 
thing is true or rea1 and could not he otherwise may perhaps transeendentally mark 
off an (albeit quirky) ontological fact. However, it seems clear that such Givenness 
(empiricist or rationalist) would have nothing in common with what we normally 
take to be the very stuff of understanding. For« in characterizing an episode or a 
state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode 
or state; we are placing it in the logical spaee of reasons, of justifying and being able 
to justify what one says » (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 36; italics ours). An indexical 
episode which would inevitably self-authenticate therefore could not be considered 
epistemic. 
We can thus better appreciate the rationale behind Sellars' earlier-quoted 
description of the Given as a "mongrel" begotten by ideas which in fact cannot 
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copulate ([1956] 1963, § 7). In sum, Sellars maintains that the episodes in Russell's 
account of "knowledge by acquaintance" should not be considered a species of the 
genus knowledge. In the words of H. H. Price: 
It may [...] be suggested that though that which is given is not altered by the 
attempt to know about it, yet its givenness is destroyed by that attempt; so that 
although a certain red patch after being described is the same entity as it was 
before, yet it is not the same datum-for it is no longer a datum at all, but has 
become an 'intellectum' instead. (1932 [1981], p. 17) 
Price eloquently sums up the sort of predicament alluded to by Sellars by saying that 
"we murder to dissect" (Ibid., p. 15; note that this is not the view defended by Price). 
1.5.4 The ineffable limit of thought 
Would this have been all to Sellars' position, it would not have added anything 
substantially new to the historical repertoire of philosophical tenets. What we would 
have, in effect, is mere a reaffirrnation of idealism. But while Sellars' project does 
align with idealism to sorne extent, the originality of his stance rests with the fact 
that he chose to virtually-not completely-eliminate the "non-idea" from the 
playing field. Indeed, Sellars does not rule out the possibility that we do connect 
with worldly objects in a manner consistent with the standard account of the Given. 
Let me make it clear, however, that if l reject this framework [where the 
perceptually given is the foundation of empirical knowledge], it is not because l 
should deny that observing are inner episodes, nor that strictly speaking they are 
nonverbal episodes. (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 38) 
There is clearly sorne point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a 
level of propositions-observation reports-which do not rest on other 
propositions in the same way as other propositions rest on them. (Ibid.) 
We can get a good understanding of what motivates this concession if we think 
of Sellars' reflections as guided by a central desideratum, one captured by 
Wittgenstein's admonition that « in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have 
to be able to think both sides of this limit » ([1921] 2002, p. 27). Indeed, how could 
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one ever disrobe the object of thought of its ideational garment and speak of a world 
beyond language? Whoever acquiesces to this tenet is then confronted with a 
choice. On the one hand, one can adopt a "pansemiotist" stance and maintain that 
the world qua ontological sphere is « perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs » (Peirce, 1998, p. 394). On the other hand, one can opt for 
"transsemiotic agnosticism" which explicitly construes the non-represented as « a 
vague, uncharted nebula » about which nothing can be said (cf Noth, 1995, p. 81). 
If we slice our notions as thickly as a William James, a convincing case couId be 
made that-at least epistemologically-these two positions involve a trivial 
"difference which makes no difference". However, metaphysically, it seems sober 
to acknowledge that transsemiotic agnosticism departs from pansemiotism in a 
potentially important way by refusing to fuse thought and object. In short, same 
premises, different entailments. 
As advantageous as pansemiotism may be on a philosophical front, one gathers 
that it was not palatable to Sellars' core intuitions (someone like Richard Rorty, for 
instance, will have no such qualms on the matter). Sellars' agnostic metaphysic thus 
departs from wholesale pansemiotism in obliquely acknowledging the presence of 
sorne terra incognita. From a biographical standpoint, it could be surmised that 
Sellars' reluctance vis-à-vis pansemiotism stems from sorne primitive sympathy 
towards scientific realism, an attitude common to positivist-era philosophers. 
Indeed, it can be argued that no one has taken up the task of uniting expelience and 
thought with greater rnilitancy than that motley assemblage which at one time rallied 
under the aptly titled banner of "logical empiricism". Yet the irony is that, by a 
series of progressive retreats from their incipient ideal, this influential movement did 
more to spread the "inchoate" feeling of disconnectedness from the world described 
by McDowell than any nineteenth-century idealist school. As a contemporary 
witness to this tragic spectacle, Sellars was acutely aware of the philosophie 
difficulties which ensue when one digs a chasm between in praesentia contact and 
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in absentia representation. In light of these concerns, his work ostensibly seeks a 
way to incorporate an ineffable ontological domain which can buttress scientific 
realism against relativistic attacks-all the while being spared the epistemological 
vicissitudes associated with the notion of experiential receptivity. Sellars found he 
could achieve just that via what we calI his "asyrnrnetry of indexicality thesis": 
experiences may yet cause our ideas, but they cannotjustify them. 
While the asyrnrnetry of indexicality thesis recognizes the possibility that 
worldly forces affect our bodily lives in several ways, it insists that these causal 
influences could never enter the discursive space where a daim to knowledge can be 
deployed. The hic et nunc contacts which are the stuff of receptive experience, 
Sellars argues, are fundamentally incommensurate with our abstract representations 
in a way that bars us from ever supposing that the epistemic warrant of the latter 
could be answerable to the former (for that task, it is to wholistic coherence that one 
must turn). Returning to our earlier analogy, we can summarize this asymmetrist 
view by saying that the moment one of receives a gift, it is no longer Given but 
Owned. 
Such a dynamic in epistemology obviously blends perfectly with an agnostic 
stance in metaphysics, as both accord the rnind's non-discursive encounters with the 
world a limit place (in the mathematical sense of the term). Thus, much like 
Berkeley evocatively likened infinitesimals to empty "ghosts", Sellars criticizes 
those who seek to moor epistemological normativity on the far side of the frontier of 
thought by pejoratively belittling their notion of Givenness as a "myth". 
1.5.5 McDowell's concurrence with Sellars 
As we saw, McDowell maintains that the mind's openness to the world allows it to 
transparently bypass surrogates like second-hand reports so as to access objects 
directly (sect. 1.4.1). Were we to hold that agents engage in quasi-forensic 
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verifications of other agents' claims before accepting them, he argues, we would be 
artificially introducing a distance between mind and world which clearly plays no 
part in our everyday cognitive situation: 
Consider a tourist in a strange city, looking for the cathedral. He asks a passer­
by, who is in fact a resident and knows where the cathedral is, for directions, 
hears and understands what the passer-by says, and finds the cathedral just where 
his informant said he would. [... ] 
If we accept the conception of mediated standings [... ], can we match the 
intuitive verdict? That would require the tourist to have at his disposaI an 
argument to a conclusion about the whereabouts of the cathedral [...]. l believe 
this is hopeless [...]. If we make the ancillary premises seem strong enough to do 
the trick, it merely becomes dubious that the tourist has them at his disposaI; 
whereas if we weaken the premises, the doubt attaches to their capacity to 
transmit, across the argument, the right sort of rational acceptability for believing 
its conclusion to amount to knowledge. ([1993] 1998, p. 417, 418) 
In light of inference's impotence, a reader unaware of McDowell's collateral 
philosophic cornrnitments would be forgiven for thinking that the cathedral's 
location is Given to the tourist (compare, for example, McDowell' s view of hearsay 
with the noninferential account of "semantic access" developed by Fodor, 1998, p. 
75-80). However, as it turns out, this is not the case, and McDowell stays true to his 
asymmetrist sympathies. 
His motive here is understandable enough. Should the forceful se1f-evidence of 
the worldly landmark cited above carry over into the space of reasons, one would be 
warranted in having recourse to ostension (e.g., "Look and see for yourself that what 
l say about the cathedral's location is true")-thereby effectively undermining the 
Sellars-inspired contention that the Given « offers us at best exculpations where we 
wanted justifications» (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 13). In order to avoid any such 
seismic shifts in his grid of philosophic commitments, McDowell is compelled to 
construe the openness thesis as pertaining only to the causal or "input" half of a 
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cognitive transaction. Once inside the mind's one-way door, the contents 
noninferentially delivered answer to a justificatory epistemology that is inferential 
through and through. 
This, of course, threatens to bring McDowell back to the sort of free-floating 
coherentism that marks one end of the seesaw. For since « spontaneity characterizes 
exercises of conceptual understanding in general » (Ibid., p. 11), there is nothing to 
ensure that whatever accounts woven in defence of a given daim attest to its actual 
objectivity and not just prowess or expediency within the whole. In other words, 
although the world heretofore made itself "open" to the mind in experience, 
incorporation of the asymmetrist constraint makes it slip away into a remote 
(ineffable) region. Seeing how McDowell is not prepared to discharge his Sellarsian 
commitments, he must therefore find a way to reintroduce sorne kind of friction into 
his picture. Breaking away from the transcendentalism espoused by Sellars and 
Kant, McDowell thus opts to supply frictionjrom within, as it were, via « a standing 
willingness to refashion concepts and conceptions if that is what reflection 
recommends » (Ibid., p. 12-13). As we will see in the next chapter, McDowell 
believes our natural constitution as rational animaIs entails not only the ability to 
critically reflect on the merit of our representations, but an obligation to do so 
(although he insists that the compelling power of this edict needs to brought out by 
civilized upbringing). 
We can now better compass the rationale which led McDowell to advocate his 
policy of mistrust vis-à-vis beliefs, new or established (sect. 1.4.2). As the one-way 
door conception risks letting spontaneity run amok, McDowell felt compelled to add 
a « standing obligation to reflect about the credentials of the putatively rational 
linkages that govern [empirical thinking] » ([1994] 2002, p. 12). Whereas Sellars' 
penchant for the philosophy of science had him substituting the empirical friction 
thrown by the wayside with a principle of economy « which can put any daim in 
jeopardy, though not aU at once» ([1956] 1963, § 38), McDowell's own humanistic 
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bent sees him opt for a more ethical-sounding replacement. As deVries and Triplett 
point out, « McDowell is a moral (or more broadly, normative) realist whereas 
Sellars is not » (2000, p. 91nlO). In either case though, the situation we get is 
essentially the same we had with Quine and Davidson: atomistic ties to the world 
having been undermined to a point of virtual impotence (by collateral noise or 
asymmetrical structure), syntactic relations and pragmatic imperatives come in to fill 
the epistemological void. 
We also see how the sophisticated position developed by Sellars allows 
McDowell to advocate "openness" and repudiate the Given as a "myth" in the same 
breath: the transparency (and seeming Givenness) of "openness" pertains only to the 
ontogenesis of representations, not their epistemic justification. Thus, no matter 
how noninferential and atomic the contents delivered by openness may be, the 
moment these enter the mind, the door snaps shut behind them; they are no longer 
answerable to punctate correspondences with the world. As Thornton writes: 
A mediated epistemic standing is one that depends on rational relations to other 
positions. In other words, it is justified by other positions such as grounded 
beliefs. An unmediated standing, by contrast, would be one that was 
foundational [...J. Both Sellars and McDowell take perception to involve a 
mediated state. (2004, p. 194) 
Rather than attempting to decompose the concept of knowledge into constituent 
elements that form its epistemological base or foundation, McDowell suggests 
that il is the most basic concept in play. Justification is thus explicated from the 
starting-point of knowledge taken as a basic standing in the space of reasons. 
(Ibid., p. 195-196) 
Drawing on the technical distinctions we have established, we can translate this 
by saying that McDowell aligns himself with Sellars in holding knowledge to be 
irreducibly symbolic, anatomie, and inferential (i.e., non-Given). Thus, no matter 
how "open" our contact with the world may be, McDowell holds that daims 
purporting to bear on that domain in the end have their merit only within the 
symbolic space of reasons (which, on his pansemiotism, is "unbounded"). From a 
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normative standpoint, McDowell's standing obligation to critically reconsider our 
beliefs effectively annuls the direct realism afforded by his openness thesis. In short, 
McDowell agrees with Sellars that the world enters the mind by way of a one-way 
door-only he happens to think that that door is very wide. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The goal of this first chapter was to present the main philosophie arguments which 
give rise to the oscillation between atomism and wholism-flagging those sensitive 
areas we will exploit further in our quest for a third way while displaying the meta­
philosophie means by which we intend to do so. 
In sum, the seesaw is set in motion by a recoil away from the idea that atomic 
episodes of receptivity can be the arbiters of epistemological matters. The 
oscillation thus begins with the plausible idea that the mind' s representations are 
answerable to one-to-one correspondences, the standing of each being assessed by 
juxtaposing it with its parallel object in the world. According to this stance, a 
representation is objectively grounded if it can indeed be perceived to be "thus and 
so". This view is therefore atomic and non-inferential, insofar at the experiential 
verdict returned has nothing to do with whatever other beliefs one might have. 
Moreover, since the mind has no say in the worldly matter of whether or not a given 
correspondence between a representation and its object indeed obtains, this option 
holds that it is not to conceptual spontaneity but to receptivity that epistemological 
normativity must turn. 
This stance, however, is not without problems. Accordingly, we distinguished 
two kinds of philosophie reprobations in this chapter, both of which uphold sorne 
form of wholism as an alternative. The first attack on atomism is exemplified by the 
"radical translation" scenario developed by Quine and Davidson, and the second by 
the asymmetry of indexicality thesis elaborated by Sellars. The forC1er view holds 
that one couId not even pin down the worldly referent of an utterance-Iet alone 
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nonnatively assess its merit-if one did not already possess a wholistic context 
within which it could be located. According to this gloss, there are so many 
variables at play in ostensive reporting that any clear and distinct target established 
amidst informational tumult is more a product of mind than of world. In light of this 
underdetermination, it is claimed that divergent systems of representations can 
square equally well with worldly contacts, and that our means for choosing between 
self-consistent rivaIs is pragmatie expediency. Yet we argued that if one adopts a 
philosophie posture that does not allow the intervention of speculative scepticism, 
this kind of critique of receptivity can not even attain prima fade plausibility. 
As we saw, McDowell's conunitment to anti-scepticism wavers. Granted, his 
work makes a sincere effort to try and renew with "enchanted" conceptions that 
admit representational freedom as a non-problematic feature of the natural realm. 
Unfortunately, McDowell upholds other commitments which effectively sap the 
philosophie force of his more sober tenets. A particularly salient expression of this 
is his belief that we should refashion our representations if that is what spontaneous 
thought recommends, a quasi-ethical demand which effectively undercuts the 
transparency of his "openness to the world" thesis. 
In an attempt to understand why McDowell does not simply espouse a strong 
kind of empirical realism, we were led to examine another key argument against 
receptivity. In contrast with Quine and Davidson's, this Sellarsian critique of "the 
myth of the Given" does not appeal overtly to the ad hoc generation of doubt. 
Central to that stance is the technical contention that, owing to the very structure of 
representation, atomic receptivity can at best cause beliefs, not ground them in any 
epistemologically meaningful way. As we saw, McDowell was most impressed by 
this Sellarsian argument, and made it a point to try and accommodate it in his 
philosophizing-a decision whose far-reaching repercussions will become 
increasingly apparent in the next chapter. 
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Is this right though? Is the interface of mind and world so constituted that while 
representation may be causally rooted in receptive experience, that worldly pedigree 
is structurally barred from ever bestowing upon it epistemic merit? It seems we are 
faced with a fork in the road. Either we go the symmetry route and accept that the 
warrant of our representations (knowledge, beliefs, etc.) can appeal to their indexical 
origin; or we go the asymmetry route and grant that while such atomic indexicality 
may contribute to their ontogenesis, their validation is answerable solely to a 
wholistic epistemology where internaI coherence supplants any and aIl worldly 
arbitrament. By our lights, there is no great dilemma here: the asymmetry of 
indexicality expounded by Wilfrid Sellars-and accepted by John McDowell in his 
own flight from Givenness-is simply mistaken. We take it to be an axiom that a 
long stretch of reasoning is only as good as its conclusion; and the implications of 
asymmetry, as we will see in the third chapter, are simply disastrous. 
Fortunately, philosophical reflection allows us to draw out the ramifications of a 
given tenet and see where, if we are consistent, it will lead us. Let us then 
provisionally suspend judgement on the matter and dutifully follow McDowell down 
the path he has chosen. Once we reach the end of that road, we will be in a position 
to determine whether the decision to go the asymmetry route was a good one-or 
whether we took a wrong turn and should part company with McDowell so as to 
retrace our steps back to the original point of bifurcation. As McDowell himself 
states, « If following what pass for norms of inquiry turns out not to improve our 
chances of being right about the world, that just shows we need to modify our 
conception of the norms of inquiry » ([1994] 2002, p. 151). For if the ends don't 
justify the means, what on Earth does? 
CHAPTERll 
McDüWELL'S THIRD WAY: FUSING THE TWIN FACULTIES 
If you board the wrong train, it is no use running 
along the corridor in the other direction. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
The Way 10 Freedom (1935-39) 
2.1 Introduction 
We have argued that McDowell's respect for the canons of philosophy is 
inconsistent with his professed disavowal of sceptical concerns. Even if such 
historical sensitivity is indeed a bane to the search for a tenable third way, it is 
clearly central to the exposition of McDowell's arguments. Indeed, any serious 
appreciation of Mind and World's dialectic calls for a working familiarity with a 
host of historical reference points, the most notable being: 1) the general atomistic 
schema developed by Russell and other empiricists, 2) Sellars' (negative) critique of 
the Given, 3) Quine and Davidson's (positive) wholism, and 4) Rorty's (and 
Davidson's) relativistic conclusions. This somewhat terse curriculum obviously 
neglects many other thinkers considered by McDowell, like Evans, Aristotle, Kant, 
and Gadamer (all of whom we will encounter in due time). What's more, sorne of 
the prerequisites we have listed play a more tacit role in McDowell's narrative. For 
example, the "inchoate" anxiety vis-à-vis frictionless wholes is largely taken for 
granted, as are the precise technical reascns underpinning the Sellarsian flight from 
Givenness. Nevertheless, those four historical points of reference do the most work 
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in the architectonic of Mind and World, their interplay constituting the main lines 
along which runs the oscillation between atomism and wholism. In short, (1) is an 
initial state from which (2) recoils to (3), leading to (4) whence a movement back to 
(1) commences-unless of course we find a tenable third way out. 
The historical dimension manifest in Mind and World belies the fact that 
McDowell's positive-theoretic recommendations have a profoundly revisionist drift 
to them, owing much to Wittgenstein's belief that philosophical problems are in fact 
products of the shortcomings of our conceptual (or linguistic) vocabulary. In his 
extensive monograph, Tim Thomton wonders whether McDowell's « assumption 
that the history of philosophy can be of positive help in forming a correct 
understanding of our place in nature» is compatible with his Wittgenstein-inspired 
therapeutic style of philosophizing (Thornton, 2004, p. 20; cf p. 244). Whatever the 
degree of stableness of this hybrid approaeh, it is clear that the historieal eomponent 
of Mind and World is not intended to provide a shopping list of established "-isms" 
which might perchance fit McDowell's peculiar conjunction of grievances and 
desiderata. Granted, in a less revisionist mood, McDowell stated his programmatic 
desire « to stand on the shoulders of the giant, Kant, and see our way to the 
supersession of traditional philosophy that he almost managed, though not quite » 
but whieh Hegel, who « we take almost no notice of », purportedly did (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 111). But in spite of the fact that he embeds his reflection in 
contexts familiar to those trained in the orthodox philosophical tradition, McDowell 
attempts to dismount the futile back and forth by means-not of substantial 
theories-but of radically novel ways of "picturing" the interface of mind and world. 
We can capture the tenor of this Wittgensteinian twist to McDowell's enterprise by 
saying instead that "If we can't see any farther than our predecessors, it is because 
giants are blocking our view". 
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McDowell's work invites us ta entertain two conceptual possibilities which-if 
they are indeed possible-certainly lie along lines of vision not habituaI to our eyes. 
The most elemental of these is his advocacy of what can only be described as 
"receptive spontaneity": « The position l am urging appeals to receptivity to ensure 
friction, like the Myth of the Given, but it is unlike the Myth of the Given in that it 
takes capacities of spontaneity to be in play aIl the way out to the ultimate grounds 
of empirical judgements » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 67). In essence, this 
proposaI consists in a radicalization of Kant' s credo: the twin faculties are said to be 
so closely allied in their partnership as to be indistinguishable (McDowell, [1994] 
2002, p. 9). According to McDowell, the experiential episodes we naturally think of 
as paradigm-cases of pure receptivity to the world comprise a certain degree of 
spontaneity. Similarly, he holds that the sovereignty we have over our most abstract 
beliefs is in fact subject to a form of receptivity by way of a standing obligation to 
pass those convictions under review. Just as human nature provides the mind with a 
means of taking in the world but moderates that passivity by requiring it to Accept or 
Refuse the deliverances of experience, so does it bestow upon the mind the freedom 
to adjust the rational linkages of its representations but curbs that agency by exacting 
upon it a responsibility to critically attend to the rational wanant of these 
manoeuvres. 
As a consequence of this amalgamation of receptivity and spontaneity, 
McDowell champions a pansemiotist picture: « Although reality is independent of 
our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the 
conceptual sphere » (Ibid., p. 26). What we have here is a fundamental revision of 
Kant and Sellars' transcendental framework: since in light of the aforementioned 
fusion « we need no longer be unnerved by the freedom implicit in the idea that our 
conceptual capacities belong to a faculty of spontaneity » (Ibid., p. 10), there is no 
need to posit an ineffable limit beyond thought so as to buttress our representations 
and prevent them from foundering into relativism. Although this entails that the 
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judiciary raIe formerly assigned to "the tribunal of experience" now lies squarely 
within the bounds of thought, we should not be bothered by that fact. Instead, 
McDowell believes we should accept that the rnind is so constituted that its web of 
representations has no outer periphery. On this view, only once we shaH come round 
to embracing this panserniotist picture and desist considering implausible 
alternatives shall we find peace and put an end to the seesaw. It is not so much the 
limit beyond thought of the transsemiotic agnostic we must dissipate nor a greater 
agnosticism we must observe, but rather the "inchoate anxiety" we must learn to 
overcome. 
Our goal in this chapter will be to canvass this McDowellian third way, and then 
criticize what we consider its main weaknesses. The first parts of the chapter will 
attempt to reconstruct the structure of McDowell's complicated argument, gathering 
various sub-arguments scattered throughout Mind and World and assembling them 
in a way that brings out their (sometimes latent) logical connections. Since we will 
be striving to establish a synoptic analysis that is as faithful and comprehensive as 
possible, the overall tone of our discussion will remain largely uncritical. Beginning 
with the general Kantian ideas that serve as an inspiration and frame of reference for 
McDowell's search, we will retrace the core amendments that he argues must be 
made if we are ever to overcome the fatal flaws in Kant's synthesis and realize a 
satisfactory dismount from the oscillation. Using Gareth Evans' views on "singular 
thought" as a foil, we will then detail McDowell's technical account of his own 
fusion of receptivity and spontaneity. This will subsequently lead us to an in-depth 
exarnination of the ancillary proposaIs that ensue from the McDowellian fusion, the 
most notable being panserniotism and the doctrine of "second nature". Upon having 
summarized in an orderly fashion the logic of McDowell's positive-theoretic 
contribution, the final portion of the chapter will be devoted to criticising the more 
problematic elements of his proposal. We will conclude with an overall assessment 
of the tenability of McDowell' s third way, and preview the path soon to be taken. 
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2.2 The main thrust of the McDowellian dismount 
2.2.1 Selectively modifying the Kantian heritage 
We have likened Kant's admonition that « Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind » ([1787] 1965, B75) to a beacon mentoring 
McDowell's investigations from afar. Kant figures in Mind and World as a 
trailblazer of sorts--{)ne with the distinction of having come « within a whisker of a 
satisfactory escape from the oscillation» (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 42). His 
central accomplishment, in McDowell's view, was his overwhelming preoccupation 
with the bringing together of opposites. However, the fatal flaw which undermined 
the success of Kant's philosophie achievements, McDowell argues, is to be found in 
his transcendentalism. 
Distinguished in his own time by an intimate fami liarity with the rival traditions 
of rationalism and empiricism, Kant brought his thorough understanding to bear on 
nothing less than the question of the interface of mind and world. At the heart of his 
complex reflections on this issue lies his contention that the very structure of our 
knowledge of the world presupposes the active involvement of the mind. There is 
no point in passing in review the specifie arguments which lead Kant to this 
momentous conclusion; for McDowell, ignoring technical preoccupations with 
synthetic a priori judgements and the like, retains only the general pith of the 
Kantian insight. That Kant was concerned to distinguish the scope and import of his 
various categories (e.g., with regards to the nature of mathematics and so forth) is 
thus of little relevance to the project which unfolds in Mind and World. What 
matters instead is the general idea that our conceptual faculty is not a mere 
receptacle waiting to be filled with an experiential content which somehow has (or 
had) a life of its own prior ta being receptively poured into that vessel. As Robert 
Brandom observes, 
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[W]ith Kant and Sellars, McDowell understands experience as a thoroughly 
conceptual achievement. Thus he insists that anything that does not have 
concepts does not have perceptual experience either. [...] 
McDowell also insists that anything that does not have perceptual experience 
does not have concepts either. [...] In his synthesis of these themes of classical 
rationalism and classical empiricism, as in so many other respects, McDowell is 
a Kantian. (2002, p. 92, 93) 
To affirm that mind and world are so intertwined, however, is no small move. 
Indeed, despite its deceptive simplicity, it is this quintessential insight which forms 
the cornerstone of Kant's famous "Copernican Revolution". The reason why the 
objects of human knowledge, regardless of how far we seek them, fit so nicely 
within our conceptual expectations, is that they are products of a precisely human 
apparatus (cf Kant, [1787] 1965, Bxvi). This apparent truism, however, has 
profound consequences for our conception of our place in the ontological scheme of 
things. In a sense, the Kantian project of accounting for the intelligibility of 
experience proves almost tao successful, as it compels us to acknowledge that it is 
not so much the mind which is in the world, but rather the world that is in the mind. 
Yet if epistemological inquiries more easily bow before the verdicts of logical 
reasoning, matters of ontology are an altogether different affair, being frequently 
marred with partialities immune to argument. Thus, while Kant's insight is more 
readily granted qua theory of knowledge, its metaphysical outcome does not go 
down so smoothly. As McDowell rightly points out: 
[T]he idea of the Given is not something that cornes to us in calm reflection, as if 
from nowhere, as a possible basis for the epistemology of empirical knowledge, 
so that we can cheerfully drop it when we see that it does not work. Rather, the 
idea of the Given is a response to a way of thinking that underlies the farniliar 
philosophical anxiety about empirical knowledge [.. .]. 
We can seem to be forced into the idea of the Given; that is what happens 
when we are impressed by the thought that conceptual capacities belong to a 
faculty of spontaneity, and fall into worrying that our picture deprives itself of 
the possibility that exercises of concepts could be what it depicts, because it 
leaves out any rational constraint from outside the sphere of thought. ([1994] 
2002, p. 15) 
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However, McDowell insists that such a retreat is futile, being but one more 
movement in the endless oscillation between a receptivity-based atomism and a 
wholism governed by spontaneity. What this strategy advocates, in effect, is a return 
to the original idea of experience as an unmediated access to the real. But while « 
the idea of the Given can give the appearance of reinstating thought's bearing on 
reality », McDowell argues that that appearance is in fact « illusory » and « does not 
fulfil its apparent promise » (Ibid., p. 15, 16). Thus, by opting to reject 
panserniotism, one effectively resets the dialectic back to its initial state. The 
problem is that this initial state is not one rest: in reviving the idea of receptive 
input, one revives all the puzzles that accompany it, for « in order to draw a lirnit to 
thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit » (Wittgenstein, 
[1921] 2002, p. 27). A panserniotist view, it would seem, is something our 
philosophie imagination simply has to learn to live with. 
There is however another, more subtle, way to reject pansemiotism: posit a 
"lirnit" beyond thought and deny its involvement in thought per se. Seen in this 
light, experiential receptivity can be construed as an irreplaceable and necessary 
constitutive feature of the possibility of knowledge whilst disowning the idea that 
there couId be such a thing a normative assessment free of discursive considerations. 
As we have seen (sect. 1.5.4), this is the strategy employed by Sellars in his bid to 
safeguard his realist sympathies. In his case, the world is seen as holding a merely 
causal office. Sellars points out that for the indexical impacts which the world 
produces upon the mind to have any authoritative sway, they must necessarily rise 
above their hic et nunc character. Therefore, to posit experiential episodes as a 
justification for the acceptance of sorne c1aim, one must alter them in such a way 
that they may fit into a "logical space" where premises and inferences are the only 
currency. 
Nevertheless, even if the brute causation which empiricism exalts cannot do any 
epistemic work, it can be acknowledged as a plausible contributor to the ontogenesis 
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of our symbolic representations. Whereas for Sellars this function is assigned a 
causal-cum-diachronic priority, in Kant it is glossed as a condition of possibility 
commanding a ontological-cum-synchronic priority. In any event, the Kantian 
noumenal realm is much like Sellars' mythical limit in being (fittingly) beyond our 
reach. The rnind may be endowed with the ability to sound out its very boundaries 
by transcendentally deducing the conditions under which its experience of the world 
is possible, but any cogitation to that effect is by its very nature indefensible. 
An obvious retort to aIl this, of course, is that "talk" of the ineffable is highly 
specious at best. The centrality of the noumenal realm in Kant's philosophy (which 
was intended as a safeguard for moral and religious assumptions) makes it a 
particularly facile target for this kind of accusation. Yet even Sellars will be seen by 
McDowell as transgressing the self-imposed agnosticism on matters non­
serniotic-especially in his sequel to "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", 
Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (Sellars, [1967] 1992), 
where the quasi-noumenal character of the unspeakable side of the Wittgensteinian 
frontier of thought is played up. 
Sellars thinks the transcendental role of sensibility, in properly Kantian thinking, 
is to supply manifolds of "sheer receptivity" to guide conceptual representations. 
At one point, he suggests that Kant needs this picture if he is to "avoid the 
dialectic which leads from Hegel' s Phenomenology to nineteenth-century 
idealism". This remark is instructive. 
Sellars is invoking Hegel as a bogeyman: as someone who, by failing to 
acknowledge any external constraint on thought, makes it unintelligible how 
what he is picturing can be directed at what is independently real [... ]. 
(McDowell, 1998, p. 466) 
Thus, despite his concordance with Kant and Sellars on many other fronts, it is on 
account of an ineffable world beyond rnind that McDowell will choose to stray from 
their philosophic counsel (forcing him to examine the extent of his Hegelian 
sympathies in the process). 
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2.2.2 Embracing the world fuUy in thought 
Julian Dodd stakes out two basic ways of construing the objective alignment of mind 
and world: «Whereas a correspondence theorist holds that facts are extralinguistic 
items which make propositions true, an identity theorist, by contrast, believes true 
propositions to he facts » (1995, p. 160). Assuming propositions to be the truth­
bearers par excellence (while it may yet have sorne validity) is rather awkward for 
our purposes, which centre on the normative assessment of representations 
generally. Nevertheless, Dodd's distinction brings to the fore two very different 
ways of picturing the relation which ensues when the mind objectively represents the 
world. In essence, the issue here is whether, in such cases, it even makes sense to 
speak of a relation holding between mind and world. For Dodd's correspondence 
theorist, although a perfect alignment would signal the attainment of complete 
objectivity, that epistemological state would not endanger the fundamental 
difference distinguishing the thinking subject from her worldly object. In contrast, 
for Dodd's identity theorist, such a perfect match would effectively extinguish the 
relation, thereby entailing a complete merger of thought and object. 
Given McDowell's commitment to fusion and pansemiotism, it should come as 
no surprise that he falls into the latter category. McDowell daims that « there is no 
ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort thing 
one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, 
what one thinks is what is the case» ([1994] 2002, p. 27). He openly recognizes that 
this view owes much to the Philosophical Investigations' assertion that « When we 
say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we-and our meaning-do not stop 
anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so » (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2001, 
§ 95). 
Now despite its apparent philosophic extravagance, McDowell argues that the 
idea of the mind fully reaching the world in fact has a plausibility bordering on the 
platitudinous. As he writes: 
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[T]o say there is no gap between thought, as such, and the world is just to dress 
up a truism in high-flown language. AlI the point cornes to is that one can think, 
for instance, that spring has begun, and that very same thing, that spring has 
begun, can be the case. That is truistic, and it cannot embody something 
metaphysically contentious, like slighting the independence of reality. 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 27) 
Note the patent lack of any "disquotational" apparatus in this passage. What in the 
standard convention would figure as the quotation-free object of a quoted 
metalinguistic sentence (cf Tarski, 1944) is here provocatively rendered in the same 
(italicized) manner, since for McDowell the very identity of the content at hand (i.e., 
that spring has begun) licenses the abolition of any substantial ontological 
distinction (for a working out of this stance's Wittgensteinian roots, cf McDowell, 
[1984] 1998, especially p. 254-255). The reiteration of spring's beginning can 
perhaps have sorne informational value, making explicit to others and to oneself the 
fact that the thinking agent has fully embraced a feature of the world-which 
McDowell here conveniently takes to be « everything that is the case» ([1994] 2002, 
p. 27; pace Wittgenstein, [1921] 2002, § 1). But such reiteration, in McDowell's 
view, serves merely to underscore, not undermine, realism. He thus argues that it is 
imperative no metaphysical role-attribution be read into the doubling: 
[A] phobia of idealism can make people suspect we are renouncing the 
independence of reality [...]. But we might just as weIl take the fact that the sort 
of thing one can think is the same as the sort of thing that can be the case the 
other way round, as an invitation to understand the notion of the sort of thing one 
can think in terms of a supposedly prior understanding of the sort of thing that 
can be the case. And in fact there is no reason to look for priority in either 
direction. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 28) 
A strange way to reformulate McDowell's point would be to say that if and when 
we successfully represent, we do not. When the thinking agent entertains a truth 
about the world, the contribution of her representational apparatus (be it conceptual 
and/or sensory) to this epistemic state is for aIl intents and purposes erased. There is 
thus no need, McDowell argues, to posit the presence of sorne representational 
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vehicle through which agents access the world: « When we are not misled by 
experience, we are directly confronted by a worldly state of affairs itself, not waited 
on by an intermediary that happens to tell the truth » ([1994] 2002, p. 143). As 
Dodd remarks: « From the perspective of the identity theorist, the correspondence 
theorist is guilty of double vision: she looks for correspondence where there can only 
be coincidence » (1995, p. 160). 
McDowell wants to construe truth as an objective alignment of mind and world 
so pronounced that the two basically merge into each other. Assured by his ethical 
realism (cf McDowell, [1979] 1998) that his standing obligation to reflect can 
supply the friction sought by the mind without having to somehow exit its own 
domain, McDowell thus breaks with Kant and Sellars' metaphysica1 agnosticism and 
confidently defends a pansemiotist view of representation he labels "The 
Unboundedness of the Conceptual" ([1994] 2002, p. 24-45). According to this view, 
« [a]lthough reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside 
an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere » (Ibid., p. 26). What we have 
here is a proposaI to fundamentally revise the way we "picture" the domain of our 
representations, taking the Quinean image of our knowledge as web or fabric of 
representations (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 13, 129-135), construing it as a 
Sellarsian "logical space of reasons" (Ibid., p. 5, 135, 158), and removing the outer 
rim of the Kantian Ding an sich (Ibid., p. 44, 83). 
2.3 Crafting "receptive spontaneity": the technical case for fusion 
2.3.1 Evans as a heuristic opponent 
Despite his considerable efforts, McDowell's attempts at philosophical syncretism 
do not always conjugate perfectly, as the ideas espoused by his varied influences 
sometimes conflict. Such a confrontation occurs when his construal of experience as 
imbued with spontaneity meets Gareth Evans' thesis that our atomic or "singular" 
access to the world does not involve anything we could properly recognize as 
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belonging to the conceptual realm. Mind and World thus finds in the person of 
Evans a worthy opponent, someone who purportedly defends the very distinction 
which McDowell makes it his dutYto undermine. 
In contrast with McDowell's advocacy of a radical fusion, Evans believes we 
have good grounds to distinguish conceptual contents from experiential contents. 
The underlying motivations at work in Evans' philosophy could not be farther from 
those driving McDowell's. The broad framework within which Evans frames his 
reflections belongs to the "analytic" tradition in philosophy, especially as laid down 
in the work of Frege and the early Russell. In today's intellectual climate, Evans' 
interests can appear somewhat outmoded. If Frege's logical writings still command 
a certain respect, Russell' s original atomist program does not fair so weIl. As Sellars 
emphasized with great force, the two kinds of knowledge posited by Russell's 
distinction between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance" 
differ in ways so fundamental as to suggest the very impossibility of their mutual 
support (sect. 1.5). Although they did not share his incredulity vis-à-vis Givenness, 
the logical empiricists had concurred with this appraisal to the extent that they too 
believed Russell's modes of knowledge to be irreconcilable. Being privy to these 
critiques and to the eventual failure of Russell's attempt to account for the epistemic 
contribution of empirical receptivity, contemporary philosophers thus have an 
unfortunate tendency to roll their eyes and scoff at any variant of this project. 
However, these subsequent readings-which later came to form the received 
view on ostension-were alien to Russell's early work. Not only did Russell see it 
as his philosophical business to technically explain his notion of a receptive 
acquaintance, he also believed (if only for a time) that such project could be 
successful. To construe his investigations into receptive atomism as somehow 
doomed from the outset by the "Given" or "synthetic" nature of the object of study is 
a dis-embellishment of hindsight, one resting on a historiographic narrative later 
written by the putative victors. 
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One of the chief virtues of Evans' highly original work is that it puts aside these 
contemporary prejudices and tries to see what positive insights can be gleaned from 
Russell's original atomist program. By taking this route, Evans' endeavour to 
philosophically elucidate the mechanics of "singular" thought does not endorse the 
sort "causal theory of reference" which became popular in the wake of Saul Kripke's 
influential Naming and Necessity ([1972] 2001). In Evans' opinion (and ours), that 
« bandwagon is going nowhere » ([1982] 2002, p. 79). Thus, while it may strike the 
contemporary palate as superseded, it is against a Russellian backdrop that Evans 
deve10ps his contention that the contents of experience are not conceptual-and it is 
from this perspective that McDowell will pose Evans as a rival fit to challenge his 
own fusion thesis. 
According to Evans, Russell came to be profoundly dissatisfied with the Fregean 
system which he had made it his dutYto build upon. In such a conception of truth­
conditional semantics, 
[a] genuine referring expression has as its sole function the identification of an 
object such that if it satisfies the predicate, the sentence is true, and if it fails to 
satisfy the predicate, the sentence is false. But if the expression fails to identify 
an object at aIl, then the truth-evaluation of the sentence cannot get started, and 
the whole sentence is an aberration. (Russell, perhaps rather unwisely, said that 
the sentence is 'nonsense'. What he meant by this was that someone who uttered 
the sentence would be like someone who uttered nonsense in that he would have 
said nothing at aIl). (Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 42) 
Evans suggests we not make too much of Russell's "unwise" wording, insofar as the 
distinction between "sense" and "Bedeutung" (Frege, 1997, p. 151-180) was never to 
impact Russell's philosophy in the way it would Frege's (Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 42­
43; cf also Frege, 1997, p. 290). In any event, what matters here is only how 
Russell went on to resolve the defect with respect to expressions that fail to identify 
their worldly object in a clear and definite way. 
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Frege's seminal contribution had consisted in drawing an intuitively powerful 
analogy: predication is a sort of function whose operator is the grammatical 
predicate and whose argument(s) is the substantive subject(s) (cf Frege, 1997, p. 
130-148). Although Russell deemed this insight to be of great moment, he 
ostensibly could not stop himself from seeing in it an important shortcoming. For it 
seemed that no matter how much one refined the logical conditions for satisfying the 
predicative functions alluded to by Frege, those specifications still would not secure 
the link of the entire apparatus to its referential domain. «Russell was as aware as 
anyone else that not everything can be thought of by description, on pain of the 
whole system of identification failing to be tied down to a unique set of objects, in 
the circumstances which Strawson has called 'massive reduplication' » (Evans, 
[1982] 2002, p. 45; cf Strawson, [1959] 2002, p. 20-22). Russell's contribution was 
thus to augment Frege's logicist system with a dimension borrowed straight from the 
British empiricist tradition. Expressions can supply us with a publicly accessible 
"knowledge by description" of the truth conditions by which one could gain access 
to a clearly defined set of objects in the world, but they remain impotent to actually 
give the mind a intimate "knowledge by acquaintance" of those discrete objects (cf 
Russell, [1918, 1924] 1998). For that one has to turn to the encounters 
themselves-to what is Given to us by the senses. By following this insight, Evans 
is apparently espousing a view diametrically opposite to McDowell's fusion. 
We are uncertain to what extent there is really a conflict between Evans' views 
and McDowell's. Although McDowell devotes an entire chapter of his book 
("Lecture Ill: Non-conceptual Content") to a polemic against Evans' stance on 
singular reference, Evans is actually a relatively minor character in Mind and 
World's overall argumentative structure, and the tensions McDowell addresses 
therein appear contrived. For one thing, McDowell's "enchanted" view of human 
endowments and Evans' technical "neo-Fregean" semantics would not suggest 
themselves as the most pertinent candidate for a comparison and contrast analysis. 
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Moreover, Evans' arguments in favour of non-conceptual content play a somewhat 
peripheral role in the overall scheme of his seminal Varieties of Reference; thereby 
lending credence ta our feeling that the conflict which makes Evans a foe of the 
McDowellian fusion-while not entirely baseless-may have a more personal 
motivation. Indeed, McDowell's inquisitiveness seemingly has more to do with his 
own profile as a thinker and posthumous editor of Evans' work than any palpable 
clash of ideas. Evans' early passing no doubt deprives us of many of the ideas 
central to the « non-stop ban-age of intellectual stimulation» his colleague and friend 
was subjected for sorne ten years (cf. McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. viii). It is therefore 
understandable that McDowell should have wanted to come to grips with his motley 
philosophical interests, and would have seen those rationalizations as important 
steps in his search for a third way. Nevertheless, we should enter the caveat that the 
work done by Evans' tenets in Mind and World is disproportionate to that found in 
his published philosophy. 
That generosity, however, does not prevent Evans' arguments from providing us 
with an excellent springboard whence to explore the most salient features of 
McDowell's fusion thesis. In the three sections that follow, we will thus look at 
what McDowell considers to be the three strongest reasons given by Evans for 
thinking that receptive experience deserves to be accorded a stratum of its own, and 
will examine the systematic replies put forth by McDowell to defend his radical 
admixture of "receptive spontaneity". 
2.3.2 Experience as involving concepts 
The first argument of Evans' for differentiating the contents of experience from 
those of concepts is that the information carried by the latter is "coarser-grained" 
than that of former; as reflected for example in the fact that we categorize far fewer 
concepts of colour than are available in the actual spectrum of human sight. Central 
to Evans' theorizing on this topic is what he calls "Russell's Principle": « Russell 
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held the view that in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgement 
about an object, one must know which object is in question-one must know which 
object it is that one is thinking about» (Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 65). Now this 
principle has important bearings on the case of the colour spectrum, insofar as our 
senses seem to provide us with far more shades than we can reasonably know in the 
technical sense expected by Russell's Principle. As Evans writes: « Do we really 
understand the proposaI that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades of 
colour we can sensibly discrirninate? » (Ibid., p. 229). 
The fact that conceptual thought deals in coarser-grained contents allows us sift 
through the barrage of information made available in experience and pick out 
objects with greater deterrninacy. In contrast, the contents fumished by sensory 
inputs manifest a fineness of grain which effectively prevents experience from 
satisfying the demand that we be explicitly cognizant of which object we intend. As 
a result, Evans adopts the following stance: «In order to make Russell's Principle a 
substantial principle, l shall suppose that the knowledge which it requires is what 
rnight be called discriminating knowledge: the subject must have a capacity to 
distinguish the object of his judgement from aIl other things » (Ibid., p. 89). To 
withdraw this necessary condition from experience would be to rob it of its 
epistemic value and reduce it to a merely causal exposure-what Evans called the 
"Photograph Model" (Ibid., p. 76-79). 
AlI of this is not to say that Evans denies that we can grasp the objects of 
experience. His argument is only that the respective degrees of information carried 
by experience and concepts shows their contents to differ in a fundamental way. In a 
sense, we could say that experiential episodes supply the mind with "analog" 
contents, while the concepts abstracted therefrom carry "digital" information (for an 
elaborate endorsement of this view, cf. Dretske, [1981] 1999, especially Chapter 6). 
Whereas concepts are vehicles of coarser-grained or digital contents which can pick 
out their referents in absentia, experiences generate fine-grained or "analog" 
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contents that require the mind to be in praesentia of a given object in order to meet 
the discrimination called for by Russell's Principle. The idea of divergent degrees of 
informational richness therefore implies that our minds routinely mobilize two 
different modes of knowledge in order to apprehend to world (i.e., description / in 
absentia vs. acquaintance / in praesentia)-a distinction which runs counter to 
McDowell's peremptory insistence that the conceptual faculty intervenes even in the 
most punctate of experiential impingements. 
Although a cursory glance will reveal Evans' comments on this subject to be 
relatively scarce and suggestive at best, McDowell seems to have considered talk of 
the colour spectrum a sufficiently robust template from which to unpack the 
ramifications of his fusion stance. McDowell's initial reaction to Evans' argument 
is to question the tacit assumption that « a person' s ability to embrace colour within 
her conceptual thinking is restricted to concepts expressible by words like "red" or 
"green" and phrases like "bumt sienna" » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 56). A 
challenge is here issued at the idea that linguistic categories overlap isomorphically 
with conceptual categorizations. Appealing to introspection, McDowell insists that 
we can and do form concepts of shades which lie between more conventionally 
delineated concepts (Ibid.). While we may not always have the linguistic resources 
to produce a name for these intermediate qualities, nothing prevents us from giving 
them an expression « that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a 
phrase like "that shade", in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the 
sample» (Ibid., p. 57). 
At this point in McDowell's argument, one could reasonably see in this 
extemalist marshalling of worldly samples at hand (presumably natural classes) a 
restatement of the notion of knowledge by acquaintance. If anything, it seems to do 
more to reiterate Russell's distinction than to collapse il. The kind of indexical 
ostension at the heart of McDowell's recourse to "that shade" implies a situational 
embeddedness which l'uns counter to the transcendent generality normally taken to 
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be a defining trait of concepts. McDowell recognizes that his argument invites such 
a reading, as burdening the world with the individuation of contents « would cast 
doubt on its being recognizable as a conceptual capacity at aIl »(Ibid.). He thus 
directs the remainder his argumentative energies at the (somewhat implausible) task 
of extending the scope of "that shade" beyond its immanent context-while trying to 
hold fast to the idea that "that shade" wouId still be available to the mind. In short, 
he wants to show that we can be acquainted in absentia. 
McDowell believes that « [wJe can ensure that what we have in Vlew IS 
genuinely recognizable as a conceptual capacity if we insist that the very same 
capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of 
the experience itself »(Ibid.). His claim, in short, is that experiential contents have 
the ability to survive beyond an agent's causal exposure to the relevant objectes). If 
we stay with a strictly "ocular" gloss (and uncritically accept the rather shaky 
assumption that the conclusions drawn in this area can be applied in an 
unproblematic way to aIl the senses), we can say that McDowell believes the ex post 
facto retention of experiential contents provides a strong rebuttal to Evans' claim 
that the contents of receptivity must be distinguished from those of the conceptual 
realm. McDowell sees in this argument from afterimages a theoretical vindication 
of his fusion thesis: « [FJrom the standpoint of a dualism of concept and intuition, 
these capacities would seem hybrids. There is an admixture of intuition in their very 
constitution [...] » (Ibid., p. 59). 
Our aim here is only to expose the arguments put forth by McDowell in defence 
of his fusion thesis, not to pass under review the cogency of his elaborate claims. 
Suffice it to point out that the success of his reply to Evans on the topic of "fineness 
of grain" ultimately depends on whether or not one can indeed pick out a 
nondescript shade with the same level of determinacy as a colour-concept even when 
1) one can not name "that" shade in question, and 2) a sample of the shade is absent 
from one's immediate surroundings. 
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2.3.3 Concepts as involving spontaneity 
Even if one were to assume that McDowell's arguments show in a definite way that 
'concepts are involved in expelience', that conclusion would not directly lend 
support to his broader claim that 'spontaneity is involved in experience'. Indeed, 
posing Evans' technical arguments in favour of non-conceptual content as sorne sort 
of adversary or obstacle to the kind of pan-spontaneity advocated by McDowell 
involves a considerable enthymeme: the putative antagonism requires that the 
"conceptual" be put in the same broad camp as "spontaneity". McDowell recognizes 
the strain his dichotomous framework places on the traditional notion of concept: 
Now we should ask why it seems appropriate to describe the understanding, 
whose contribution to this [Kantian] co-operation is its command of concepts, in 
terms of spontaneity. A schematic but suggestive answer is that the topography 
of the conceptual sphere is constituted by rational relations. The space of 
concepts is at least part of what Wilfrid Sellars calls "the space of reasons". 
When Kant describes the understancling as a faculty of spontaneity, that reflects 
his view of the relation between reason and freedom: rational necessitation is not 
just compatible with freedom but constitutive of it. In a slogan, the space of 
reasons is the realm of freedom. ([1994] 2002, p. 4-5) 
Obviously, simple affirmation that such is McDowell's usage will not do; we need 
arguments to secure the transitive inference that 'there is spontaneity in experience'. 
For, strictly speaking, if we construe "sheer receptivity" as the Given, this commits 
us only to viewing a "tainted receptivity" as symbolic, anatomie, and inferential 
(sect. 1.5.2). As such, incorporation of a more onerous notion like spontaneity in 
this mix warrants further explanation. Let us explore this missing link. 
Evans' second argument against fusing the contents of concepts with those of 
experiences is that the latter are immune in a way that allows them to present 
themselves as they are regardless of what we believe; as in the case of someone who 
is told that an appearance is illusory yet is powerless to refashion his sight 
accordingly (cf Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 122-123). McDowell recognizes that « 
Evans is here insisting that the active business of making up one's mind is the proper 
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context in which to place conceptual capacities, and that is something l have been 
urging throughout these lectures» ([1994] 2002, p. 60). However, the crucial issue 
here is whether the fact that a worldly object presents itself forcefully in experience 
conunits the mind to a likewise belief in the conceptual realm. In short, the 
philosophic problem is how to construe the fact that the world often makes the mind 
"offers it can't refuse". The question is one of pivotaI importance, for it seems that, 
« [i]f one does make a judgement, it is wrung from one by the experience [...] » 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 61). Does not this kind of strong indexicality 
underrnine or hinder our exercise of spontaneity? The matter is made aIl the more 
difficult by the fact that, despite their "coercive" nature, experiential episodes do let 
us know that things are "thus and so". 
For his part, Evans argues that this compels us to acknowledge that experiences 
provide us with contents distinct from those we wilfully embrace in spontaneity: « 
[lJt seems to me preferable to take the notion of being in an informational state with 
such-and-such content as a primitive notion for philosophy, rather than to attempt to 
characterize it in terrns of beliefs » (Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 123). Yet it is seemingly 
constitutive of the very idea of the conceptual realm-of the space of reasons-that 
we should have a say in deciding what we believe. We can thus say that McDowell, 
like Evans, is searching for a "primitive notion for philosophy"; only he wants to 
countenance a stronger notion which will allow the reach of our spontaneity to 
extend aIl the way down to our most basic episodes of receptivity. 
We have already had a brush with McDowell's way about this task, albeit under 
a different guise, when we mentioned his insistence that for a gift to be properly 
Given it must be Accepted (sect. 1.5.2). Simple and straightforward though his tenet 
appears to be, it contains sorne important difficulties which undermine its strength, 
putting in question the overall tenability of McDowell's positive-theoretic proposaI. 
We will have ample opportunity to discuss these rigours later in this chapter. What 
we want to do now is look at the logic which underpins it. 
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At first glance, the idea of a "receptive spontaneity" seems an outright 
contradiction in terms. A superficial look at this notion could suggest that 
McDowell's enthusiasm for Kant's credo has led his fertile imagination to bite off 
more than he can philosophically chew. Most of these understandable 
apprehensions can be put to rest if we keep in mind that what McDowell means by 
"spontaneity" is far broader than what we normally take the term to signify. One 
way to explicate McDowell's idiosyncratic use of the term would be to say that it is 
for him an umbrella term covering aIl grades of freedom. At the stronger and more 
familiar end of that spectrum, we find that freedom which allows agents to dabble 
freely in the fabric of their representations. This is arguably the species of 
spontaneity most familiar to us. It is responsible, for instance, for deciding which 
plank of Neurath's wholistic boat gets moved where (cf Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 3). 
Yet McDowell holds that spontaneity is also manifest in weaker acts of the mind. 
As he writes: « That things are thus and sa is the content of the experience, and it 
can also be the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the 
subject decides to take the experience at face value » (McDoweIl, [1994] 2002, p. 
26; italics ours). 
Thus, while McDowell readily concedes that the faculty which rescues sensible 
intuition from Kant's proverbial blindness is symbolic, anatomie, and inferential, he 
insists that those features entail the involvement of yet another-and less 
structural--one. For if the realm of mind is indeed a SeIlarsian "space of reasons", 
this implies that the inferential ligatures which bind that wholistic fabric together 
must be grasped as reasons. In our view, there is much to recommend this insight. 
One can perhaps argue that the layout of our anatomie linkages is dictated by an 
impersonal logic, but even the strongest rationalism would loose aIl plausibility if it 
did not recognize that the CUITent which runs through that inferential circuitry is the 
assent-however minimal-of the thinking agent. 
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We would not be able to suppose that the capacities that are in play in experience 
are conceptual if they were manifested only in experience, only in operations of 
receptivity. They would not be recognizable as conceptual capacities at aIl 
unless they could also be exercised in active thinking, that is, in ways that do 
provide a good fit for the idea of spontaneity. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. Il) 
Thus, from the most sophisticated scientific decision to the very lobby of the 
Sellarsian one-way door (sect. 1.5), aIl that is mind is construed by McDowell as 
lying within the purview of human spontaneity. As such, what is "drawn into" 
experience is not just conceptual thought-but genuine freedom as weIl: 
[W]e cannot simply insulate the passive involvement of conceptual capacities in 
experience from the potentially unnerving effects of the freedom implied by the 
idea of spontaneity. If we think that the way to exploit the passivity of 
experience is to deny that spontaneity extends aIl the way out to the content of 
experience, we merely faU back into a misleadingly formulated version of the 
Myth of the Given. [...] If those impingements are conceived as outside the 
scope of spontaneity, outside the domain of responsible freedom, then the best 
they can yield is that we cannot be blamed for believing whatever they lead us to 
believe, not that we arejustified in believing if. (Ibid., [1994] 2002, p. 13; italics 
ours) 
The last portion of this passage aUudes to the Sel1arsian argument against 
receptivity. For the receptive fragment to contribute knowledge-that is, for the 
content it forcefuUy delivers to have any epistemic value-it seems it must open 
itself to the possibility of falsity (Sel1ars, [1956] 1963, § 7; cf sect. 1.5.3). The velY 
notion of 'Truth', we could say, has the same kind of anatomie structure as the 
concept 'Sister': by its very nature, it presupposes another concept, in this case 
'False'. As a result, an experiential content that would impel its own veracity upon 
the mind by an undeniable presence (e.g. the empiricist's sense-datum) would be 
structuraUy impotent to enter into the realm of spontaneity. Seen in this light, 
Givenness effectively bars the mind from exercising its most primitive freedom in 
cognition, namely the (binary) choice to think or not to think that a content is indeed 
thus and so (cf sect. 4.4.2). A "mythical" episode of pure receptivity, divorced as it 
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would be from any spontaneity, could therefore generate only dogmas-not beliefs 
(much less reasons): «The trouble about the Myth of the Given is that it offers us at 
best exculpation where we wanted justifications» (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 13). 
2.3.4 Spontaneityas an upshot of our human nature 
The third and final argument of Evans' addressed in Mind and World states that, 
since we share perception with animals that do not possess our conceptual faculty, 
we should recognize the contents which belong to concepts as supplementary-and 
hence different-from those manifested in experience (cf. Evans, [1982] 2002, p. 
124). According to this view, « mere animaIs only receive the Given, whereas we 
not only receive it but are also able to put it into conceptual shape» (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 123). 
Although he obviously does not share Evans' conclusion that the contents of 
experiences and concepts differ in sorne fundamental way, McDowell agrees with 
the basic premises whence that inference is drawn: 
Mere animaIs do not come within the scope of the Kantian thesis, since they do 
not have the spontaneity of the understanding. We cannot construe them as 
continually reshaping a world-view in rational response to the deliverances of 
experience; not if the idea of a rational response requires subjects who are in 
charge of their thinking, standing ready to reassess what is a reason for what, and 
to change their responsive propensities accordingly. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 
114) 
The challenge McDowell faces, then, is to show how this view of spontaneity as 
exclusively human in conjunction with the sober recognition that « [i]t is a plain fact 
that we share perception with mere animaIs» (Ibid.) does not undermine the fusion 
thesis by corrunitting him to the same conclusion as Evans. For while Evans' stance 
is congenial to his dichotomous Russellian framework, it would appear to drag 
McDowell into conflict with his own monistic commitments. 
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Since McDowell readily acknowledges the truth of the premises at hand, the only 
strategy that remains for him to exploit is to produce supplementary claims that shift 
the balance of argument in his favour (clearly, humans are indeed free to "reassess 
what is a reason for what"). He proposes to adduce such a countermeasure, 
outlining his tactic as follows: 
[...] l want to borrow from Hans-Georg Gadamer a remarkable description of the 
difference between a merely animal mode of life, in an environment, and a 
human mode of life, in the world. For my purposes, the point of this is that it 
shows in sorne detail how we can acknowledge what is common between human 
beings and brutes, while preserving the difference [i.e., between human being 
and brutes] that the Kantian thesis forces on us. ([1994] 2002, p. 115) 
According to this account, the kind of sentience with which animaIs are endowed is 
fit to cope with biological imperatives in a way that promotes their survival. But 
whatever evolutionary adaptation has furthered sentience as a feature of animal life 
has done so at the price of forgoing spontaneity, since « a merely animal life is 
shaped by goals whose control of the animal's behaviour at a given moment is an 
immediate outcome of biological forces» (Ibid.). It is at this point that Gadamer 
steps in: « Now Gadamer's thesis is this: a life that is structured only in that way is 
led not in the world, but only in an environment » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 115; 
cf Gadamer, [1960] 1992, p. 438-456). 
Although he summons this distinction to further his own view of the human 
mind, McDowell takes great care not to let this differentiation between a meaning­
rich "world" and a drier "environment" degenerate into a constmal of animaIs as 
causally drifting in the flow of their proximal inputs, which would suggest the 
underlying presence of a matrix totally alien to what we could legitimately credit as 
sentience. Granted, McDowell sees in Gadamer's particular usage of "environment" 
and "world" a way to ensure that whatever receptivity animaIs do possess can be 
clearly segregated from our own human brand of receptivity. However, he is aware 
that endorsing a strict "stimulus-response" construal of animal conduct would 
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effectively sanction the "bald" naturalist' s contention that intentionality in general is 
but a sympathetic projection of our own (private and unverifiable) autopsychological 
lives (sect. 1.3.2 and 1.3.3): 
This is not to imply that features of the environment are nothing to a perceiving 
animal. On the contrary, they can be problems or opportunities for it [...]. 
This talk of what features of the environment are for an animal expresses an 
analogue to the notion of subjectivity, close enough to ensure that there is no 
Cartesian automatism in our picture. Exactly not: we need to appeal to an 
animal' s sensitivity to features of its environment if we are to understand its alert 
and self-moving life, the precise way in which it copes competently with its 
environment. [...] To register how far we are from the Kantian structure, we 
might say that what is in question here is proto-subjectivity rather than 
subjectivity. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 116-117) 
Due to his opposition to mechanistic interpretations, McDowell feels compelled to 
acknowledge that animaIs have sorne sort of intentionality-however naïve or 
undeveloped-at their commando However, lest this minimal concession to a 
"proto-subjectivity" be understood as insinuating the presence of sorne shared 
spontaneity that would run across the spectrum of life forms, McDowell's next 
paragraph opens with an unequivocal reaffirmation of his Gadamer-inspired 
conviction that, « [i]n a merely animal mode of life, living is nothing but responding 
to a succession of biological needs » (Ibid.; italics ours). 
In truth, the appeal to Gadamer does not really confirm McDowell' s stance-at 
least not in the sense of providing support for it. Rather, what the distinction 
between "environment" and "world" does is provide McDowell with an another way 
to state his conviction that animal thinking has nothing in common with human 
thought (while this manifestly helps us get a better grasp of the intuitions driving his 
confidence on the matter, it is actually very much like the Given in that "it offers us 
at best exculpation where we wanted justifications"). 
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2.4 Friction resurrected: Iocating a basis for perpetuaI self-criticism 
2.4.1 Laying the groundwork for a tribunal within 
We have travelled a very long chain of reasoning, and now come to the final links. 
Let us briefly pause and recap. As McDowell sees it, we should push for a drastic 
reinterpretation of the Kantian credo so as to fuse the twin faculties of spontaneity 
and receptivity: «The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results 
from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity. (...] We can dismount 
from the seesaw if we can achieve a firm grip on this thought: receptivity does not 
make an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 9). As we have seen, this radical fusion has profound consequences 
for the way we are to picture the interface of mind and world. Experiential episodes 
are to be reconsidered in a way that allows for the contribution, however minimal, of 
a distinctly human brand of freedom. At its most primitive level, spontaneity 
intervenes in our decision to take sensory contents at face value, to assent that things 
are indeed "thus and so". ln so doing, we effectively rob the gift of indexicality of 
its mythical character. But fusion at the most punctate level also beckons us to 
rethink our metaphysical outlook on a macroscopic scale, reconsidering the 
conceptual realm in such a way that it becomes all-encompassing. This, in short, 
entails pansemiotism, a tenet we shall now explore. 
McDowell' s "unbounded" view of the conceptual realm, as we have said, 
borrows liberally from Quine's wholistic imagery (cf McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 
13nll). Although McDowell's overall program is far more concerned with 
therapeutically reconciling "mind and world" than with establishing the places of 
philosophy and science, the wholistic penchant of his positive-theoretic proposaI 
does share with Quine the conviction that « the network, as an individual thinker 
finds it governing her thinking, is not sacrosanct » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 12). 
However, as a member of what Rorty has called the "Pittsburgh School of Neo­
Hegelians" (cf Thomton, 2004, p. 3), what bothers McDowell in Quine's position 
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is not so much that it grants us leeway in how we configure our least observational 
representations but, more crucially, its ambiguity in holding experience as a 
"tribunal" to which the whole must conform, if only en masse (cf Quine, [1953] 
2001, p. 41). Granted, Quine effectively hollows out representations of any self­
standing meaning by adhering to an aseptic stimulus-response model. Yet despite 
the fact that multiple networks of representations can be made to match ostensions 
equally well (Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 26; cf sect. 1.1.3), the authority of those lival 
wholes is nevertheless diffused to the extent that, in the end, « [t]he edge of the 
system must be kept squared with experience » (Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 45). In a 
sense, we can say that in Quine' s tribunal picture, although contacts can (in 
principle) deliver any verdict, they must nevertheless deliver sorne verdict-an 
admixture Quinean scholar Roger Gibson has aptly characterized as "Behaviourism 
cum Empiricism" (Gibson, 2004, p. 181-199). 
One of the main concerns of McDowell in Mind and World is to evaluate the 
plausibility of such a stance, to investigate the philosophical possibility of such a 
"minimal empiricism" (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. xi). He summarizes the genesis 
of the problem as follows: 
To make sense of the idea of a mental state's or episode's being directed towards 
the world, in the way in which, say, a belief or judgement is, we need to put the 
state or episode in a normative context. [...] This relation between mind and 
world is normative, then, in this sense: thinking that aims at judgement, or at the 
fixation of belief, is answerable to the world-to how things are-for whether or 
not it is correctly executed. 
Now how should we elaborate the idea that our thinking is thus answerable to 
the world? [...] Even if we take it that answerability to how things are includes 
more than answerability to the empirical world, it nevertheless seems right to say 
this: since our cognitive predicament is that we confront the world by way of 
sensible intuition (to put it in Kantian terms), our reflection on the very idea of 
thought' s directedness at how things are must begin with answerability to the 
empirical world. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. xi, xii) 
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As McDowell sees it, Quinean wholism cannot daim worldly impingements as 
efficacious members of the episteITÙc judiciary (which indudes maximal integrity of 
held beliefs). The impotence here stems from Quine's "ITÙnimaIly empirical" 
construal of the edge of the whole as comprised of semanticaIly-hollow behavioural 
relations. By so denying the possibility of anything that could resemble self­
standing contents-the infamous "idea" idea (cf. Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 48)-Quine 
effectively deprives himself of anything that could have effectively supplied sorne 
form of nontrivial receptivity. 
Receptivity figures in the explanatory background of circumstances that belong 
together with evolving world-views in the order of justification. But receptivity 
itself cannot rationally interact with spontaneity, in the way that Quine's rhetoric 
implies, though his official conception of receptivity predudes such interaction. 
Against this, l daim that although Quine's half-hearted attempt to picture 
world-views as products of a rational interaction between spontaneity and 
receptivity is unacceptable, [... ] that is no reason to discard the very idea of such 
an interaction. The trouble lies not in the idea itself, but in the half­
heartedness-in the fact that while the rhetoric depicts the interaction as rational, 
Quine conceives receptivity in such a way that it cannot impinge rationally on 
anything. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 141) 
The crux of the issue then, is whether the underdeterrninacy in Quine's wholism 
extends aIl the way out to the experiential episodes themselves, or whether we 
should make a "ITÙnimal" concession to empiricism whereby receptive friction 
prevents the slide from underdeterITÙnation to nondeterITÙnation. For it seems this is 
precisely what we must do if we want to justify our conviction that « [s]uiting 
empirical beliefs to the reasons for them is not a self-contained game » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 5). AlI of this, of course, is but another way of glossing the "world 
as ineffable liITÙt" theme touched on earlier with respect to Sellars and Kant (sect. 
2.2.1). It should therefore come as no surprise that McDowell directs his attention to 
the contradictions nested in the view of experience as a tribunal with the same 
leitmotif as ever, namely that it is absurd for a philosophy to straddle both sides of 
the frontier of thought. 
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2.4.2 Recovering our rightful place in nature 
McDowell strongly believes we should resist the appeal to transsemiotic 
agnosticism, inviting us instead to embrace pansemiotism wholeheartedly. 
However, eschewing recourse to a transcendental limit, while it may yet avoid a 
crucial mistake, does not alleviate the anxiety of the oscillation per se. For the 
strategy itself does not address the discomforts that come with the option of whole, 
chief among which is the fear that an asymmetrical "one-way" interface leaves open 
the possibility that the mind might not be warranted in laying any daim to 
objectivity. If McDowell wishes to imbue aIl that is mind with spontaneity but 
wants to obstruct the march of relativism, it would seem something more is needed. 
Let us examine his creative response in this regard. 
As we saw in the first chapter (sect. 1.3), McDowell suggests that by reuniting 
with pre-modern world-views, we may yet learn to accommodate a fact which 
oftentimes seems queer to our eyes; namely that our faculty of spontaneity-while 
not lawful-is nevertheless not sui generis (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 66-86). 
According to this view, we can exorcise the metaphysical alienation if we moor our 
conception of the intelligible onto a ontology free of the reductive tendency which 
gained ascendancy in post-Cartesian / post-Galilean times: 
Setting our faces against bald naturalism, we are committed to holding that the 
idea of knowing one's way about in the space of reasons, the idea of 
responsiveness to rational relationships, cannot be reconstructed out of the 
materials that are naturalistic in the sense that we trying to supersede. [...] So it 
looks as if we are picturing human beings as partly in nature and partly outside it. 
[...] 
But there is a way out. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 77-78) 
Exercises of spontaneity belong to our mode of living. And our mode of living 
is our way of actualizing ourselves as animaIs. So we can rephrase the thought 
by saying: exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualizing ourselves as 
animaIs. This removes any need to try to see ourselves as peculiarly bifurcated, 
with a footholù in the animal kingdom and a mysterious separate invol vement in 
an extra-natural world of rational connections. (Ibid., p. 78) 
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According to this account, the primary virtue of the pre-modern world-view was 
that, whatever debates it witnessed, it effectively provided its adherents with a tacit 
construal of rnind analogous to that which thinkers since at least Kant have striven to 
recover in explicit theorizing (with varying degrees of success). Thinkers working 
in pre-modern times basically took it for granted that the proper place of the human 
mind-freedom included-is the natural order of things (although man typically 
occupied a privileged abode in most cosmologies, religious or secular). 
McDowell maintains that the crucial point which divides philosophizing In 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages from the more incredulous modern brands is the 
place of law in explanation. For if the rnind' s representations are indeed steeped in 
an all-encompassing freedom, as McDowell holds, then it is only normal that a 
philosophical outlook which makes lawful behaviour the hallmark of the world's 
intelligibility should have trouble integrating the spontaneity side of the Kantian co­
operation. 
Sellars traced the anxieties of modern epistemology to the fact that the idea of 
knowledge is the idea of a position in a justificatory network; this was the 
context in which he mentioned the space of reasons. Anxiety about knowledge, 
of the farniliar modern kind, results when that fact is juxtaposed with the 
threatened extrusion of the space of reasons from nature. It is not that the idea of 
knowledge as a position in the space of reasons was new-as if it was not until 
around the seventeenth century that people hit on the thought that beeomes so 
pregnant in modern epistemology, that knowledge is a normative status. But 
before the modern era, the idea that knowledge is a normative status was not felt 
to stand in tension with, say, the idea that knowledge might be the result of an 
exercise of natural powers. A naturalism that responds to this tension [...] is 
quite different from a naturalism like Aristotle's, whieh never feels a tension 
here, and has no need for imagery of grounding or foundations. (MeDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 80n12) 
It would be inaccurate to say that McDowell nostalgieally conceives his eall to 
renew with the pre-modern world-view as doing revisionist justice to farsighted 
achievements hitherto neglected by philosophie historiography. Rather, he insists 
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that what we can learn most from rekindling with the pre-modern past is that theirs 
was precisely not a theoretical achievement but a commonsensical assumption as to 
the state of things. As he writes: 
[T]here is an intelligible tendency to set up the study of nature as the very 
exemplar of what it is to investigate how things are. Thus, when nature threatens 
to extrude the space of reasons, philosophical worries are generated about the 
status of rational connections, as something that we can be right or wrong about. 
One response to these worries is to resist the extrusion in the manner of bald 
naturalism, leaving the conception of nature unquestioned but insisting that after 
aIl the putative rational requirements that we want to defend can be founded on, 
or constructed out of, independent facts of nature. If 1 am right about the genesis 
of the worries, it must be anachronistic to read something like this into Aristotle. 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 79-80) 
According to this gloss, Aristotle's conception of nature as a "book of lessons" 
allowed him to inquire into objects of study like norms or minds free of the 
(philosophically pathological) need for a complex reductionist apparatus. 
As is typical of McDowell's rather adumbrated author-based accounts, he has 
little use for the specific categories and other technicalities of the full Aristotelian 
system (a cursory look at the figures we have encountered thus far highlights the 
many theses left out, be they Quine's grievances with positivistic conceptions of 
science, Davidson's project for a non-circular truth-conditional semantic, Sellars' 
hostilities towards sense-data theories, or Kant's technical intersecting of the 
analytic / synthetic and a priori / a posteriori). Instead, McDowell praises the 
Stagirite only in a most general way. 
In Aristotle's conception, the thought that the demands of ethics are real is not a 
projection from, or construction out of, facts that could be in view independently 
of the viewer's participation in ethical life and thought, 50 that they would be 
available to a sideways-on investigation of how ethical life and thought are 
related to the natural context in which they take place. The fact that the demands 
bear on us is just, irreducibly, itself. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 83) 
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Although his own ethical views largely converge with Aristotle's (cf McDowell, 
[1980] 1998b), McDowell's compliments are thus directed not so much at specific 
Aristotelian tenets as to the meta-philosophical way they are argued for. The virtue 
of Aristotle's inquiries into the human condition, he maintains, is that they never 
once stop to ponder whether they are grounded in a sufficientIy robust outlook (it 
would probably be no great Ieap to conjecture that McDowell's imagination was 
captivated by what seemed to him a widespread "quietism" avant la lettre). 
In a sense, Aristotle's idea that man is an indivisible conjunct of animality and 
rationality is taken by McDowell as a harbinger to Kant's credo about the 
inseparable contributions of conceptua1 thought and experiential intuition. It is not 
so much that Aristotle's philosophy actually contains something akin to the Kantian 
synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity McDowell so ardently strives to make 
tenable. Rather, Aristotle's naturalist approach stokes McDowell's confidence that 
his radical amalgam can indeed be achieved. 
1 have been considering the tendency to oscillate between two unpalatable 
positions: a coherentism that loses the bearing of empirical thought on reality 
altogether and a recoil into a vain appeal to the Given. 1 have proposed a 
diagnosis of this tendency: it reflects an intelligible distortion undergone by the 
Aristotelian idea that normal mature human beings are rational animaIs. 
AnimaIs are, as such, natural beings, and a familiar modern conception of nature 
tends to extrude rationality from nature. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 108) 
In Aristotle' s conception of human beings, rationality is integrally part of their 
animal nature, and the conception is neither naturalistic in the modern sense 
(there is no hint of reductiveness or foundationalism) nor fraught with 
philosophical anxiety. What makes this possible is that Aristotle is innocent of 
the very idea that nature is the realm of law and therefore not the home of 
meaning. (Ibid., p. 109) 
But instead of trying to integrate the intelligibility of meaning into the realm 
of law, we can aim at a postlapsarian or knowing counterpart of Aristotle's 
innocence. (Ibid.) 
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It is central to McDowell's way of viewing the pre-modern conception that the 
human rnind not be construed as something distinct from the natural realm. 
Aristotle is (rightfully) seen as an exemplar of this laudable assumption that rational 
animaIs have their place in a cosmos of unbroken continuity. Seen in this light, 
McDowell contends that Aristotle's "innocent" approach to inquiry provides us with 
a general blueprint for the development of a tenable third way capable of exiting the 
seesaw. While this obviously reads much into a body of thought foreign to the issue 
at stake, that is precisely the point. Nevertheless, it is an ironic consequence of 
McDowell's hybrid approach to philosophy that he should strive to answer 
Wittgenstein's search for the discovery that will bring us peace ([1953] 2001, § 
133)-by renewing with that activity's most prorninent system-builder. 
2.4.3 Counter-spontaneity as an upshot of our "second nature" 
McDowell's insistence that spontaneity is a feature unique to humans flows from his 
desire to reconnect with the "enchanted" conceptions of nature purportedly taken for 
granted p110r to the advent of modern thought. But above and beyond supplying him 
with the thoroughgoing example of an outlook respecting the ontology proper to 
both Kantian faculties, McDowell finds much in Aristotle' s thinking which, he 
argues, vindicates his precept that we have a perpetuaI obligation to question the 
merit of our beliefs (sect. 1.4.2). 
The best we can achieve is always to sorne extent provisional and inconclusive, 
but that is no reason to succumb to the fantasy of an external validation. 
If we enrich it, then, to include a proper place for reflectiveness, Aristotle's 
picture can be put 1ike this. The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, 
which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them. We are 
alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a 
decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are 
opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons. Thereafter our 
appreciation of its detailed layout is indefinitely subject to refinement, in 
reflective scrutiny of our ethical thinking. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 82) 
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Notice the pivotaI role played by the notion of "a decent upbringing". As 
McDowell explains, 
If we generalize the way Aristotle conceives the moulding of ethical character, 
we anive at the notion of having one's eyes opened to reasons at large by 
acquiring a second nature. 1 cannot think of a good short English expression for 
this, but it is what figures in German philosophy as Bildung. (Ibid., p. 84) 
As German scholar Rüdiger Bubner warns, « [i]t must be made clear that Bildung as 
a modern concept assumes much more of the subject' s power of spontaneity than 
what Aristotle had in rnind with his talk of second nature» (2002, p. 211). It is 
unclear whether McDowell intended his alternating usage to reflect corresponding 
theoretical nuances (Bubner does not detect any such rationale). In any event, 
without reading too much into McDowell's choice of words, we can follow his lead 
and look into the German notion as a way to better pin down the kind of 
philosophical work he expects from our supposed "second nature". The original 
meaning of the word Bildung (from the German "Bilel' or "picture") is, roughly, 
"something formed according to the inner depiction of an exemplary model". The 
suggestion here is that the "pictures" which come to shape a person's world-view 
can be transrnitted via upbringing, thereby allowing human animaIs to culturally 
reproduce the abstract schemes in which their rational differentia finds its home. 
While it is clearly an emergent outgrowth proper to the community of rational 
animaIs, this "second" nature is still through and through natural. Although the 
cultural specifics will vary, inculcation of "pictures", McDowell argues, is not a 
contingent social phenomenon. In fact, so convinced is he that the "second nature" 
brought out by upbringing « could not float free of potentialities that belong to a 
normal human organism » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 84) that he thinks it 
effectively « gives human reason enough of a foothold in the realm of law to satisfy 
any proper respect for modern natural science» (Ibid.). Secure in the strength of this 
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supposed objective grounding, the idea of "second nature" becomes pivotaI to 
McDowell's architectonic in providing the means by which one is introduced to the 
rules governing the abstract space of reasons. 
In rampant platonism, the structure of the space of reasons, the structure in 
which we place things when we find meaning in them, is simply extra-natural. 
Our capacity to resonate to that structure has to be mysterious; it is as if we had a 
foothold outside the animal kingdom, in a splendidly non-human realm of 
ideality. But thanks to the notion of second nature, there is no whiff of that here. 
[...] [A]lthough the structure of the space of reasons cannot be reconstructed out 
of facts about our involvement in the realm of law, it can be the framework 
within which meaning cornes into view only because our eyes can be opened to it 
by Bildung, which is an element in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of 
animaIs we are. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 88) 
We have already seen how that abstract "space" is composed of intertwining 
inferences. In essence, the whole is glued together by the anatomic dictum that « 
nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief » (Davidson, 
1986, p. 310). Such inferences, however, require the assent of a thinking agent. Just 
as one must Accept that the contents Given in experience are "thus and so" (thereby 
reducing the "given" to a lower case, non-mythical, variety), so must one Agree that 
"this fol1ows from that". Yet if the reasons for believing a conclusion accrue from 
the validity of the deduction whence it is drawn (e.g., a modus ponens), the reasons 
for believing in the rules of inference themselves would have to come from an 
altogether different source. This is where the idea of "second nature" steps in. In 
McDowell's view, recognizing the commitments which anatomically flow from our 
representations is a most civilized affair. Perhaps a good way to summarize what 
McDowell is driving at would be to say that the space of reasons must be tended by 
a "practice of reasons". 
It has been customary since at least Plato's Meno to consider education as the 
chief broker of new-found entailments. The Greek idea of anamnêsis had made the 
grasping of previously unfamiliar reasons a salutary means of ridding Œleself of the 
corruption inherent in our finite predicament so as to commune-if only through a 
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veil-with the incorruptible truths that make rationality possible. While McDowell 
would be uncomfortable with the idea that the space of reasons somehow gives one 
ingress to a privileged realm of transcendent truths, his construal of "second nature" 
clearly retains the social dimension of this account (cf. McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 
95)-a selective move which echoes Richard Rorty's push for epistemology as an 
ongoing conversation devoid of any trans-historical pretensions (cf. Rorty, 1980, p. 
360-394): 
In being initiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something 
that already embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively 
constitutive of the layout of the space of reasons, before she cornes on the scene. 
This is a picture of initiation into the space of reasons as an aIready going 
concern [.. .]. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 125) 
The tradition is subject to reflective modification by each generation that inherits 
it. Indeed, a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of 
the inheritance. (Ibid., p. 126) 
Although the polemic against Evans had McDowell devote a significant amount of 
argumentative energy towards discrediting the commonplace idea that « mere 
animaIs only receive the Given, whereas we not only receive it but are also able to 
put it into conceptual shape» (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 123; cf. sect. 2.3.4), his 
view of the social dimension of reason now spurs him to make a very bold claim: « 
[I]t is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a creature might be born at home in the 
space of reasons. Ruman beings are not: they are born mere animaIs, and they are 
transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity 
» (Ibid., p. 125). 
Whatever its merits, this thesis plays an important epistemological role in 
McDowell's positive-theoretic attempt to dismount the seesaw. We have seen how 
the idea of a "standing obligation" is called in to serve as a substitute for the 
empirical friction discarded in the flight from Givenness (sect. 1.4.2). McDowell 
thinks "second nature" rids this policy of its ad hoc character: 
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People sometimes object to positions like the one 1 have been urging [i.e., "the 
unboundedness of the conceptual"] on the ground that they embody an arrogant 
anthropocentrism, a baseless confidence that the world is completely within the 
reach of our powers of thinking. This looks akin to an accusation of idealism. 
Why should we be so sure of our capacity to comprehend the world if not 
because we conceive the world as a shadow or reflection of our thinking? 
But an accusation of arrogance would not stick against the position 1 am 
recommending. In my first lecture [on "Concepts and Intuitions"], 1said that the 
faculty of spontaneity carries with it a standing obligation to reflect on the 
credentials of the putatively rational linkages that, at any time, one takes to 
govern the active business of adjusting one's world-view in response to 
experience. ([1994] 2002, p. 39-40) 
Thus, according to McDowell, what ultimately prevents the slide into relativism is 
the fact that we can normatively oversee the manner in which we choose to weave 
our representations. The kind of empirical friction we let go of when we abandon 
the mythical hope for sorne form of Givenness can be reinstated if we fold thought 
onto itself. 
Whereas this can seem to be embracing the wholistic horn of the dilenuna, 
McDowell thinks that if we renew with Ancient ways of thinking, we can begin to 
see our way to a conception which makes the reflective policing of beliefs an 
integral part of our nature as rational animaIs. As he succinctly puts it, « [w]e are 
looking for a conception of our nature that includes a capacity to resonate to the 
structure of the space of reasons » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 109). In this respect, 
McDowell believes that « Kant' s lack of a pregnant notion of second nature explains 
why the right conception of experience cannot find a firm position in his thinking » 
(Ibid., p. 97). Seeing as how Kant was already only « within a whisker » from a 
robust solution (Ibid., p. 42; cf sect. 2.2.1), then, with these amendments in place, 
McDowell reckons the oscillation should be laid to rest. 
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2.5 Salient problems with McDowell's fusion and pansemiotism 
2.5.1 Is "friction-with-a-veto" still friction? 
ln the first chapter, we expressed our belief that an attempt to successfully end the 
futile oscillation between atomism and wholism should devote the bulk of its efforts 
to evicting the stubborn interlocutor of dialogic thought and to undoing the 
considerable harm done by the Sellarsian asymmetry of indexicality thesis. It 
should clear by now that this is no! the strategy adopted in Mind and World. The 
elaborate dismount developed by McDowelI is ambitious, to say the least. Perhaps it 
is only normal that so grand an issue as the seesaw should attract a retort of 
comparable grandeur. Be that as it may, what we want to do in the remainder of this 
chapter is mark out those areas where we disagree most with McDowelI's proposaI. 
McDowelI believes the chief virtue of the Aristotelian approach is that it places 
the rational animal in a natural context, alongside the other denizens we take to be 
paradigm-cases of intelligibility. McDowelI commends Aristotle for this outlook, 
which he attributes to the Greek thinker' s providential ignorance of the modern 
equation between nature and the realm of law. However, we believe the praise 
should go even deeper, extending to very meta-philosophy championed by Aristotle 
(one which, we opine, would have remained intact had he been privy to the fairly 
cohesive scientific world-view which gained prominence after Descartes, Galileo, 
and Newton). The outstanding merit of Aristotelianism, in our view, is that it 
approaches mind and world with the same ontological humility. If peripatetic 
wanderings show immanent particulars to be the most elementary constituents of the 
world, then it is the duty of the philosopher to refashion his metaphysical theories 
accordingly. Similarly, if investigations into the nature of the rational animal reveal 
the play of faculties that seerningly refuse to answer to the rigid principles found in 
forests and beaches, the philosopher is to take into account this fact in way that does 
not jeopardize those other findings. ln keeping with this aetiologic posture, we 
should like to calI into question one of the core tenets involved in McDowelI's 
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positive argument, namely that the mind must Accept the contents presented to it by 
the world-that it must marshal spontaneity to judge the deliverances of receptivity 
to indeed be "thus and so". 
We think the mind's contribution in experience should be conceived as much 
thinner than the kind of unmitigated spontaneity McDowell wants involved in even 
the most primitive contact with the world. We are quite friendly to the idea that an 
irreducible contribution must be made by the subject in order for it to intelligibly 
partake in whatever qualitative contents are involved in an episode of indexicality. 
For while we hold that the bulk of the energy expenditure (understood broadly) is 
assumed by something other than the mind in such events, we nevertheless think a 
minimal part of the total cost must be covered by the apprehending agency. We 
therefore agree with McDowell that the matter simply cannot be reduced to a neatly 
divided subject-object transaction, with the world picking up the tab. However, we 
would render the epistemic primitive advocated in Mind and World in a manner still 
more basal than what it endorses, supplementing McDowell's philosophy with the 
notion of a brute conative act whereby a living creature expresses the raw energy 
which distinguishes it from inanimate matter. With this contribution firrnly in place, 
there would be no tension inherent in the idea of experience as making the subject 
"an offer she can't refuse": her agency could be sliced thinly enough for her to 
receptively "take in" that deliverance, even though she did not have a spontaneous 
say in the matter (we will elaborate on this important idea in sect. 4.4.2). 
McDowell's bottom line, however, is thicker. The most basic choice his 
epistemology admits must be recognizable as a full-fledged exercise in spontaneity. 
As McDowell states: « Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to 
judge that things are as one's experience represents them to be » ([1994] 2002, p. 
Il). The rationale at work in this stance is as follows. To begin with, the ability to 
Accept or Refuse a content is arguably as far as an epistemological primitive can go 
while remaining a plausible candidate for the label of "spontaneity". Now there is 
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nothing inherently wrong with this-with the idea that we don't always have a say in 
what we think about the world. But McDowell's flight from Givenness forbids him 
to countenance the possibility that the world could actually coerce the mind into 
understanding it, with or without its consent. Countenancing forceful empirical 
contents in this manner would prevent spontaneity from extending aIl the way out to 
the most pointed tips of the Quinean web of representations, thereby undermining 
McDoweIl's pansemiotist commitments. It is only when freedom satmates that rim 
through and through that the rim effectively dissipates, and an unbounded realm 
ensues. 
Thus, for aIl his commitment to the Sellarsian segregation of index / symbol, 
atomic / anatomie, noninferential / inferential; McDoweIl grasps that it is precisely 
such a fundamental divergence that must be overcome if we are ever to 
dismount-or even "dissolve"-the seesaw. White Sellars and Kant had allowed 
the above dichotomies to go unchallenged and had chosen to reduce their left-hand 
parties to a "mythical" or "noumenal" limit status, McDowell wants to do away with 
the dualisms altogether by proposing bold new conceptions which merge the 
opposites into an indiscernible compound. It is thus an essential requirement of the 
McDowellian project that the SOIt of minimal agency at play in the Acceptance or 
RefusaI of receptivity not be differentiated from the sort involved in more overt acts 
of spontaneity. As such, McDoweIl wants the meagre energy expenditure assumed 
by the mind in recognizing that things are indeed "thus and so" to differ in degree 
but not in kind from the freedom to creatively dabble in the fabric of beliefs. As he 
sees it, « the capacities that are in play in experience [...] would not be recognizable 
as conceptual capacities at aIl unless they could also be exercised in active thinking, 
that is, in ways that do provide a good fit for the idea of spontaneity » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 11). In his view, if we construe the subject's active contribution in 
experiential receptivity as anything less than full-fledged spontaneity, « then the best 
[impingements] can yield is that we cannot be blamed for believing whatever they 
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lead us to believe, not that we are justified in believing it » (Ibid., p. 13). The fusion 
thesis thus leads McDowell to daim (rather paradoxically) that « even though 
experience is passive, it draws into operation capacities that genuinely belong to 
spontaneity» (Ibid.). 
As our aetiologic stance asks us to be rnindful of what's actually the case, we 
feel we must disagree with McDowell's daim that the freedom at play in Accepting 
(or Refusing) extends aIl the way. We are very keen to any epistemology that soils 
"pure" empiricism by insisting on the conative dimension at play in receptivity. Ta 
be sure, the empiricist insight that our sensory organs provide us with a free lunch of 
sorts contains a (quite sizeable) kemel of truth. But analogies with dominoes or 
photographs can only go so far: while it is true that something akin to causality is 
involved in experience, it is equally true that experience (in the nontrivial sense that 
concerns epistemology and not forensic medicine) is a privilege of the living. 
Taking the world in through one's sensory apparatus entails an effort on our part. 
Whether that conative dimension is best construed as lying within the purview of 
mind or body is irrelevant. If one wishes to repair the harm done to the human being 
by Cartesian dualism and renew with Aristotelianism, then one must be as attentive 
to animality as one is to rationality. On this point, McDowell fares quite weIl. 
However, we believe such a stance teaches us unequivocally that humans patently 
do not have the kind of ennobling privilege to Refuse the Given which McDowell's 
philosophical deliberations take them to have. 
McDowell is fond of saying that Givenness « offers us at best exculpations 
where we wanted justifications » ([1994] 2002, p. 13). For him, this poses a 
problem. But what if the quest for justifications is the quest for exculpations? 
McDowell insists matter-of-factly that « it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on 
the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute 
force, it is quite another thing to have a justification» (Ibid., p. 8). Whence cornes 
this demand that justification be anything more than a release from further 
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epistemological responsibility? The inference which says that the Given cannot be a 
reason for any c1aim (or any set of c1aims) flows only if one construes justification as 
both discursive and open-ended. We readily acknowledge that justification-both 
its demand and its supply-is essentially a discursive activity. But we 
wholeheartedly reject the mistaken assumption that the discursive nature of 
justification perforce makes it open-ended (cf sect. 4.3.2). Supplying explanations 
to back up one's c1aims indeed requires something along the lines of civility (of the 
kind exemplified by enlightenment thinkers' scholarly correspondence). But if one 
walks away from the epistemological negotiation table and ceases further intellectual 
commerce with an interlocutor unimpressed by one's empirical demonstration(s), 
one is most emphatically relieved of any blame. To find fault with an expositor of 
reasons for leaving the matter up to the world itself is to confess a (quasi-Platonic) 
veneration of the space of reasons as not just a public sphere where arguments are 
presented, but as a telepathic common-area where individual participants loose their 
volitions. 
One can object, as McDowell does, to scientism when it purports to have a 
monopoly on objectivity. But there is no good inference going from the rejection of 
such pretensions all the way to an endless exercise in disputation within the space of 
reasons where, with no world in sight, any party is allowed (both ontologically and 
normatively) to veto the deliverances of receptive experience if she so chooses, 
modulo whatever correct manners may be shared because of a common upbringing. 
Appeals to the world need not always involve a momentous experimentum crucis, 
but there is a way to construe the cessation of discursive justification-the 
attainment of a commendable epistemic exculpation-in more humble terms which 
do not dictate ahead of the world what can and cannot count as evidence for a c1aim. 
Since we do not share McDowell's acquiescence to the Sellarsian "one-way 
door" account of the relation between in praesentia indices and in absentia symbols, 
we are not beholden to his constraints. We have no quarrel with the fact that our 
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embeddedness in nature is such that the world routinely forces upon us an 
epistemologically nourishing free meal (albeit one not much refined). In fact, we 
take this condition to be a boon, not a bane, for philosophy. To illustrate the point, 
let us single out two very considerable difficulties a view like McDowell's faces. 
First, the choice to Accept or Refuse does not sit weIl with a "one-way door" 
interface of mind and world. On that construal of representation, it is structurally 
impossible for the mind to ascertain what is before it as a candidate for RefusaI or 
Acceptance. Knowing what a content is entails knowing what a content is, by which 
time the content has entered inside the space of mind. McDowell himself recognizes 
that « [i]n experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One's conceptual 
capacities have already been brought into play, in the content's being available to 
one, before one has any choice in the matter» ([1994] 2002, p. 10; italics ours). 
However, recognition of this fact is far from benign, and should have been of great 
moment for McDowell's philosophy. For either a) the asymmetrical door is opaque 
and the freedom to Refuse or Accept is in fact just a fortuitous exercise in 
guesswork, or b) that door is transparent and the idea of an all-encompassing 
freedom needs sorne serious re-evaluating. 
Yet there is a more tangible problem with McDowell's stance. If spontaneity 
does indeed extend aIl the way to the mind's most primitive experiential 
impingements, it should be possible in principle to shut oneself to receptivity 
aitogether-all the time. Obviously, such a policy can not be implemented. If we 
consider that thinking is the rational animal's means of earning its living in the 
world, we gather that the penalty for consistently Refusing aU incoming candidates 
would likely be death (or sorne form of vegetative autism). What is important here 
is that this "friction" is not the product sorne inner policing of representations, and 
that the reason for the impossibility of an unyielding RefusaI lies outside the "space 
of reasons". 
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2.5.2 Can "friction-from-within" really provide friction? 
In aIl, we can identity two expressions of "friction from within" in McDowell' s 
picture. The first takes place on very small scale-the smallest McDowell's aIl­
encompassing spontaneity permits. It resides in the ability to Accept or Refuse the 
contents of experience at the most elementary (binary) level. The human mind is 
said to endogenously generate friction insofar as it can stymie the stream of receptive 
input. We have just presented the difficulties this idea faces. Let us now look at the 
problems associated with the more elaborate friction in McDowell's dismount, that 
which operates on a larger scale. 
According to McDowell's account of "second nature", rational animaIs have the 
ability to institute epistemic norms to guide them in critically inspecting the fabric 
which makes up their "unbounded" conceptual realm. He argues that « [i]t is 
essential to conceptual capacities, in the demanding sense, that they can be exploited 
in active thinking, thinking that is open to reflection about its own rational 
credentials » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 47; note that the "credentials" here are 
purely rational, not empirical). But while it is a natural outgrowth of our human 
nature, this "standing obligation to reflect" needs to be brought out through 
upbringing. The leading channel through which the norms of reflective thought are 
transmitted is culture. Just as each member of the community of rational animaIs 
participates in a common nature, so too do they participate in a common "second 
nature". Through education, human offspring are initiated into a set of guidelines 
that effectively lay down what is to be considered rationally justified. However, 
McDowell claims that this does not undennine the objective status of what is 
transmitted in our socialization: « The bare idea of Bildung ensures that the 
autonomy of meaning is not inhuman, and that should eliminate the tendency to be 
spooked by the very idea of norms or demands of reason » (Ibid., p. 95). However, 
since the conventions so promulgated « may have hitherto unnoticed defects, such as 
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parochialism or reliance on bad prejudice » (Ibid., p. 81), the cultural norms 
themselves are not exempt from review, and « a standing obligation to engage in 
critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance » (Ibid., p. 126). 
As it stands, we have no problem with this view. What we take issue with is 
McDowell's desire to tum the norms instilled in Bi/dung inta a substitute for the 
kind of empirical friction relinquished in his flight from Givenness. Above and 
beyond the fact that we deem this flight to be misguided, our complaint is that the 
"counter-spontaneity" provided by the reflective imperative is patently not a 
replacement for worldly receptivity. 
We have seen how, in forswearing recourse to a transcendental limit upon the 
rnind's domain, McDowell considers himself to be setting right what Kant and 
Sellars (in his later work) supposedly did wrong. Contemplation of this crucial 
failing on the part of his philosophie mentors eventually leads McDowell to 
reconsider the ideas of a thinker who figures fleetingly but flatteringly in Mind and 
Wor/d, Hegel. What McDowell finds in Hegelian philosophy is not only an 
analogue of pansemiotism but a generalized support for his contention that thought 
can effectively fold onto itself in a way that allows it to supersede experiential 
impingements as arbiter of episternic affairs. As McDowell writes, « Hegelian 
Reason does not need to be constrained from outside, precisely because it includes 
as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility » (1998, p. 
466). McDowell's own gloss is devoid of the world-historical presumptuousness of 
Hegel's Geist. But while McDowell's version has a more pluralist tone, it 
nevertheless rests on a fundamentally universalist assumption. Indeed, McDowell 
believes that since we rational animaIs pattake in a ubiquitous biological nature, the 
Bi/dung brought to the fore by our peers « could not float free of potentialities that 
belong to a normal human organism » ([1994] 2002, p. 84; ironically, despite the 
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fact that McDowell calls in the strictures of culture to supp1ant the friction typically 
provided by the world, his original intent was to curtai1 accusations of 
anthropocentric arrogance, cf. sect. 1.4.4). 
Like McDowell ([1994] 2002, p. 126; 2002, p. 296), we have a hard time 
be1ieving that the world-views, institutions, practices, and ready-made 
categorizations imp1icit in natural languages cou1d have been passed on for so 
long-and accepted and emp10yed by so many-had not the bulk of them fruitfully 
served us in ways that attest to their relative objectivity. As Ruth Millikan 
poignantly writes, 
If we can understand why singing fancy songs helps song birds, why emitting 
ultrasonic sounds helps bats, why having a seventeen-year cycle he1ps seventeen­
year locusts, why having ceremonial fights helps mountain sheep, and why 
dancing figure eights helps bees, surely it is mere cowardice to refuse even to 
wonder why uttering, in particular, subject-predicate sentences, subject ta 
negatian, helps man. Surely there is sorne explanation for this helping that is 
quite general and not magical. (1984, p. 7-8) 
As such, we readily recognize that the epistemic "theft" afforded by culture spares us 
much toil (sect. 1.2.4). But in sharp contrast with McDowell's "standing obligation" 
to spontaneously criticize our beliefs, we think such a process of acculturation gives 
us sense of security in our beliefs. If anything, Bildung teaches us to trust, not 
distrust. 
How can McDowell claim that the (symbolic) conventions which make up a 
person's Bildung admit sorne kind of worldly motivation-all the while marshalling 
technical incredulity at those aspects of our human "sapience" closest to our 
animality, the most notable being our (indexical) ability to perceive? For if human 
nature can be made to secure the epistemic standing of complex socio-cultural 
institutions like education, why can't it similarly validate the ability of our minds to 
take in (in a nontrivial way) its worldly environment by way of a sensory apparatus? 
Strangely enough, in McDowell's Sellarsian epistemology, it is precisely such 
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proximity to the world which excludes "observational" representations from 
supplying friction-whereas the distance of conventional institutions assures them 
that role. In this inverted asymmetrist scheme, "second nature" is a first-class citizen 
and "first nature" is relegated to an unmentionable status. Yet why is it that 
McDowell can appeal to our biology so as to prevent Bildung from spinning in the 
void it is intended to fill, but he can cite that same status as evidence for the 
epistemic impotence of the Given? If our nature as rational animaIs can ground the 
critical norms passed on in upbringing, surely it can likewise succour symbolic 
representations indexically driven through the rnind's supposed "one-way door" as 
they negotiate the "logical space of reasons". Echoing the criticism made at the 
close of the last section: if a cultural practice of 'eating poisonous mushrooms while 
jumping off cliffs' cannot be passed on across generations, what is this to be 
attributed to? 
We think: it is pure speculative delusion to suggest that "a decent upbringing" 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 81, 82) rnight somehow supplant worldly friction. 
Granted, it may be that, as a philosopher investigates the interface of rnind and 
wOrld, she comes to believe that the sphere of thought is so constituted that it has no 
outer rim. This does not, however, preclude the fabric of our representations---of 
our culture-from subsurning beneath it a realm of nature quite alien to any of the 
humane cornforts we understandably surround ourselves with. The existence of such 
a wOrldly domain can be transcendentally deduced from within culture, if one 
wishes, via an optirnism in the fertility of our BiLdung; as McDowell does when he 
urges that our shared biological situation assures us a foothold in the realm of law 
([1994] 2002, p. 84). Yet the presence of the order of nature can be felt with more 
urgency, regardless of whether one wants to or not, in the way it occasionally tears 
the fabric of culture from beneath; be it in surprise, ignorance, injury, error-and 
ultimately, death. 
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When we first pondered why McDowell clings to the rejection of Givenness in 
spite of his insistence that the world is basically made "open" to us, we remarked 
that his imposition of perpetuaI scrutiny did not take into due consideration a very 
proximate reason agents have to trust that their representations have an objective 
basis; to wit, the fact of effective success (sect. 1.4.3). Accordingly, we argued that 
McDowell's "standing obligation" should be weakened in such a way as to be 
triggered only upon the substantial frustration of those expectations which grow out 
of hitherto fruitful representations. Although we are endowed with spontaneity, it 
seems to us a flagrant misuse of that faculty to engage in speculative ruminations 
which prompt ad hoc visits to the doctor to see if one's representations of health 
"pass muster". Until and unless syrnptoms actually manifest themselves, one should 
assume that one is free of disease. 
This idea that humans revisit their conceptions only when compelled ta do so 
seems so plain as to go without saying-the casual reader of Mind and World likely 
supplies that missing element herself. But upon further examination, we see that the 
conspicuous absence of any remark to that effect by McDowell is a calculated move 
after aIl (cf the careful rationalist wording spotted earlier in this section). For 
countenancing disruptions of habit implies accepting exactly the kind of empirical 
friction McDowell's "second nature" ardently strives to supersede, insofar as a 
balloon popping unexpectedly behind one's head clearly sits outside the realm of 
spontaneity (it simply won't do to affirm that one drapes the hic et nunc fact with 
meaning as soon as one gets a cognitive hoId on what's happening: that one 
subsequently does so is not the product of choice). The way we see it, it is precisely 
because these rents run counter to civilized expectations that "first nature" makes a 
better normative bulwark to our spontaneity in representation. Such a view also 
answers the oft ignored but aIl important philosophic question: why is common 
sense so common? 
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Just as McDowell overdoes Kant's credo when he insists that spontaneity and 
receptivity not only co-operate, but are not « notionally separable » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 9); so does he overdo Wittgenstein's insight when he takes the 
passage « How do l know that this colour is red?-It would be an answer to say: "1 
have learnt English" » (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2001, § 381)-and hastily infers that it 
wouId be "the answer" to cite inculcation into a language. 
2.5.3 The ambivalent role of the noumenal 
According to McDowell, the concession ta a noumenal realm beyond the 
phenomenal-no matter how slim its liIIÙt-like ontology-is the whisker's breadth 
which ultimately prevents the Kantian synthesis of receptivity and spontaneity from 
successfully overcoIIÙng the seesaw. 
If one posits an empirically separable contribution from receptivity, one commits 
oneself to something Given in experience that could constitute the ultimate 
extra-conceptual grounding for everything conceptual, and it is a way of putting 
a central Kantian thought to say that that idea must be rejected. [...] 
But Kant also has a transcendental story, and in the transcendental perspective 
there does seem to be an isolable contribution from receptivity. (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 41) 
McDowell thus sees himself as taking Kant' s insights to their logical completion by 
removing the obstructing dogma of the noumenal: 
[I]f we take Kant's conception of experience out the frame he puts it in, a story 
about a transcendental affection of receptivity by a supersensible reality, it 
becomes just what we need. Outside that frame, Kant' s conception is a 
satisfactory way to avoid our dilemma, the apparently forced choice between the 
Myth of the Given and a coherentism that renounces external constraints on 
thinking. But the frame spoils the insight, because the radical mind­
independence of the supersensible cornes to seem exemplary of what any 
genuine IIÙnd-independence would be [...]. (Ibid., p. 95-96) 
This "buffet" view of the historical canons has ruffled many a specialist's 
scholarly feathers. Graham Bird, for instance, believes McDowell's split 
interpretation of Kant, with the transcendentalist metaphysic as a "monstrous" or 
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"dark" side, to be fundamentally mistaken. According to him, not only is 
McDowell' s work sorely lacking in exegetical accuracy, it fails to see that there is 
much to recommend Kant's commitment to noumena (Bird, 1996, p. 236-243). To 
be fair though, McDowell openly admits that his reading of Kant owes much to 
Strawson's commentary in The Bounds of Sense ([1966] 1990); prudently showing 
reservations about whether « Strawson's Kant is really Kant» (McDowell, [1994] 
2002, p. viii). In any event, whereas Bird contends that McDowell's philosophy 
should have embraced an ontological realm beyond thought, we find Robert Stern at 
the opposite end of the hermeneutic spectrum pOltraying McDowell as a too­
conservative emulator of Hegel's refurbishing of the Kantian framework. According 
to Stern, it would have been beneficial to McDowell's overall project had he 
embraced idealism more boldly. 
To put the contrast simplistically: while McDowell's wants to vindicate common 
sense, to put us back in touch with tables, cats and other people, [00'] Hegel wants 
much more-to vindicate a kind of conception of philosophy that Kant had 
thought was impossible, and which would also appear to have no place in 
McDowell's therapeutic, late-Wittgensteinian outlook. (Stern, 1999, p. 260) 
[00'] Hegel makes clear that he sees such metaphysical modesty as culturally and 
intellectually disastrous. (Ibid.) 
In light of this reading, Stern finds much irony in the fact that «McDowell (and, in a 
different way, Rorty) should take themselves to be representing an authentically 
Hegelian outlook, when they argue for greater philosophical quietism and modesty 
[00'] » (Ibid., p. 264). 
It is an understandable consequence of our meaning-making apparatus that we 
tend to see contemporary thinkers as reprising the archetypal roles canonized in 
histories of philosophy. But valuable though such historical juxtapositions may be 
from a literary standpoint, it is probably a sound methodological policy to resist 
these sorts of erudite (re)constructions. However, in this instance the divergent 
appraisals of Bird and Stern teach us two very important things. First, it becomes 
130 
increasingly apparent that Thornton' s fears about the inherent instability of 
McDowell's hybrid historical-cum-quietist approach may have been well-founded. 
Second-and more importantly-we begin to make out the outlines of a certain 
ambivalence vis-à-vis the noumenal in McDowell' s dialectic. For despite his calls 
to repudiate the agnostic view and replace it with pansemiotism, McDowell portrays 
the incorporation of a world beyond mind as inherently attractive to theoretical 
reflection. 
The considerable task McDowell sets himself in Mind and World is made aIl the 
more laborious by his acceptance of an assortment of philosophical constraints, chief 
among which is his steadfast refusaI to construe the Kantian co-operation of 
spontaneity and receptivity as anything less than an alI-out fusion, one so tightly-knit 
as to prevent us from wedging-in even a "notional" distinction. As we have seen 
throughout this chapter, the atternpt to make this radical amalgamation hold forces 
McDowell into an ever-expanding body of rationalizations (of varying strengths). 
The pre-eminent danger faced by his fusion and pansemiotist theses is that the 
parties they are designed to reconcile might eventually loose their very identity in the 
blend. However, progression towards such a final "synthesis" of opposites would 
dramatically bring home the fact that McDowell has parted in an important way 
from the original Kantian intent. The more McDowell' s fusion and pansemiotism 
are developed-in other words, the more one is convinced by his arguments that the 
twin faculties are not even "notionally" discernible-the more one wonders whether 
it would not simply be best to espouse sorne kind of monism. It is thus vital that the 
inevitable collapse of McDowell's amalgam be perpetually forestalled. As a result, 
although McDowell stalwartly declares that we should forgo the possibility of a 
noumenal realm, his philosophy manifests a mixed attitude: its positive-theoretic 
proposaIs enjoin us to repudiate the noumenon, yet require it in order to make our 
presumed anxiety vis-à-vis wholism intelligible. 
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On that score, it is interesting to note the ubiquity of the following pattern: 
McDowell' s position is "not quite like this"-but "not quite like that" ei ther. 
Granted, philosophical stances can sometimes be quite elaborate. But if sorne 
esoteric detail of McDowe11's stance escapes our grasp, then that missing element 
should be produced forthwith; as there is a point beyond which philosophical 
subtlety becomes obscurantism. Unfortunately, since no such stable account 
emerges, the idea of a "receptive spontaneity" (or a "spontaneous receptivity"?) 
reveals itself to be not a philosophie dismount-but a rhetorical seesaw a11 its own. 
Were such a notional "hide and seek" merely a provisional literary device intended 
to accentuate sorne key feature(s) of McDowell's theses, then temporarily feeding 
this kind of tension could be forgiven. This, however, is not the case. Not only is 
the strategy never relinquished, it is actua11y used by McDowe11 as a very substantia1 
motive for dismissing significant rival positions, most notably those of Donald 
Davidson and Richard Rorty. For although McDowe11 considers Kant' s 
transcendentalism the crucial weakness to be avoided at aIl cost, we find him 
wielding the abandonment of a lirnit beyond mind as a reproach against the ideas of 
Rorty and Davidson. 
That is a rather puzzling move. Indeed, the newcomer to McDowe11' s 
philosophy could be forgiven for seeing it as a companion to those of Rorty and 
Davidson. Both of these thinkers have wrestled with basically the same issues 
concerning the interface of mind and world, and both have come to conclusions 
roughly analogous to those advocated by McDowell: the mind is at home in its own 
expanse, and the desire for rigid foundations beyond thought should be renounced. 
In Davidson' s case, the impetus for this stance was a subtle working out of the 
logical consequences of Quinean wholism. Like McDowell, Davidson has a hard 
time swallowing the idea that experience could serve as an epistemological tribunal 
whilst lying outside the realm of mind. The following is not atypical of Davidson's 
writing: 
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[I]f we reject the idea of an uninterpreted source of evidence no room is left for a 
dualism of scheme and content. Without such dualism we cannot make sense of 
conceptual relativism. This does not mean that we must give up the idea of an 
objective world independent of our knowledge of it. The argument against 
conceptual relativism shows rather that language is not a screen or filter through 
which our knowledge of the world must pass. (Davidson, [1984] 200 1, p. xx) 
This passage by Davidson could easily pass for an excerpt of Mind and World: 
The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of 
justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The 
extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non­
conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we cannot really 
understand the relations in virtue of which a j udgement is warranted except as 
relations within the space of concepts [00']. The attempt to extend the scope of 
justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it is 
supposed to do. (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 7) 
Whereas Davidson's concerns centre around meaning and the possibility of a non­
circular science of semantics, Rorty' s philosophical interests are less technical and 
deal with culture in its broadest sense. Nevertheless, Rorty too appears to be 
travelling the same philosophic path as McDowell. Again, consider the following: 
[W]e would do weIl to abandon the notion of certain values ("rationality", 
"disinterestedness") floating free of the educational and institutional patterns of 
the day. We can just say that Galileo was creating the notion of "scientific 
values" as he went along, that it was a splendid thing that he did so, and that the 
question of whether he was "rational" in doing so is out of place. (Rorty, 1980, 
p.331) 
And McDowell: 
What is at work here is a conception of nature that can seem sheer common 
sense, though it was not always so; the conception 1 mean was made available 
only by a hard-won achievement of human thought at a specific time, the time of 
the rise of modern science. ([1994] 2002, p. 70) 
We can acknowledge the great step forward that human understanding took 
when our ancestors formed the idea of a domain of intelligibility, the realm of 
naturallaw, that is empty of meaning, but we can refuse to equate that domain of 
intelligibility with nature, let alone with what is real. (Ibid., p. 109) 
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ParaUels like these are by no means exceptional, and similar comparisons can be 
made almost at leisure. Nor is there anything particularly novel about the affinity of 
the contents themselves, insofar as McDoweU openly acknowledges the influence 
which the works of Davidson and Rorty have had on his thinking (in fact, he credits 
an enthusiastic reading-his « third or fourth »-of Rorty' s Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature for triggering the reflection that was eventually ta lead to Mind 
and World, [1994] 2002, p. ix; and he is equaUy explicit in stating that he delineates 
his « stance against [Davidson' s] by way of a contrast that it wouId be easy to 
relegate to the edges of the picture, with massive agreement in the centre », ibid., p. 
viii). 
In light of McDoweU's obdurate condemnations of any and aU epistemological 
theories that intimate sorne latent recourse to the "mythical" Given, one would have 
expected Rorty and Davidson to be showered with plaudits for their staunch 
observance of the Wittgensteinian admonition that one cannot think both sides of the 
frontier of thought. Not so. Although Davidson and Rorty were correct not to 
espouse the idea of a unrepresented realm beyond representation, McDowell 
believes their philosophies should be reprimanded for not being sufficiently attracted 
to the "noumenal temptation". The foUowing eloquently sums up the tenor of his 
indictment: « It is true that Rorty resists the blandishments of traditional philosophy, 
but the effect of the framework he assumes is that he can do that only by plugging 
his ears, like Odysseus sailing past the Sirens » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 147). 
Davidson is also seen as closing his eyes to the vertigo posed by his wholism: « Of 
course Davidson believes that his position is a place where thought can come to rest, 
not a movement in an interminable oscillation. But l think he contrives to make it 
seem so only by going insufficiently deeply into the motivation of the Myth of the 
Given » (Ibid., p. 15). 
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It seems the extra-mind picture must be dispensable enough for the unbounded 
picture to eventually overcome its pull-but attractive enough to exert a flight from 
the idea of a whole "spinning in a void". In other words, for pansemiotism to hold, 
one must find peace; for pansemiotism to be sought, one mustn't find peace. 
McDowell has even gone as far as to make his empathy towards Givenness-a view 
he deems to be radically mistaken-his badge of philosophic distinction. In a text 
originally written as an introduction to Mind and World, he states: 
So why should anyone prefer my way to Davidson's? WeIl, there is, I believe, 
an intuitive appeal to the idea that empirical thinking must be answerable to 
impressions if it is to be contentful at aIl, and Davidson's approach does nothing 
towards explaining that away. [...] Suppose someone is really tempted to think 
both that empirical thinking must be answerable to impressions and that it cannot 
be. Davidson does nothing to help such a person. [00'] Whereas on my side, I 
offer a story whose point is to acknowledge, but explain away, the attractiveness 
of the other of the two sources of the anxiety, the thought that impressions 
cannot constitute a tribunal. (McDowell, [1999] 2000, p. 8) 
We can now ascertain the distance which separates our own approach to inquiry 
from that of McDowell. Specifically, we see how unlikely it would have been for 
him to heed our calI to not consider rival speculative arguments (sect. 1.2.5). For 
what we take to be a key weakness of McDowell's approach, he considers a strength. 
In any event, there is something quite revelatory about McDowell's stance. It is 
worth noting that while he prides himself on being able to comprehend the attraction 
presented by the pole of receptive atomism, he does not show equal empathy for the 
wholistic stances espoused by Davidson and Rorty. Why is it, then, that those who 
appeal to sorne form of Givenness are pulled towards something inherently 
attractive, whereas those who daim to find peace in wholes seerningly have to feign 
their philosophic repose? Does not such an interpretation !end credence to our 
earlier suggestion that wholism should never have arisen to begin with, and that the 
Given might actually be the furthest thing from a myth? 
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2.6 Conclusion 
We described our purpose as twofold, first presenting McDowell's positive ideas 
then criticizing them. In a sense though, the totality of this chapter acted in the 
service of this latter task. Since we decided to follow McDowell down the 
Sellarsian road he accepted to see if it led to worthwhile ideas, we were effectively 
letting McDowell plead his own case by detailing his arguments. The question, 
then, is whether the third way which emerges from it aIl is indeed tenable. 
Combined with his desire not to "lapse" into any sort of Givenness, McDowell's 
appreciation of the relativist pitfalls of wholism pushes him tawards something far 
more radical than any of these options taken independently. As we have seen, he 
maintains that if we fuse receptivity and spontaneity together, we can reap the 
benefits of each while being spared the vicissitudes of their troublesome relation. 
However, we argued that such a project is doomed to fail. Should creative travails 
succeed in spawning something which would vaguely resemble the fusion 
McDowell pushes for, that conception would prevent us from capitalizing on the 
epistemological advantages proper to punctate receptivity and wholistic spontaneity. 
Indeed, one is inevitably presented with a choice. Either one recognizes the faculties 
of receptivity and spontaneity as distinct faculties and attempts to account for their 
relation, or one forgoes explaining that relation by positing an all-encompassing 
mingling of attributes and accepts that the neutral variant which emerges from the 
fusion will be quite unlike its pre-synthesis parentage. For once it is claimed that 
mind and world are one, it simply cannot be business as usual in epistemology. 
Although McDowell is steadfastly opposed ta the first of these disjuncts, he 
cannot bring himself to surrendering the distinctions he claims to repudiate, which 
would collapse the twin faculties of the Kantian co-operation into a truly 
indistinguishable amalgam. In spite of his Hegelian inclinations, McDowell 
harbours a certain cosmological humility; one which, though commendable, is 
incommensurate with the radicalism of his fusion thesis. For instance, out of a fear 
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that the "unbounded" view of mind he advocates-which has aIl the trappings of 
idealism-might signal « a baseless confidence that the world is completely within 
the reach of our powers of thinking » (McDoweIl, [1994] 2002, p. 39-40), he 
develops an intricate historical rereading of the natural which shifts the burden of 
empirical friction onto culture. Our spontaneity, according to this gloss, is not 
curbed by worldly contacts, but by the rational humility instilled in upbringing. 
However, we argued that since cultural norms are in tum limited by a natural order 
that is precisely not cultural, the problems at hand are merely transposed to a 
societal level-not addressed. Thus, in the final analysis, we believe Mind and 
World's bid to be unsuccessful. 
We must admit that many of the ideas in Mind and World are quite entrancing, 
providing (as promised) a great deal of fodder for the philosophie imagination. Yet 
if this is the strength of this work, it is also its chief weakness. For it is not 
McDoweIl's ideas as such which must be judged, but whether they are equal to the 
problem they are adduced to resolve. On this count, we cannot help but feel that 
McDowelI's proposaIs do not live up to their intended purpose. Certainly, we can 
admire the way he strove to refine and improve "pictures" which, it would seem, had 
little hope to begin with. Nevertheless, McDowelI is arguably more convincing in 
portraying the oscillation between atomism and wholism than he is in elaborating a 
tenable way out of those dead-ends. AlI told, we think the McDowelIian fusion is a 
logical invalid supported only by a rhetorical pacemaker: it is a third way that can 
have it both ways only so long as its inevitable collapse into monism is adroitly kept 
at bay. 
To be sure, McDowelI would likely be unscathed by such an assessment, as the 
want of palpability of his proposaIs is very much a product of design: « [I]f 1 am 
right about the character of the philosophical anxieties 1 aim to deal with, there is no 
room for doubt that engaging in "constructive philosophy", in this sense, is not the 
way to approach them » (McDowelI, [1994] 2002, p. xxiv). Such proclamations 
137 
notwithstanding, one can reasonably wonder whether McDowelI stays true to this 
"therapeutic" approach-whether he really heeds his own calI to « exorcize the 
questions rather than set about answering them »(Ibid.). Clearly it is no great 
stretch to recognize that a distinctly positive vision is sketched in Mind and World. 
In any event, McDowelI's meta-philosophical commitments are his own, and we do 
not feel bound by them. 
Instead of trying to drastically revise the conceptions of mind and world which 
suggest themselves most naturally to us and supplant them with arcane notional 
admixtures which disintegrate at the slightest theoretical contemplation, wouId it not 
be preferable to tinker with a handful of small but unhealthy philosophical ideas, 
namely the asymmetry of indexicality and the inference from anatomism to 
wholism? That such a move would not only be aetiologically sensible, but 
economical as weIl, surely is no coincidence. 
CHAPTERID 
HALTING THE INITIAL RECOIL: REJECTING ASYMMETRY 
A wise general eats his enemy's food. One 
of his chickens is worth twenty of mine. 
Sun Tzu 
The Art of War (c. 6th cent. B.e.) 
3.1 Introduction 
As McDowell sees it, the oscillation is not a problem in need of a solution, but rather 
a "symptom" to be "dissolved". Indeed, he repeatedly characterizes his enterprise as 
rendering explicit a latent anxiety which he believes underlies philosophie discourse 
on epistemology and metaphysics. According to this "therapeutic" gloss, the reason 
why philosophy is trapped in a quandary between the atom and the whole is that it is 
notionally ill-equipped. As we saw in the second chapter, McDowell's own way out 
of the seesaw consists in proposing a bold new way of picturing the interface of 
rnind and world, one that supposedly fuses the opposite features whose difficult 
reconciliation perpetuates the back-and-forth instability. Thus, he contends that « in 
order to escape the oscillation, we need to recognize that experiences themselves are 
states or occurrences that inextricably combine receptivity and spontaneity » 
(McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 24). But we have argued that the notion of "receptive 
spontaneity" has about as much chance of success as that of a "square circle". 
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McDowell, of course, has an elaborate story about human culture which is 
intended to soothe the understandable objection that regulation from within the 
expanse of mind is a stand-in which falls short of objective norrnativity. However, 
as we have tried to show, that story is moot. Among other things, it supposes that 
cultural norms of refiective thought are somehow sovereign in a way that lets them 
supplant (and not merely add to) worldly friction. But clearly civilized upbringing 
cannot discharge philosophy from recognizing that the world imposes on the mind 
(and on culture) a landscape of possibilities with or without its co-operation. In our 
view, we may indeed have a "second nature", but it is inept to buffer the second 
recoil away from the whole. 
These improbable suggestions, however, did not arise in a vacuum. Rather, the 
drastic fusion thesis was intended to negotiate the demands of a prior philosophie 
constraint. While Mind and World asks us to try and fathom audacious new ideas 
that run counter to sorne of our most strongly held intuitions, its revisionist dialectic 
is nevertheless beholden to one nonnegotiable covenant: thought may enjoy a causal 
contact with its objects, but it cannot recuperate those contacts as reasons. Since 
this Sellarsian thesis strikes at the very heart of the semiotic structure of 
representation, McDowell believes the only way to circumvent the problems 
associated with the idea of an ineffable domain is to advocate a pansemiotist 
outlook. Given our negative appraisal of that undertaking, what we want to do in 
this chapter is part company with McDowell's positive-theoretic proposaIs and 
return to the fork in the road we met up with at the close of the first chapter so as ta 
critically re-examine the technical arguments which forced him into so implausible 
an account in the first place. Instead of trying to make the McDowellian fusion 
tenable by adding yet another battery of corrective nuances, we want to rewind the 
path of the seesaw, identify the precise logical moment when the dialectic went 
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wrong and direct aIl our efforts on remedying that point. In short, if are to put an 
end to the oscillation between atomism and wholism, we believe one of the principal 
tenets which must be ablated is the asymmetry of indexicality thesis. 
This chapter will seek to articulate an assortment of problems and 
inconsistencies which we believe are damning to the Sellarsian thesis. After setting 
the general context, we will challenge asymmetry in two volleys, starting from more 
intuitive appeals and progressively working our way towards more a priori 
arguments. Our first concem will be to show how the asymmetry stance effectively 
misappropriates representational contents. Questioning whether the asymmetrist can 
have access to diachronically established stores of knowledge, we will argue that the 
appropriation of any such heritage by an agent involves a cognitive effort which 
itself cannot have recourse to prior contents. We will then tum to Sellars' 
contention that economic considerations within the whole offer a viable source of 
normativity. Putting this daim to the test, we will examine the case of trivial 
variances which do not jeopardize the integrity of the whole. Upon confirming 
wholism's normative impotence in such instances, we will try to bring to the fore the 
peculiar way in which asymmetry accommodates the theft of content from 
experience de facto while denying that origin a proper epistemologica1 standing. As 
a means of further illustrating the fallaciousness of this view, we will propose a 
thought experiment which will exhibit how observation inevitably contributes to the 
warrant of daims to knowledge, even when those daims are arrived at via argument. 
Our second critical volley will then ask what ensues when one applies the 
asymmetry thesis within the realm of mind. The recurrent theme of our assault on 
this front will be that wholism is not immune to the asymmetry thesis itse1f. In fact, 
we will endeavour to show that the asymmetrist stance effectively undermines the 
very inferential space it deems to be the legitimate medium of intelligibility. 
141 
3.2 Returning to the fork in the road: asyrnrnetry revisited 
3.2.1 "E pur, si muove" 
There is general philosophic motif which we should like to bring to the fore. It is 
unclear to us whether it pertains to ontology or epistemology (or both). In any case, 
it is not proper to any particular thinker, period, or school. Rather, it is a generic 
pattern which surfaces time and time again as a harmful piece of reasoning. The 
manoeuvre typically unfolds as follows. First, a distinction is made between two 
kinds of objects (broadly construed). The philosopher, taking an inventory of the 
reality that surrounds her, quickly gathers that it manifests sorne sort of prima facie 
plurality. The things that populate her environment are many, and vary in their 
natures. Thus, to the most readily accessible class of middle-sized material objects 
that are brought rather nonchalantly to her cognitive attention, she adds more exotic 
articles such as relations, signs, minds, etc. (this store of items becomes increasingly 
populous when a thinker is particularly astute andJor has access to a developed 
patrimony of philosophical works). However, sooner or later, the philosopher cornes 
to the conclusion that the roster of things which exist is too ponderous. The 
profligacy must end and a trim is in order. 
Preferences in ontology are a curious thing, as their ad hoc admixtures of 
negative disdain and positive preference often seem answerable only to an aesthetic 
rationale. In any event, the philosopher eventually wishes to eliminate an undesired 
object, distinctly changing its official status in such a way that it is no longer 
considered part of the catalogue of things real. This raises the museological problem 
of deaccession, which is the actual removal of an object from the space occupied by 
a collection. For museums, this step can take an array of shapes, ranging from 
transfers to other institutions to public auctions to simply tossing an object on the 
curb. But if philosophical discourse can overtly let it be known that a given article 
of being is no longer welcomed-no longer part of what is deemed the true 
metaphysical landscape-difficulties arise when such alienation gives way to 
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deaccession. For if an object hitherto considered real by thought now finds itself 
disdained, "where" are we to put it? Rence arises the second movement of the 
motif. The philosopher must now find a way to retroactively expurgate an object 
which, it was hitherto held, possessed an actuality-however abstract-that was 
sufficiently compelling for it to be thought of as a denizen of the real. 
Now one may rightfully argue that speculative acumen is not a license for being. 
But what we wish to consider here are not objects for which there is absolutely no 
ground, but rather those cases where one recognizes the existence of something de 
facto yet subsequently wishes to withdraw it from metaphysical circulation. Things 
the being of which does not present itself in the first place obviously do not confront 
one with the problem of having to execute deaccession against one's prima facie 
intuitions. To be sure, the matter of establishing what is a de facto acknowledgement 
of being is a tricky one. Without engaging in hermeneutic speculations 
disproportionate with their basis, we can nevertheless establish sorne more robust 
grounds whence to decide whether or not a given item is indeed taken to be 
minimally real despite a thinker' s technical arguments to the contrary. If nothing 
else, it seerns fair to say that arguments in favour of removing an object fram the 
official ontological raster are rather dubious when they repeatedly appeal to the 
object in question (such is the case with McDowell, whose repeated ernployment of 
receptivity and spontaneity does more to substantiate the ontological likeliness of 
those faculties than to reinforce his contention that the notions are in fact one and the 
sarne). 
We thus have a strange situation: the philosopher recognizes that there is 
something the existence ofwhich she wants to deny. Row to proceed? The problem, 
in short, is how to rid oneself of something which, whilst it cannot survive 
philosophical scrutiny, nevertheless accrues widespread recognition-notably by 
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oneself on a more intuitive level. The oldest solution to this quandary (as old as 
philosophy itself) has been to posit a distinction between appearance and reality, and 
to relegate the undesirable party to the illusory side. 
Talee the case of change, a particularly unsettling issue for early Greek 
philosophical thought. Consider a piece of burning wood. As it burns, a change 
occurs. First the wood was brown and cold; then it is replaced by something black 
and hot. ln other words, one thing cornes into existence while another exits. This, 
as it stands, presented a philosophical puzzle of sorts: "where" did the first object, 
which was brown and cold, "go"? Similarly, where did the subsequent object, which 
is black and hot, "come from"? This problem may strike the contemporary mind as 
no problem at aIl: it is readily apparent to us that nothing came or went in or out of 
existence. Yet we owe this comforting explanation largely to Aristotle, whose 
distinction between forrn and matter (and potency and act) paved the way for a 
robust account of change. The pre-Socratics, however, took an altogether different 
route. lnstead of preserving the prima fade acknowledgement that in sorne strange 
way there are both two and one states involved in change and endeavouring to 
produce an account that would do justice to this pre-theoretic point of origin, they 
became ontologically partisan. Thus, for Heraclitus, the burning wood was in fact a 
succession of two things, and aIl intuitions to the contrary were considered illusory 
(cf Burnet, [1892] 2003, p. 144-177). ln contrast, Parmenides held that there is only 
one thing involved in the burning wood, and aIl intuitions running counter to that 
tenet were deemed by him mere appearance (Ibid., p. 189-201). 
Both of these thinkers were willing to rewrite the book of nature. AlI is change, 
said one; nothing changes, said the other-but neither of these stances actually fits 
the data. No doubt faithful adherents of a particular school were able, through 
intensive study, to bring themselves to see the error of their epistemologically 
primitive ways and to seriously believe their master's doctrine. They most likely 
looked upon this privileging of a given aspect, not as an ontological bias, but as a 
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profound sort of clarity, one capable of discerning the really real from the 
apparently real. In the end, though, the respective partisanships remained, and the 
situation which gave the philosophers cause to ponder-the mundane 
impetus-went on unexplained. 
In contrast, we believe that what was unique about Aristotle's own approach was 
a kind of ontological humility (sect. 2.5.1). The vast explanatory feats accomplished 
by Aristotle were made possible by an unrelenting sobriety of thought, which is not 
only remarkable when compared to his predecessors (including most emphatically 
his teacher, Plato), but which would likely still stand out amongst today's 
philosophies. Aristotle was able to make change intelligible because he shunned 
facile recourse to "appearances" and made it a sort of methodological compact ta 
always strive for concordance with the data that set his inquiries into motion. Byour 
lights, this is the aetiologic posture alI philosophers should adopt: to eschew ladder­
discarding. 
According to Aristotle, the question to start with is not: What must reality be like 
in order to make it possible for us to acquire knowledge of it? But simply: What, 
as a matter offact, is reality? (Peikoff, 1999, p. 14) 
AlI the others in their various ways engage in disconnected, free-floating 
theorizing. They come at sorne point to sorne conclusion in conflict with the 
facts of reality as reported by our senses, and they proceed to say, "Down with 
reality". Or rather, they don't put it that way; they say, "This isn't reality, it is 
simply appearances; true reality is the world that lives up to our theories". 
But Aristotle refuses to endorse any dichotomy between reality and 
appearance. For him, reality is what we observe, and any theories that go 
counter to it are simply wrong. [...] Aristotle's typical procedure is that he 
conscientiously presents [the pre-Socratics'] arguments, and then he says, in a 
matter-of-fact way, "But we see these things, they are obvious, they are facts, 
and facts are facts". Then, of course, since he is a great philosopher, he proceeds 
to make mincemeat of the arguments that led to the denial of those facts. (Ibid., 
p. 15) 
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This approach, far from being a disconnected ideal, is of great consequence for the 
solving of philosophic problems. In the case of change, it was only when a thinker 
finally took it upon himself to bow before the natural layout before him that the way 
was cleared for a robust comprehension of the object of study. This much is only 
normal. For how can one hope to account for a situation when one obstinately 
refuses to acknowledge the full reality of sorne of the elements that comprise it? 
The case of representation is very similar to that of change. According to the 
broad Kantian frarnework we have been exploring, the human mind is endowed with 
two faculties, one receptive (i.e., "sensible intuition") and the other spontaneous 
("conceptual understanding"). The issue at the heart of our concerns-and which 
gives rise to McDowell's seesaw-is how we can conjugate these twin faculties so 
that neither supersedes the other. However, how can one hope to explicate the 
relation between receptivity and spontaneity when one denies the existence of one of 
the relata (pace Sellars)-or of the relation itself (pace McDowell)? 
McDowell's proposaI renders fertile aetiologic explanation impossible. 
Appealing to a distinction between appearance and reality in therapeutic guise, he 
enjoins us to re-conceive the matter far differently then we did upon beginning our 
inquiry: there is really only one faculty at play, not two. AlI intuitions to the 
contrary are depicted as either remnants of lingering historical dogmas or symptoms 
of our limited imagination. Sellars' own stance shares with McDowell the appeal to 
mistaken appearances, but glosses the situation differently. According to him, there 
is indeed only one faculty, but that is because receptivity is a chimera. How then 
does he deaccession this item? On this count, Sellars could have followed 
Heraclitus and Parmenides in invoking the facile distinction between appearance and 
reality. However, since this manoeuvre would have effectively deprived his 
philosophy of much plausibility, he instead employs perhaps the least subtle strategy 
of aIl, relegating the Given to that children's table of metaphysics whose attendants 
are euphemistically labelled "heuristic". 
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At the close of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", Sellars addresses the 
obvious question of how so massive a delusion as the "Myth of the Given" could 
have gained prominence. While he remains steadfastly committed to his conviction 
that talk of things Given is totally baseless from a strictly philosophical standpoint, 
he conjectures that « in the attempt to account for the fact that his fellow men behave 
intelligently not only when their conduct is threaded on a string of overt verbal 
episodes [...] but also when no detectable verbal output is present », sorne human 
must have once developed « a theory according to which overt utterances are but the 
culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes » (Sellars, [1956] 
1963, § 56). According to this instrumentalist gloss, although the Givenist « 
mislocates the truth of these conceptions » and « confuses his own creative 
enrichment of the framework of empiricaI knowledge, with an analysis of knowledge 
as it was », thereby mistakenly believing his constructs « to be antecedent objects of 
knowledge which have somehow been in the framework from the beginning » (Ibid., 
§ 62), the fictional language of basic noninferentiaI impressions can nevertheless 
serve as a shorthand helping us understand how we fix references. However, Sellars 
stresses that the usefulness of such rhetoric does not warrant our believing that a 
real situation underlies our belief in receptivity: 
[W]hile our 'ancestors' came to notice impressions, and the language of 
impressions embodies a 'discovery' that there are such things, the language of 
impressions was no more tailored to fit antecedent noticings of these entities 
than the language of molecules was tailored to fit antecedent noticings of 
molecules. (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 62) 
In keeping with the asymmetry of indexicality thesis, this stance is a convenient 
compromise: it rejects something as mythical whilst keeping all of the benefits 
associated with il. As Sellars writes: 
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[O]f course, as long as the existing [common sense] framework is used, it will be 
incorrect to say-otherwise than to make a philosophical point about the 
framework-that no object is really coloured, or is located in Space, or endures 
through Time. But, speaking as a philosopher, l am quite prepared to say that 
the common sense world of physical objects in Space and Time is unreal-that 
is, that there are no such things. (Ibid., § 41; italics in original) 
How one can sensibly make such a major concession to the attributes of a theory 
and still maintain that there really is no legitimate metaphysical substratum 
vindicating that theory's standing is an ambidextrous feat of expediency well beyond 
us. Yet perhaps we should not be so appalled at such a stance, insofar as it is not 
without precedent. For instance, a certain catholic Cardinal by the name of 
Bellannine once proposed to construe the heliocentric cosmology upheld by 
Copernicus and Galileo as « really just an ingenious heuristic device for, say, 
navigational purposes and other sorts of practically oriented celestial reckoning » 
(Rorty, 1980, p. 329)-while denying it the official status of truth. There is, of 
course, a well-known aetiologic retort to such a stance, which until recently 
conunanded the respect of learned individuals. However, owing in no small part to 
Sellars' asymmetry argument, times have changed, and we now find the 
confrontation of reason and faith construed as a trivial matter of personal preference. 
Emboldened by the Sellarsian critique of representation, Richard Rorty writes: « 
Mere looking at the planets will be of no help in choosing our model of the heavens, 
any more than mere reading of Scripture » (1980, p. 332; italics in original). Perhaps 
then the time has come to move beyond ostention and "make mincemeat of the 
arguments that led to the denial of those facts". 
3.2.2 Laying down a setting whence to proceed 
What we want to do now is establish a framework where we can better pin down the 
mechanics of the asymmetry of indexicality thesis. Not only will doing so prevent 
digression into textual exegesis, it will also allow us to bring into sharper focus the 
technical philosophic argument which lies behind the "myth of the Given" slogan. 
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(PLACE ANYTHING HERE) 
Figure 1 Virgin launch pad. 
Let us begin then by marking-off an area of space by a rectangle and henceforth 
refer to this space as a "launch pad" (fig. 1). Ignoring size constraints, this box can 
be occupied by anything. Whatever is present in the launch pad makes itself 
manifest in the manner and degree appropriate to it. Thus, if there is a duck, it will 
walk like a duck, quack like a duck, etc. Similarly, if it is a typographical letter, 
weIl, it will neither quack nor walk but simply offer itself to sight. In short, the 
space of the launch pad is a neutral canvass which can be occupied by anything. The 
only difference is that its contents are framed for special refiective consideration, the 
launch pad being but a convenient way to mark off a difference between subject and 
object (please note that a human being can figure as the content of the launch pad, as 
is the case for example with cryptic natives). 
Let us now place an agent in the vicinity of this launch pad. Once again, guided 
by non-speculative sobriety, let us construe this agent as a healthy human adult. 
Given the agent's nature as a rational animal and the constitution of the object as 
whatever it is, sorne sort of indexical impingement ensues from the encounter. Let 
us assume that whatever proximal requirements are needed for the agent to grasp a 
given abject in the launch pad are met. Thus, since a duck quacks and the human 
agent hears, the human agent hears the duck quack (the non-existence of the Pegasus 
and the like ensures that these do not enjoy this indexical power, thereby leaving the 
question of "what there is" to what there is. Existence needs no midwifery). 
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In keeping with the "intentional realism" propounded earlier (sect. 1.3), our 
agent should not be construed as a mere automaton, one which could be studied by 
medicine or biology but which would have little relevance to epistemology. The 
term "indexical" would be inappropriate in such a brute case, insofar as we would be 
lacking the significance in virtue of which indices rise above mere causality (sect. 
1.5.2). As McDowell writes, « movements of limbs without concepts are mere 
happenings, not expressions of agency » ([1994] 2002, p. 89; cf Sect. 1.3.2). 
Likewise, deVries and Triplett point out that Sellars' outlook was « willing to go 
beyond descriptions of behavior and to theorize about causes and explanations of 
that behavior» (2000, p. 138; cf Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 53-55). This much is only 
normal. For if there is to be a "logical space of reasons" at aIl, it must perforee be 
woven with representations of a symbolic order, insofar as « [l]anguage and aIl 
abstract thinking, such as belongs to minds who think in words, is of the symbolic 
nature» (Peirce, 1998, p. 307) and the « symbol is the only kind of sign which can 
be an argumentation » (Ibid., p. 308). Accordingly, we shall say that symbolic 
representation allows an agent to transport the contents of the launch pad in absentia 
of their referent(s), thereby allowing her to communicate with others via convention. 
Now the asymmetrist argues that the contents which dwell in such a symbolic 
space cannot be gauged on the basis of whatever forceful inputs might spring from 
the launch pad. For example, if we place the letter 'Q' in the pad and the ensuing 
exposure motivates the agent to think (in a symbolic space) that "The letter Q is in 
the box", the asymmetrist argues that although this belief may yet have been caused 
by an experiential episode, it cannot be validated by a simple retum to the point of 
origin-by an ostensive appeal to the 'Q' Given. According to this view, while the 
ontogenesis of representations may be rooted in an input that is atomic, any 
normative daim made by the agent would a fortiori have to be wholistic. Indexical 
force thus enjoys a dubious standing at best, being forever exduded from the 
symbolic space where human intelligibility takes root (cf fig. 2). 
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Figure 2 The asyrnrnetry of indexicality thesis. 
This schema has no pretension of being scientific, nor is it presented as 
philosophically profound or novel. That said, it does have the advantage of clarity, 
delineating the scope of our concerns. Indeed, not only does it provide a tangible 
platform whence to express the thesis of asymmetry; it also establishes a setting 
where the atomism-versus-wholism dilemma surfaces most acutely. To illustrate 
what is at stake, consider the following limit cases. Confronted with a launch pad, 
an agent could choose to call upon her faculty of spontaneity exclusively, without 
taking advantage of whatever input her faculty of receptivity may provide her. Eyes 
closed and hands tied behind her back, she may declare that there are two carrots in 
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the box, or a cigar, or whatever else. In such a case, the agent obviously has 
acquired sorne mastery of the concepts 'Carrot' and 'Cigar'. However, whatever 
gains might follow from the possession such concepts (acquired by toil or theft) 
could not be put to use should the agent in question shun her faculty of receptivity, 
as the chances of receptivity-free success are slim, to say the least. Representation, 
it wou1d appear, requires that we call upon our faculty of receptivity, since 
spontaneous thoughts without receptive content are empty. 
Suppose then that our agent vows to rely exclusively on her faculty of 
receptivity. Sensing whatever emanates from the launch pad before her, what can 
she possibly think of the contents lodged therein? The only answer under these 
conditions seems to be thus: what is before her is what it is. Granted, she is likely 
confronted with an object far coarser than the classic sense-datum (sect. 1.3.3). 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which she must choose which of her concepts best 
fits the data. Representation therefore requires that we accept our role as agents and 
delve into a patrimony beyond the punctate area surnrnoned in experience, since 
receptive intuitions without concepts are blind. 
Pinning down the fact that healthy human agents manage to successfully 
represent the worldly objects before them, the aetiologic inquiry consists in asking 
how this cornes about. The real or genuine friction at stake is that an agent' s success 
at this cognitive task can waver when presented with objects of ever growing 
complexity. In other words, it is true that linguists (and natives) sometimes fail to 
take things for what they are (though rabbits are usually easy cognitive fare). We 
thus have access to a starting and finishing point, the endeavour being to "reverse 
engineer" the various contributions at work. This anchor not only furnishes us with 
a sense of direction; it also imposes bounds on the possible scope of our hypotheses, 
as each Kantian faculty is impotent when considered independently. Moreover, this 
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interpretation fits into a genuine1y "re-enchanted" picture. Not only is the mind's 
ability and competence recognized and respected, so is the domain which that mind 
is attempting to successfully represent. 
Read in this light, McDowell's Mind and World can become a clear-headed 
reminder that, after a wave of enthusiastic but ill-starred programmatic reversaIs, 
neither atomist nor wholist construals of mind and meaning will do. The problem, 
in sum, is that each of these broad theoretical interpretations sees itself as an 
epistemological panacea and refuses to learn from the other. The atomist is right to 
insist that objective representations are indexically anchored to their object in a bond 
which tenaciously resists the kind of all-encompassing permutations (speculatively) 
posited by wholism. In other words, whatever is in a launch pad simply cannot be 
represented as any thing one wishes-no matter how much one refashions one's web 
of representations. However, the atomist is wrong to proceed from this truth to 
denying that representation admits a certain plasticity. For the wholist is right to 
insist that ostensions are not as neat an epistemological affair as atomists would have 
us believe, and there is indeed some truth to the idea that not aIl representations can 
be put in jeopardy at once. Be that as it may, the wholist overdoes the insight, and 
sees in the anatomie ligatures of representation a license to claim that the whole is 
the true epistemic arbiter. McDowell thus wams against falling prey to a seesaw 
between « on the one side a coherentism that threatens to disconnect thought from 
reality, and on the other side a vain appeal to the Given, in the sense of bare 
presences that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical 
judgements » ([1994] 2002, p. 24). The issue we must therefore negotiate is how to 
conjoin the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity in a single theory such that 
neither renders the other obsolete. If one views the situation this fairly 
unceremonious way, then the blueprint for a tenable third way is plain: receptivity 
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and spontaneity are both potent contributors to epistemic objectivity, and « [t]o 
neither of these powers maya preference be given over the other » (Kant, [1787] 
1965, B75). 
We surmise that the vast majority of thinkers who employ Sellars' derogatory 
"myth of the Given" slogan do not fully appreciate the rationale which was 
originallY propounded to support it, nor are they alive to its practical ramifications. 
For instance, take the case of a man who, upon being presented a hidden-camera 
recording of himself selling black-market goods, claims that the person shown in the 
video is not him (though, plainly, it is). Can the faculty of spontaneity wholistically 
manipulate the symbolic space in a way that runs counter to the contents of indexical 
input? In other words, can this fraudulent person refashion the whole of his 
representations so as to contradict the deliverances of receptivity? While such a feat 
of subterfuge would be far-fetched, the asyrnrnetrist is committed to the view that 
this can in principle be achieved. Holding that receptivity has no authoritative sway 
in epistemic affairs, the asyrnrnetrist concludes that the only imperative normatively 
guiding the syrnbolic space is coherence within the whole. In what follows, we will 
endeavour to show that this asyrnrnetrist argument breaks down when it is taken 
seriously. 
3.3 Sorne serious problems with one-way doors, part one: getting in 
3.3.1 Diachronie theft 
One of the chief problems faced by someone wishing to dismiss the very possibility 
of a (non-trivial, non-virtual) seITÙotic transaction ultimately Giving contents to the 
mind is that of producing a plausible substitute. The standard manoeuvre in this 
regard has generallY been to calI in the whole. It is unclear to us how an entirety of 
representations could generate new contents without adding anything to that whole. 
Nevertheless, the wholist's argument on this front usuallY rests on an intuitive 
analogy with inference. The assumption is that, given a working set of contents, the 
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mind could effect computations which rearrange the components of those premises 
into new items of knowledge. Thus, much like the classical syllogism takes starting 
premises and draws from them a conclusion hitherto absent (or latent), the 
philosophic cash value of this view is that the "new" representation spawned would 
arise strictly from "within" the wholistic confines of the mind. 
As we stated in the first chapter (sect. 1.5.2), on those occasions where Sellars 
presents a positive-theoretical alternative to the supposedly "mythical" Given, he 
does so in a far more cryptic fashion than his usual fare of meticulous attacks, the net 
result being that his philosophical case for the whole cornes through with 
considerably less force than his negative stance. Be that as it may, we are made to 
gather that the non-Given must be symbolic, anatomic, and inferential, and that these 
features imply sorne sort of wholism. While Sellars' cornments to this effect are 
often quite murky, the following is perhaps the least ambiguous statement we find in 
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind": 
One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a 
tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent 
of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do. 
For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not 
because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which 
can put any claim injeopardy, though not al! at once. ([1956] 1963, § 38) 
The claim being made here is that refashioning the whole with an eye to maximal 
integrity (à la Neurath' s boat) is an alternative that boldly departs from the "tortoise" 
and "serpent" images. According to this gloss, empiricism and Absolute idealism 
are two sides of the same foundationalist coin, and both can be struck down by 
pointing out their inability to avoid regress. 
Yet one can legitimately wonder whether Sellars' preferred conception-the idea 
that knowledge is "a self-correcting enterprise"-can itself withstand the grievance 
levelled at the preceding foils. Could one not insert a likewise parenthetical snub 
after Sellars' stance? Echoing the criticism enunciated earlier vis-à-vis the toil-free 
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vacuum of wholism (sect. 1.2.4), could we not ask: Whence come these daims 
which can be put in jeopardy? While the wholistic rejection of the Given prides 
itself on forgoing recourse to something that is not within the purview of the 
thinking subject, it nevertheless requires the presence of a body of contents the 
origins of which are taken for granted. 
One fairly recent trend in this regard has been to propose that we inherit a viable 
set of representations as part of an ongoing generational dialogue. For his part, 
Richard Rorty-who correctly saw himself as « draw[ing] sorne corollaries from 
Sellars, doctrine» (1980, p. 389)-argues that one need not bother with "where" or 
"how" the ideas which make up such cultural patrimony arose, pushing instead for a 
wilful disregard of such questions (Ibid., p. 315-356). But c1early this stratagem 
won't do. Its most straightforward problem is that it tosses the difficulties at hand 
onto another set of agents whom, it is assumed, somehow generated the primeval 
contents from which the generational dialogue supposedly snowballed. In so 
reducing cognition to a rnind-to-rnind transaction, Rorty adopts a stance analogous 
to Quine and Davidson's: the burden of content-ontogenesis is shifted onto an 
imaginary community deemed at one with nature (sect. 1.2.4). Whereas the 
language "radically" translated is a system synchronically alien, Rorty conceives his 
own "untouched people" as diachronically foreign. No doubt enraptured by the 
Nietzschean account of the Fall, Rorty pictures this community as one "uncorrupted" 
by the impulse to seek an objective alignment between mind and world: 
The urge to say that assertions and actions must not only cohere with other 
assertions and actions but "correspond" to something apart from what people are 
saying and doing has sorne claim to be called the philosophical urge. It is the 
urge which drove Plato to say that Socrates' words and deeds, failing as they did 
to cohere with current theory and practice, nonetheless corresponded to 
something which the Athenians could barely glimpse. The residual Platonism 
which Quine and Sellars are opposing is not the hypostatization of nonphysical 
entities, but the notion of "correspondence" with such entities as the touchstone 
by which measure the worth of present practice. (Rorty, 1980, p. 179) 
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We will answer this anti-correspondence view in the fourth chapter. For now, let 
us note that, unless one posits the presence of sorne strong innate repertoire of 
concepts lodged in an agent's brain (a questionable supposition), whatever cultural 
patrimony is handed down to us-"Adamic" or otherwise-presents itself as but 
another object before the rnind. Even though one's culture and natural language 
spares one the toi! of many worldly categorizations, this does not absolve one of the 
toil needed to appropriate that inheritance itself. It is true that the vast majority of 
agents within a given community do not have to discover for themselves the worldly 
basis for the concept 'Mammal', and make inferences upon that content which will 
effectively generate new concepts. In this sense, most of us have not only profited 
from cognitive theft, but have made interest on the profit. But it must be recognized 
that every individual who does own that concept has had to earn it in toil, and that 
this discovery involves a process identical with the one performed by the trailblazer 
who gave her peers and descendants 'Mammal'. 
A wholistic theory may thus be superlatively well-suited to describe how each 
rnind constructs its inbred representations on the basis of a pre-established 
patrimony, describing in convincing detail how an agent can run with the baton of 
her forebears. But a purportedly "receptivity-free" account of content ontogenesis 
will ultimately avail itself incomplete if it fails to provide an explanation of how that 
agent manages to grab hold of the inheritance to begin with. On that front, it is 
doubûul that any kind of bootstrapping can provide a viable explanation of content 
ontogenesis. To put the matter starkly, the wholist wishing to work solely with a 
receptivity-free account of inferential ontogenesis and a diachronie bequeath would 
have to assemble those materials to produce an algorithm of sorts capable of 
predicting the contents which will be present in the next launch pad (fig. 3) before 
the experiential surprise of receptively discovering sorne pages down what that 
content actually is. 
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3.3.2 Normative impotence 
Suppose we take it for granted that an antecedent store of contents is somehow 
"there" for the agent to exploit. Given this (generous) head start, can 
representational contents still be accounted for in a way that makes due without 
receptivity? Sellars' own brand of wholism wouId fit well with such an in media res 
perspective, insofar as it seems to be providing an account of the rationale legislating 
a "hermetically-sealed" symbolic space. Central to his positive alternative to the 
Given is the idea that we cannot put aU the daims of knowiedge we possess in 
jeopardy at once (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 38). 
This much strikes us as true. Indeed, we consider this pivotaI tenet to be one of 
the more important contributions to have come out of the critique of atomistic 
theories. However, this achievement is generally overdone by sorne who---in their 
eagerness to find a substitute to the once dominant atomistic paradigms-have 
assigned it an epistemic weight it simply cannot carry. This infatuation towards 
wholism has expressed itse1f in a variety of theoreticai excesses (for a survey, cf 
Fodor and Lepore, 1992). What we want to do here is critically prod the tacit 
assumption that the principle of economy alluded by Sellars somehow spares one the 
dutY of accounting for the receptive dimension of representational content. As a 
case study, consider the following launch pad (fig. 3): 
Figure 3 Launch pad A. 
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We take it to be self-evident that this launch pad prompts the representation of a 
chicken. That most sensible view of course rests on sorne form of inductivism, a 
world-to-mind inference which in these philosophically troubled times has become 
quite suspect. Contemporary philosophers incredulous towards induction, having 
retreated to implausible theoretic idioms, would no doubt prefer to construe the 
agent's "grasp" of the aforementioned chicken as a "guess" the standing of which is 
to be subsequently subjected to verification. Such a strange and artificial contortion, 
relying as it does solely on the human faculty of spontaneity, is supposed to spare the 
philosopher from any (putatively problematic) recourse to receptivity. Yet the 
chances of such receptivity-free success are slim, to say the least. As Charles 
Peirce-himself the pioneer of "abductive" inference-pointed out, 
It is weIl within bounds to reckon that there are a billion (i.e., a million million) 
hypotheses that a fantastic being might guess would account for any given 
phenomenon. [...] [I]t suffices to show that according to the doctrine of chances 
it would be practically impossible for any being, by pure chance, to guess the 
cause of any phenomenon. (1931-1958, vol. 7, para. 38). 
We do not want to be misunderstood as endorsing Peirce's own take on inference. 
Regrettably, Richard Bernstein (2002, p. 19) is correct when he points out that 
Peirce (in sorne moods) endorsed a theory of cognition quite similar to the 
asymmetrism espoused by Sellars (cf Peirce, 1992, p. 11-27). Rather, we see the 
fertility of the 'Chicken' representation spawned by the above launch pad as 
sobering calI to accept the mind comprises an irreducible component of receptivity 
(abduction cannot "solve" induction; induction solves induction). 
In any case, suppose an agent were to daim that 'The image of a banana is in the 
box'. These rival chicken and banana daims would then have to vie for epistemic 
merit within the symbolic space of reasons. How then is an individual or a 
discursive community to deterrnine which of the conflicting representations has the 
upper hand? The crucial point here is that since such a trivial matter in no way 
jeopardizes the bulk of a system of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, the principle 
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of economy is of no help. While we readily concede that the inability to imperil an 
of one's beliefs at once imposes a limitation on the kind of spontaneity one can 
marshal (insofar as we can only effect modifications by increments), such impeded 
warpage at best provides only a subtractive epistemic power: a concern for integrity 
can only rule out contents that are "somehow" already "there"-not generate them. 
3.3.3 Synchronic theft 
In light of the fact that the wholistic principle of maximal integrity is impotent to 
normatively address less-than-major divergences in content, what is to be the arbiter 
of epistemological discords (individual or communal)? An epistemology will be 
next to useless if it cannot address this kind of dilemma, which is by far the variety 
we most frequently face (paradigm-shifting situations are not an everyday 
occurrence). The Sellarsian answer to such trivial rivalries of content, it would 
seem, is a paradoxical hyblid: receptivity de facto / nothing de jure. Recall that 
Sel1ars qua asymmetrist accepts the possibility that indexical force might contribute 
to the ontogenesis of representations (sect. 1.5.4). Agnostically refraining from talk 
of Givens but reaping aIl their ontogenetic benefits, the asymmetrist simply calls 
upon the one-way door construal and asserts that the content is "aheady" within the 
domain of mind. McDowel1 explains this philosophical tour de force as fol1ows: 
Sellars devotes part of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" to defending a 
notion of sensory impressions. The point of the defence is to distinguish 
impressions from bits of the Given, and Sellars effects this by carefully refusing 
to attribute any direct epistemological significance to impressions. They have an 
indirect epistemological significance, in that without them there could not be 
such directly significant circumstances as seeing that things are thus and so, or 
having it look to one as if things are thus and so. But it is only in that indirect 
way that impressions enter into the rational responsiveness of empilical thinking 
to the course of experience. We can have an innocent interpretation of the idea 
that empirical thinking is rationally responsive to the course of experience, but 
only by understanding "the course of experience" to mean the succession of 
appearings, not the succession of impressions. ([ 1994) 2002, p. 140-141) 
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Thus, although the wholistic principle of maximal integrity is impotent to settle 
the chicken-versus-banana debate, it would seem that the matter can be resolved in a 
non-problematic manner: a banana claimant would clearly be wrong, since at the 
inner foot of the mind's one-way door lies a chicken representation. Lest this be 
thought of as a case of Givenness, McDowell (following Sellars' lead, [1956] 1963, 
§ 45) reassures us that the content at hand is an "appearing", not an "impression". 
One can rightly wonder whether any such slide in terminology can dissipate the fact 
that an epistemically fecund input from the world has occurred. For those 
philosophers weary of countenancing any indexical contribution can insert 
representational dominoes at leisure, but as long as the final one tips over without 
our agency, that is a telltale sign that we are dealing with receptivity (of aIl people, 
McDowell should have been alive to this sort of terminating chain, cf McDoweIl, 
[1981] 1998, p. 319). As David Kelley puts it: « Any effect whatever is a 
discriminative response to stimuli, in the sense of a differential reaction to them: that 
is what a causal relation is » (1986, p. 203; italics in original). 
Be that as it may, a chicken content has suddenly "appeared" within the expanse 
of mind, thereby providing pseudo-empirical (phenomenal?) fodder for the 
normative assessment of rival claims which could not otherwise register as anything 
but inconsequential to the ongoing integrity of the whole's pre-existing 
configuration. Should it be asked what, pray, brought this content (and not another) 
about; the answer, pace agnosticism, would be conveniently simple: one literally 
cannat say. In essence, the asymmetrist position takes the "helping oneself to 
content" reproach rightly levelled at Davidson by McDoweIl ([1994] 2002, p. 68, cf 
sect. 1.2.4) and elevates into a key component of its theory of representation (we can 
summarize this peculiar situation in figure 4). 
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Figure 4 The supposed asymmetry of launch pad A. 
Instead of trying to conceal conceptual theft as a flaw, the asyrnmetrist flaunts it 
as a boon of her structural account. Since it is a truism that the process of 
intelligibly apprehending an object is capped off by its intelligible apprehension, 
Sellars argues that epistemology can make due without the process that got us there, 
as aIl that can really be the subject of meaningful discourse is the complete product: 
[W]hen we picture a chiId [... ] learning his first language, we, of course, locate 
the language learner in a structured logical space in which we are at home. Thus, 
we conceive of him as a person (or, at least, a potential person) in a world of 
physical objects, coloured, producing sounds, existing in Space and Tirne. But 
though it is we who are familiar with this logical space, we run the danger, if we 
are not careful, of picturing the language learner as having ab initia sorne degree 
of awareness-'pre-analytic', limited, and fragmentary though it rnay be-of this 
sarne logical space. (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 30) 
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Here then, in a nutshell, is the argumentative recipe behind the "myth of the Given" 
critique: let the world and our cognitive apparatus do whatever they need to do to 
deliver contents to the mind's symbolic space and then, once the contents are 
"there", rebuke any attempt to establish the epistemic merit of such items on the 
basis of their experiential origin by raising the objection of post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc (sprinkling vague allusions to the whole along the way so as to intimate sorne 
sort of substitute). 
3.3.4 Argument and observation 
Naturally, there is a strong intuitive pull away from the one-way door conception of 
experience. It would therefore go a long way towards securing the veracity of the 
asymmetrist view if it could produce sorne kind of intuitive account that supports its 
daims. Let us then take a look at one the more frequently cited examples in this 
regard, the Mueller-Lyer illusion (cf deVries and Triplett, 2000, p. 25). 
In this image, two lines of equal length are juxtaposed side by side for easy 
comparison. Located at the tips of each line are arrow heads, the pair of one of the 
lines pointing inwards, the other lines' tips pointing outward. The net effect of this 
is that the lines appear to be of unequal lengths, the inward-pointing arrows 
seemingly compressing the line on which they are appended, the outward ones 
stretching theirs. Thus, although the lines are in point of fact identical with respect 
to their lengths in rerum natura, the human agent indexically exposed to them will 
experience them as being uneven. 
What is interesting about this strange image is that even if one is made privy to 
the fact that the lines are in fact of even lengths, the indexical force it will exert on 
us will continue to prompt a representation of unevenness. As McDowell writes: « 
How one's experience represents things to be is not under one's control, but it is up 
to one whether one accepts that a9pearance or rejects it. [... ) In the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, one' s experience represents the two lines as being unequally long, but 
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someone in the know will refrain from judging that that is how things are » ([1994] 
2002, p. 11, lln9). We thus seem to be confronted with a very potent case of 
indexical asyrnrnetry: an index causes a representation (i.e., of unevenness) in one 
direction but, once that content is coherently situated within the rest of an agent's 
wholistic web, the revamped symbolic representation of the image (as even) cannot 
return to its origins and appeal to a likewise indexicality so as to establish its merit. 
In other words, once the atomic knowledge by acquaintance crosses the threshold of 
the mind's one-way door and is anatomically meshed with the whole, it looses is 
noninferentiality. Proving that the lines are even (which indeed they are) is 
subsequently a matter of complex demonstration within the space of reasons. As 
Richard Rorty would say (sect. 3.3.1), "mere looking" seems to be of no help. 
We reject this asymmetrist account. However, before we sound out why, let us 
be clear on what is at stake: the asymmetrist does not claim that anatomie inferences 
contribute to normatively assessing the situation in a way that augments the 
contribution of Givenness. Rather, the asymmetrist position is that anatomie 
inferences totally supplant Givenness in the normative assessment of a 
representation's epistemic merit. It is thus not a simple matter of weighing the 
strength of abstract arguments against that of ostensive evidence (e.g.: '1 have 
burned my hand, and whatever inferences l or anybody else weaves must conform to 
this'). Instead, owing to a complex technical argument, the self-evident is held to be 
a "myth" which can have no epistemic sway whatsoever. In sum, the Sellarsian 
thesis is nat that the Given must share its episternic authority with the non-Given, 
but rather that the Given has no such authority. 
As a means of illustrating why we believe the asymmetrist view to be seriously 
wrong, consider the following experiment. Instance an agent who has no clue what 
the Mueller-Lyer illusion is. She has no knowledge of this object, neither "by 
description" nor "by acquaintance". Let this agent sit alone in a quiet room 
equipped with an image-projector. Suppose that the said illusion is suddenly 
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displayed for her to see, and that ample noise-free time is allowed for her to fully 
take in the indexical force issuing from her proximal exposure to the worldly object. 
We now turn off the projector and close the lights in the room, such that she is 
immersed in total darkness. At this point, we allow her to hear a voice which 
explains to her in great detail everything that is required for her to repudiate her 
erstwhile representation of the 1ines as uneven (argumentation in favour of even 
lines need not be merely assertoric-she can engage the voice in interactive 
discourse). Suppose, then, that after sorne time our agent is convinced by the 
inferential discourse that the lines were in fact even, despite what she saw. In other 
words, after a symbolic exchange in the space of reasons, she now normatively holds 
the representation of the lines as uneven to be incorrect. 
The question we must now ask is: is it true, as the asymmetrist holds, that the 
indexical episode which our agent experienced when the image was made visible is 
authoritatively impotent in the pitch black space of reasons which ultimately led her 
to think of the lines as even? Granted, since the giving of reasons to this effect was 
properly in absentia, the exercise was through and through symbolic; the voice 
simply could not have produced the image in praesentia. However, can one really 
infer from tms that the indexical force played no part in the normative assessment 
which our agent arrived at? 
What is important to recognize is that the argument convincingly presented to 
our agent must calI upon the unevenness of the lines. Indeed, one of the pivotaI 
premises of the inferential chain presented to her in darkness is that 'The lines 
appear uneven to whoever sees them'. What would happen to that complex 
argument should the lines in fact appear even? The only way for the agent to assess 
the cogency of the argument is for her to take advantage (in an epistemically 
efficacious way) of the indexical episode which alone can establish whether the lines 
indeed appear uneven to whoever sees them. For while logical reasoning alone 
could no doubt establish the formaI validity of the inferences eloquently presented, 
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the question of those inferences' actual epistemic merit-their merit as 
knowledge-will forever hang in the air unless one ruptures the asymmetry and 
sneaks a peak at sorne representational relation tenaciously asserting its own 
normative standing with or without the whole. Talk of a space of reasons is fine. 
But reasons are reasons for or towards something, and the index must be allowed to 
point both ways. 
Notice that we have not provided an illustration of the Mueller-Lyer illusion. 
Let those who knew what the preceding was about determine for themselves to what 
extent that "acquaintance" contributes to their normative assessment of our 
argument, of our reasons for upholding symmetry. Granted, the weight of the 
indexical contribution will vary greatly, and gauging its scope is a loose affair at 
best. Nevertheless, what is important here is that according to the asymmetrist, there 
should be no such contribution. In all aetiological sobriety, we cannot help but think 
that something is drastically wrong with such a daim, and that the asymmetrist is 
letting a small and unwarranted (technical) tail wag a very big (naturalist) dog. 
Let us remark that the Mueller-Lyer is just that: an illusion. We are dealing with 
what Millikan (1984) would call an abnormal case. This important fact weakens the 
asymmetrist's stance and lends credence to ours. Citing an extraordinary situation as 
an exemplar of a generalized epistemological daim robs that daim of much of its 
credibility-or at least much of its scope. It is one thing to daim that indexical 
asymmetries can and do occur; it is another to elevate such a structure to the status 
of covering model for all mental representation. By that same token, the fact that 
even the Mueller-Lyer image cannot be established as illusory without returning to 
its indexical force only makes our critique more robust (it goes without saying that 
indexical symmetries abound and are more obvious in cases involving the 
representation of healthier objects). 
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3.4 Sorne serions problerns with one-way doors, part two: once in 
3.4.1 Is immunity guaranteed? 
In the flight from atomic receptivity, it is generally assumed that a dominant 
epistemological paradigm has been unseated to make way for a better one. Granted 
(in the twentieth century at least), the negative portion of this revolution has 
proceeded with more enthusiasm than the positive one. Rebuilding efforts just don't 
seem to attract as many practitioners of the philosophical arts, especially in an age 
when constructive theorizing is viewed with cynical suspicion. Perhaps this meagre 
offering of positive views explains why certain texts find themselves fast-tracked to 
a success and prominence arguably disproportionate with their actual content; and 
why someone like Quine-whose "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" « is perhaps the 
most analyzed short philosophical paper written in the last fifty years » (Fodor and 
Lepore, 1992, p. 37)-writes of being « lucky to have had [recognition] so 
abundantly while l am here to marvel at it », suggesting « in due modesty » that it 
may have been « excessive» (Quine, 1985, p. 479). 
In any event, the point here is that those fleeing from atomism obviously saw (or 
wished to see) wholism as a substantial alternative under which to repair. If this is 
so, then it seems that the attack on Givenness was not intended as sorne sort of 
epistemological nihilism denying the very possibility of thought. Rather, most 
critiques of receptivity-including those of Quine, Davidson, and Sellars-daim 
that by rejecting the idea of se1f-authenticating punctate episodes, we are not 
divesting ourselves of the possibility of establishing the epistemic merit of our 
representations. However, it is argued that atomistic conceptions are fatally 
defective in this regard, and that we must drastically reconsider what it means for an 
item of knowledge to be in good standing. In its most generic form, the argument 
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has been that any representation liable of bearing sorne sort of episternic 
value-liable to be intelligible and perhaps shown to be true or false-must be 
anatomie in structure. The widespread (but mistaken) assumption is that if this 
much can be demonstrated, then victory for wholism is assured. 
Now there are many ways to go about showing that an atomist epistemology 
could not be feasible. In the first chapter, we looked at two such approaches. In the 
first instance, atornism is said to be impossible because the rnind's experiential 
contact with the world is pervaded by informational noise, and that if we need to sift 
through this to reach a representation's referent, then that representation is perforce 
anatornically linked to others. As McDowell explains, 
The idea is that if concepts are to be even partly constituted by the fact that 
judgements in which they figure are grounded in the Given, then the associated 
conceptual capacities must be acquired from confrontations with suitable bits of 
the Given: that is, occasions when pointing to an ultimate warrant would have 
been feasible. But in any ordinary impingement on our sensibility, it would have 
to be a manifold Given that is presented to us. So in order to form an 
observational concept, a subject would have to abstract out the right element in 
the presented multiplicity. ([1994] 2002, p. 7) 
As we saw when discussing the speculative scenario of "radical translation", this is 
the tract of reasoning favoured by Quine and Davidson (sect. 1.2.3). Sellars is by no 
means a stranger to this kind of argument. For example, he writes: 
Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate for deterrnining the 
colour of an object by looking, the subject must know that conditions of this sort 
are appropriate. And while this does not imply that one must have concepts 
before one has them, it does imply that one can have the concept of green only 
by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. (Sellars, [1956] 
1963, § 19; italics in original) 
But what sets Sellars apart from other attackers of atornism is the other, more 
profound, criticism he levels at Givenness; to wit, the asymmetry of indexicality 
thesis. Our daim is that it is precisely the strength of Sellars' critique of the "myth 
of the Given" which imperils it. 
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Sellars could not have foreseen that faithful students of his thought like Richard 
Rorty wouId one day expound relativist doctrines (correctly) claiming him as a 
precursor (sect. 3.3.1), nor that philosophers like John McDowell would come to see 
wholism with enough philosophie suspicion to consider it the unpalatable pole of a 
tug-of-war with the Given-one sufficiently flawed to generate sympathy towards its 
supposedly "mythical" antipode (sect. 2.5.3). Blissfully ignorant of such latter-day 
developments and secure in the conviction that the whole would steer epistemology 
to a better sort of normativity, the scientifically-minded Sellars trusted that whatever 
blows he would deliver at receptivity would be fair game and would do no harm to 
his own positive-theoretic stance. Indeed, one of the reasons why there have been so 
many attacks directed at receptivity in contemporary times has been the widespread 
confidence that an alternative source of normativity is in the offing. Thus, so long as 
philosophers assumed that they could switch over to a wholistic epistemology, their 
appetite for critical deconstruction went on unimpeded. In our opinion, nowhere 
was this virulence more prominent than in the work of Wilfrid Sellars. But Sellars' 
attack went too far and deep: by directing bis efforts at undermining so basic a 
semiotic feature as the structural relation which ties the indexical order to the 
symbolic, it jeopardized the haven he thought he could retreat to. For we argue that 
the abstract space of reasons where Sellars claims intelligibly and normativity take 
root is not immune to the asymmetry argument. Much the opposite: every argument 
which can be levelled at something outside the mind's one-way door can be applied 
with equal effectiveness inside it. 
Recall that, in opting for the expression "the Given", Sellars was stressing the 
breadth of his philosophie concerns (sect. 1.5.1). It is because of its sweeping range 
that "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" has become a classic of philosophy 
still read today. In effect, Sellars claims that if empiricism upheld so mistaken a 
view of knowledge, it is because it rested on a tacit epistemological assumption 
which, once we are made aware of it, reveals itself the keystone of most other 
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schoois as weIl. In fact, by its own assessment, the Sellarsian program aims to 
debunk an idea so pervasive that it spans what have typically been considered 
antagonist traditions in the history of philosophy: 
This framework has been a corrunon feature of most of the major systems of 
philosophy, including, to use a Kantian turn of phrase, both 'dogmatic 
rationalism' and 'skeptical empiIicism'. It has, indeed, been so pervasive that 
few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it; certainly not Kant, and, 
l wouid argue, not even Hegel, that great foe of 'irrunediacy'. (Sellars, [1956] 
1963, § 1) 
As a case study in how Givenness can play out on rationalist terrain, consider the 
Cogito. According to the standard Cartesian account, all the objects of thought can 
in plinciple be doubted. But even if one were to contemplate an object for which 
there is no basis whatsoever, this contemplation would obliquely yield at least one 
item of knowledge whose epistemological basis is secure, as the very act of thinking 
any object eo ipso attests to the existence of the thinking subject. AlI other 
representations may depend on others (i.e., be anatomic), may be reached only by a 
process of reasoning (i.e., be inferential), and may be bound to various abstract 
conventions (i.e., be symbolic). But the Cogito is Given: it is atomic, noninferential, 
and indexical (sect. 1.5.2). That is, its very structure is sufficient to support its 
content, it requires no other representations to be intelligible, and it imposes itself 
via a force we need not produce ourselves. The pivotaI Sellarsian argument against 
this kind of Givenness, of course, is the asyrrunetry of thesis. According to this 
view, indexical force may perhaps impose the apprehension of a content upon an 
agent, but any subsequent epistemic appeal to that content cannot rest on a likewise 
semiotic mechanism. In terms of the schema put forth earlier (fig. 2), it is held that 
the alTOWS cannot form a 100p which goes "to and fro". As a result, the asymmetrist 
maintains that the Cartesian Cogito is at best an ineffable revelation, not the fertile 
axiom the rationalist takes it to be; and that whatever normative support it may offer 
is in fact beholden to the .vhole, not any discrete self-authenticating insight. 
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Note that aIl of this faIls squarely within the "framework of Givenness" yet in no 
way involves the senses. The entire affair takes place in a purely ideational sphere, 
one which makes it its rationalist badge of honour to forgo any recourse to the 
body' s experiential episodes. The asyrnrnetrist contention that it is impossible to 
return to indexical origins thus halds whether the content in question is "outside" or 
"inside" the realm of mind. The asyrnrnetrical attack upon the Given, as SeIlars 
himself insisted, is not lirnited to sense-data and the like, but is rather directed at the 
structure of representation per se, be it construed in internalist, externalist, or neutral 
terms. Keeping this in rnind, we argue that Sellars took his assault to a level so basic 
that it effectively sacked the abstract space of reasons which he (wrongly) believed 
could house epistemology in the afterrnath of the asymmetry critique. 
3.4.2 The indexical symmetry of inference 
As we saw when we discussed the tour de force of ontogenetic theft whereby 
contents enter the rnind's supposed one-way door, the asymmetry thesis holds that 
those representations which "somehow" appear within the symbolic space answer 
only to a wholistic rationale (cf fig. 4). According to this view, any agent wishing ta 
defend claims to objective knowledge is barred from indexically returning ta 
whatever (ineffable) point of origin perchance gave rise to her beliefs, having thus 
no other recourse but Given-free argumentation within the space of reasons. Let us 
then ask: since Givenness is a formaI (i.e., symmetrical) relation which can rear its 
"mythical" head in any ontological realm, is this symbolic space immune to it? 
Consider the following situation, aIl solidly located in an agent' s symbolic space 
(fig. 5). For the purpose of clarity, let us christen the first chicken (which is said to 
be P) Primo, and the second (which is inferred to be Q) Secundo: 
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Figure 5 The asymmetry issue in a symbolic space. 
It is clear that the conclusion qua inferential product could not arise if there was no 
Primo, insofar as without that content the premise that 'Primo is P' could not be 
asserted and without that premise the conclusion could not be drawn. In that sense, 
Primo the chicken is a contributor to the ontogenesis of the conclusion, partaking in 
the movement which asymmetry (agnostically) permits; namely that something (a 
premise) gives rise to a representation (a conclusion). 
Admittedly, it can seem somewhat queer to say that preIlllses "cause" a 
conclusion in inference. Of course, we say this while keeping in mind the caveat 
spelled out earlier about the deficiencies of alluding to the idea of "causality" where 
indexical force is concemed (sect. 1.5.2). What is important here is the ontogenetic 
dynamic proper to inference. What does it mean to say that a conclusion is drawn 
from premises? It means that the premises supply the materials which go on to 
make up the conclusion. Deduction-the paradigmatic exemplar of inference-is 
said to be monotonie: a conclusion drawn deductively contains nothing in it that was 
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not already in the premises. Now the issue is whether this feature allows us to say 
that the premises indexically caused the conclusion, or whether the allusion to such a 
causal-like "impact" upon the conclusion (however mild) is misguided. Causation 
itself has always been a tremendously thorny topic. However, contemporary 
logicians have found that the notion can be handled robustly if construed 
counterfactually. The idea is to assess the presence of causation by logically 
travelling upstream, so to speak. Thus, we can say that A caused B when the 
situation is such that if A had not occurred then B would not have occurred. Since a 
deduced conclusion contains no content that was not previously in the premises, it is 
therefore accurate to say that premises are causal contributors to a conclusion. 
As we have seen (sect. 1.5.4), the asymmetrist is at liberty to agnostically 
concede the possibility that something indexically gives rise to a representation. 
What she takes issue with is rather the movement which seeks to indexically retum 
to that origin in order to secure the representation's status. On this front, we argue 
that the asymmetrist must throw away inferences along with experiences, since it is 
precisely a symmetrical retum to causal origins which confers epistemic merit onto a 
conclusion in inference. Here's why. Once again, let us remark that there can be no 
'Secundo is Q' if there is no 'Secundo'. Now 'Secundo is Q' is a conclusion only if 
it signifies '(That chicken which is P) is Q'. For if Secundo cannot appeal to Plimo 
as its referent, then 'Secundo is Q' has no epistemic support, and reverts to being a 
mere assertion about another chicken, Secundo, being Q. The inference (in this case 
a Barbara figure) may thus ontogenetically follow from its premises, but the valid 
pedigree of its conclusion is useless if Secundo cannot indexically "retum" to Primo 
(much like evidence can indexically cause a certain verdict in a murder trial but 
awaits an ostensive appeal which will reap that normative benefit). In short, the 
inferential ligaments which bind the conclusion to the premises and confer validity 
onto the third proposition are possible only if a semiotic movement "to and fro" 
173 
Primo and Secundo is possible. If the Secundo chicken cannot rightfully claim to 
stand for the Primo chicken, then every content in the above schema (fig. 5) must be 
sui generis. If this is so, then aIl inference is impossible. 
A crude objection to this wouId be that inference cannot involve anything 
remotely close to the Given, since one of the distinctive features of the Given is that 
it is noninferential. ln order to avoid such a gross confusion, we should make it 
clear that our argument pertains only to the content-respect which makes inference 
possible. There is no doubt that the conclusion of an inference owes whatever 
epistemic status it has to a relation that is patently anatomie. As we made clear 
when describing the "causation" whereby premises give rise to a conclusion, the 
product of a monotonie inference contains nothing in it that was not previously in 
the premises. Leaving aside the question of what constitutes a valid rearrangement, 
we can say that a rearrangement of contents must take place for there to be an 
inference proper, the contents available in the premises being colligated in such a 
way that the ensuing product is built from nothing but those antecedent premises. 
For aIl these reasons, we grant that a conclusion is indeed anatomically bound to its 
prelll1ses. However, what we take issue with is the view that this somehow 
eliminates atomism in a way that makes the conclusion of inference fully non-Given. 
Our claim is rather that a conclusion is anatomically bound to the premises which 
indexically give rise to it only because this anatomical relation subsumes atomic 
relations without which there could not be the sort of content-respect that confers 
onto the conclusion a special normative status. In other words, if an argument runs 
20 minutes, and its conclusion an additional 2 minutes, those last two must point to 
the previous twenty noninferentially for the inference to make its point (on pain of 
regress). For whatever is said about a term in a conclusion will be merely asserted 
arbitrarily and not entailed if that conclusion' s term cannot atomically represent the 
same term in a premise. 
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The lesson here is a powerful one: it suffices that one cannot establish the 
episternic merit of a conclusion (i.e., gauge if it indeed follows) without pointing to 
the contents imbedded in the antecedent prernises which spawned it to show 
that-contrary to the asymmetry thesis-indexical appeal to a causal origin must in 
sorne sense be epistemologically efficacious. Thus, if it were true, the Sellarsian 
thesis of indexical asymmetry would not only disconnect the mind fram a world 
beyond it (sect. 3.4.3), it would also deprive one of the kind of content-respect that is 
a precondition to rational thought within the symbolic "space of reasons". 
3.4.3 No refuge 
In Mind and World, McDowell astutely remarks that « The Myth of the Given is 
especially insidious in the case of "inner sense" » ([1994] 2002, p. 21) and that « 
when we reject the Given here, we can seem to be rejecting "inner" awareness 
altogether »(Ibid.). Feeling a grave epistemological danger lurking, he orninously 
asks: « How can we reject the Given without thus obliterating "inner" awareness? » 
(Ibid.). In keeping with his conviction that the noumenal is the last bastion of the 
Given (sect. 2.2.1), McDowell thinks that insisting on panserniotism spares him this 
destructive fate. His argument, in short, is that if we do away with the "inner-outer" 
distinction, we need not worry about the rejection of Givenness obliterating the 
"inner" (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 36-39; cf. Taylor, 2002). 
If McDowell does not agree with the transcendentalist view espoused by his 
mentors Kant and (to a lesser extent) Sellars, it is because, following Wittgenstein's 
"quietist" optirnism and Hegel's (far from quiet) idealism, he insists that « thinking 
does not stop short of facts. The world is embraceable in thought » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 33; cf. sect. 2.2.2). The Hegelian motive behind this stance has 
historically been labelled "idealist". The incorporation of Wittgenstein, however, 
adds a surprisingly new turn to the old dichotomy. Indeed, Wittgenstein ([1921] 
2002, §§ 5.6 to 5.641) has famously maintained that idealism (i.e., the "inner"), 
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when consistently pursued, amounts to realism (i.e., the "outer"). Thus, fram a 
Wittgensteinian viewpoint, it really makes no difference whether it is we who are in 
the world or the world that is in us; the distinction is essentially vacuous and can be 
turned like a glove. 
We are qui te sympathetic to this kind of position. As we suggested when 
discussing the instability of McDowell's fusion thesis (sect. 2.5.3), we think that any 
monism must perforce be neutral. But whatever merits are attached to such a 
rejection of Cartesian dualism, the manoeuvre itself does nothing to paUiate the 
destructiveness of the "myth of the Given" critique. McDoweU does not seem to 
fully appreciate that the most ardent form of idealism (or neutral monism) can still 
contain symmetrical appeals. It is simply not true, as he claims, that « We faU into 
the Myth of the Given only if we suppose that this pointing wouId have to break out 
through a boundary that encloses the sphere of thinkable content » (McDowell, 
[1994] 2002, p. 39). Although McDoweU is well aware that the Given's all­
encompassing scope makes it applicable "endogenously" (Ibid., p. 136, 158), he can 
be satisfied that his pansemiotism is immune to Sellars' attack only to the extent he 
construes the Given as applying only to IlÙnd-world relations. Since that narrow 
reading is philosophically (and textuaUy) IlÙstaken, we think his confidence is 
IlÙsplaced. 
Generally speaking, the idea that a wholistic web of ideational items can be a 
normative refuge remains plausible only so long as that space is spared fram the 
asymmetry critique. However, this asylum is a myth all its own, as the technical 
notion of something "Given" is germane not only to sensory experience and the like 
but to any case where an atomie appeal to an indexieal origin is made in order to 
non-inferentially establish some sort of episteIlÙc value (for a survey and critique of 
narrow construals of the Given, ef. deVries and Triplett, 2000, p. xxvi-xxx). The 
exact nature of the origin is of no importance; "Givenism" is defined by its 
(symmetrical) form, not its content. A IlÙnd-to-IlÙnd relation (e.g., Descartes) can 
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involve Givenness as easily as a mind-to-world relation. lt therefore cannot be that a 
wholistic web of non-Given reasons is a substitute for Givenness, since the very 
logical being of inferential knowledge, as we have just seen, depends on an appeal 
that is patently Given. 
Wilful of ignorance of the Given's broad scope notwithstanding, there is just no 
way one can dismiss Givenness aIl the while laying daim to sorne remnant of an 
intelligible domain. In a perverse way, McDowell's fears that in rejecting the Given 
we might be « obliterating » the "inner" realm as weIl as the "outer" are very much 
justified. Truth be told, in rejecting the Given, any realm where the epistemic tries 
to take root is annihilated. For it really makes no difference what ontological 
domain one chooses to situate inference in; so long as an atomic appeal to indexical 
origins is made, the asymmetrist must reject il. "A is A" in a mind-to-mind space 
(fig. 5) shares the same symmetrical relation as "A" bearing on A in a mind-to-world 
context (fig. 4). If one maintains that the latter is not possible at its most basic 
structural level (and not just as a matter of happenstance), then one is eo ipso 
committed to the view that the former is also impossible. The whole thus lives on 
borrowed time: it remains a plausible sanctuary only so long as one does not submit 
it to the same ruthless anti-Givenness critique which Sellars directed at experience. 
Bad Sellars considered that the content-respect at the heart of inferential 
knowledge is patently syrrunetrical, he would have no doubt restricted his assaull. In 
fact, he probably would have managed to take out empiricism had he not tried to 
take rationalism along with il. As things stand, his critique is unsuccessful because 
it succeeds on both fronts. Whereas the McDowellian oscillation considers 
wholistic relativism to be the main philosophie danger flowing from the "myth of 
the Given" critique, we hold that since what really ensues from the asymmetry 
argument is the obliteration of reasons as such, the actual pitfall is nihilism. 
We should like to conclude oUf rejection of asyrrunetry with a brief observation. 
Alan Turing, in laying down the conceptual groundwork for addressing the question 
177 
of mathematica1 decidability in his imaginative 1936 paper "On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem", insisted that we grant 
him a handful ofaxioms: 
The machine is supp1ied with a 'tape' (the analogue of paper) running through it, 
and divided into sections (called 'squares') each capable of bearing a 'symbol'. 
[...] The 'scanned symbol' is the on1y one of which the machine is, so to speak, 
'directlyaware' [...]. (quoted in Monk and Raphael, 2002, p. 500) 
Let us imagine the operations performed by the computer to be split up into 
'simple operations' which are so elementary that it is not easy to imagine them 
further divided. (Ibid., p. 502) 
Besides these changes of symbols, the simple operations must inc1ude changes 
of distribution of observed squares. The new observed squares must be 
immediate1y recognisable by the computer. (Ibid.) 
We must confess to a 1imited interest in the "cognitive sciences", which appear to us 
ridd1ed with questionable alchemic hopes which are not assumed in the fulllight of 
day. Without endorsing the computationalist construal of mind which 
enthusiastically sprang from the above architecture, we nevertheless find it 
remarkable that, for the Turing machine to effect its anatomic-inferential-symbolic 
computations, it must be "direct1y aware" (i.e., indexically) of its contents in an 
"immediately recognisable" (noninferentia1) manner that "cannot be divided further" 
(atomic). 
3.5 What DOW? 
When we described the principal features that make up what Sellars aptly called the 
"Given", we did not dwell too much on their opposites, mentioning only in passing 
the traits which by implication constitute the "non-Given" (sect. 1.5.2). If we accept 
that the Given is indexical, atomic, and noninferential, then we can likewise affirm 
that the non-Given is symbo1ic, anatomic, and inferentia1 (cf. fig. 6). 
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1 non-Given Given 
Symbolie Indexieal 
Anatomie Atomie 
Inferential Noninferential 
Figure 6 The respective features of 
the non-Given and Given. 
The members that comprise each vertical tripartition are more or less synonymous 
with each other. Much like speaking of being triangular and trilateral amounts to the 
same thing, there is a certain redundancy in saying that an index is atomic and so on. 
This is of no great importance, insofar as what interests us in the chart is not so 
much its rows as the relation (if any) between the colunms. Putting aside the various 
polemics, what we have here are two very different "orders" of representation, to 
each of which can be annexed one of the Kantian faculties. Thus, the order of the 
non-Given is where spontaneity can express itself, whereas that of the Given is 
where receptivity occurs. 
With this framework in place, Sellars mobilizes an argument which, though 
sophisticated in its presentation, involves a fairly straightforward inference: "The 
orders of spontaneity and receptivity differ; therefore they cannot relate in a fertile 
way". This asymmetrist argument is not unique to knowledge or the mind (it can be 
invoked, for instance, to defend the absurd daim that since movement and rest 
differ, one can only hold a baseball in one's mitt, not receive it). Of course, the 
reasoning itself at work here is analogous to that which gives rise to the (in)famous 
mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes. Now McCulloch (2002) has rightly 
called attention to the anti-Cartesian character of McDowell's project of radically 
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uniting mind and world. Indeed, the stated purpose of the McDowellian fusion 
thesis is to ensure that we not picture the world as sorne sort of ineffable space 
which extends ever so slightly further than that of the realm of mind. Nevertheless, 
by trying to go the monist route, we think McDowell effectively grants the premise 
that if spontaneity and receptivity differ, they cannot relate: since he wants them to 
relate, he insists that they don 't differ after ail (figure 7 summarizes these views). 
In contrast with these approaches, we will seek neither to obliterate the Kantian 
relata nor to reduce one of them to virtual impotence. üwing to our aetiological 
posture, we simply cannot deny that we have good grounds to notionaily distinguish 
receptivity from spontaneity, Givenness from non-Givenness. As Crispin Wright so 
aptly put it: « The overcoming of dualisms is a good thing only when the duality is 
bogus; otherwise, it is just the missing of distinctions» (2002b, p. 173). However, 
what we want to do is grant the premise that freedom and reason belong to an arder 
altogether different from experiential compulsion-yet demolish the mistaken 
supposition that this somehow entails an impossible coexistence. The position we 
will defend in the next chapter is that, when conducted under proper (i.e, non­
speculative) norms, the mind's representations involve a sca1e which is greater than 
the atom but smaller than the whole, and that on such a scale the twin faculties can 
be construed in such a way that their interplay becomes non-problematic. 
1 ,
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non-Given Given Fusion: (or Given non-Given) 
Figure 7 Two misguided ways to resolve the tension between the 
non-Given and Given. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
As we take inventory, we see that there are several forces at work in McDowell's 
oscillation. Chief among these is the initial recoil away from the idea of a discrete 
receptive contact with the world. Yet in so fleeing from any and all things Given, it 
is uncritically assumed that there is a fallback position theorists can migrate to. The 
promised land in this case is provided by the whole, which marks the opposite end of 
the seesaw. Shrinking from the world into the safe confines of the mind, it is hoped 
that the whole will supply what was deemed missing from the atomic content, 
namely a plausible source of epistemic normativity-at least one which can survive 
the technical criticisms levelled at empiricism. Secure in this belief (and in the 
conviction that anything punctate would at best be ineffable), Sellars designed a very 
powerful strike: it is not so much that empiricist theories are wrong in claiming 
sensory episodes as reasons; rather, it is the very idea that one could symmetrically 
retum to indexical origins which is mistaken. 
However, much like McDowell's fusion thesis remains plausible only so long as 
its constituents are artificially kept unfused and their inevitable collapse into monism 
delayed (sect. 2.5.3), Sellars and others' assumption that a wholistic fabric of 
inferences could house representation in a post-Given epistemology feeds on a 
narrow construal of the Given as pertaining only to sensory episodes. Accordingly, 
aIl we have done in this chapter is taken the philosophie assault on Givenness (not 
just empiricism) seriously-and looked at where it leads. What this investigative 
strategy has taught us is that Sellars' attack was too powerful. For if one stays true 
to his programmatic ambitions and holds fast to the idea that the Given is a formaI 
(symmetrical) appeal which transcends any specifie ontological domain, then 
inferential knowledge must be rejected: content-respect is the quintessential 
indexical symmetry. It is as if sorne army general was so convinced that his enemy's 
continent was distant that he remorselesf'ly devised a weapon splintering the very 
structure of physical matter, thereby devastating his own continent in the process 
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(Granted, demonstrating that the rejection of Givenness leads to nihilism is not per 
se a refutation of the asymmetry thesis. It could very well be that noninferential 
appeals are indeed impossible in any domain. However, since this would effectively 
obliterate inferential knowledge as well, it is hard to see how one could argue such a 
daim). 
Since we have rejected the initial recoil away from atomism by undermining its 
most potent technical critique, does that mean we should take up the empiricist 
project anew? Not at ail. To a certain extent, the idea of placing the burden of 
epistemic normativity solely on the shoulders of receptivity is a deeply misguided 
project which is doomed to fail. What then are we to do? Well, we have seen how 
McDowell and Sel1ars tried to do away with the Kantian co-operation-the former 
by fusion, the latter by asynunetry. In the end, however, neither accomplishes what 
is needed most, namely an elucidation of the modalities whereby spontaneity and 
receptivity interact. Thus, putting an end to the seesaw between atornism and 
wholism requires not only that we avoid these futile poles, but also that we strive to 
meet another desideratum: preserving the relata whose difficult joining sets the 
problem in motion. For just as the change of a burning piece of wood can only be 
explained once we accept that there is indeed a sense in which two things and one 
thing are involved, so will the mechanics of representation be elucidated and the 
oscillation ended when we accept that receptivity and spontaneity are distinct non­
contradictory faculties of equal standing. 
CHAPTERIV
 
TOWARDS A STRONGER THIRD WAY:
 
ANATOMISM WITHOUT WHOLISM
 
This amounts, in effect, to the declaration: 
"Since the intrinsic has failed us, the 
subjective is our only alternative". 
Ayn Rand 
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (1967) 
4.1 Introduction 
What does it mean to search for a third way? What wouId such a philosophie 
avenue look like, should one find it? A sensible means of ascertaining this would be 
to look at the antecedent poles whose problematic struggle a third way is intended to 
arrest. The options of atomism and wholism we have been discussing throughout 
this work are both means of theorizing « the way concepts mediate the relation 
between minds and the world » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 3); that is, they are 
broad models that tell us how we should represent representation. In the unstable 
situation addressed in Mind and World, the two opposing candidates are "the myth 
of the Given" and "unconstrained coherentism" (and their respective cognates). 
Those labels are, of course, highly semantically charged, connoting as they do a 
host of (sometimes debatable) interpretations and value-judgements. Accordingly, 
we have preferred to employa more neutral nomenclature. Yet it is a fact that 
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atomism and wholism are not mere structural features devoid of philosophie weight. 
For instance, when one holds that the mind's representations are answerable to 
correspondences with their respective objects, one thereby commits oneself to a slew 
of assumptions about the proper conduct of epistemological normativity. Adherents 
to the atomistic account are thus more likely to see ostensions as an effective means 
of grounding beliefs, establishing the veracity of claims, and so on. In contrast, 
when one holds that punctate appeals to receptivity are impossible (even in theory), 
one is compelled to seek alternative modes of normativity. As such, the wholist 
embraces not only a different quantitative scale, but also a different qualitative 
construal of the epistemological dynamic goveming that expanse. On this view, 
multiple (and conflicting) configurations of symbolic representations can be made to 
fit with identical patterns of indexical forces. Accordingly, the wholist maintains 
that we choose freely how we represent-en masse-that things are "thus and so". 
This, then, is what we should except of a third way: a template of how much content 
is involved in the assessment of a representation-and an account of what 
faculty(ies) ultimately does the adjudicating. In short, a third way must state a scale 
and explicate a norm. 
On that count, McDowell proposes an "unbounded" scale with, as a norm, a 
Bildung-instilled incredulity vis-à-vis one' s beliefs-spontaneous criticism from 
within supplanting experiential receptivity as a source of friction. We will not recap 
the complex and interwoven fabl1c of arguments by which McDowell seeks to 
breathe life into this fusion of receptivity and spontaneity. What is important is the 
manner in which his reasoned deliberations construe the antagonist poles of the 
oscillation. For the greatest point of divergence between McDowell's proposaI and 
ours is that he sees the difficulties of each as grounds to extinguish the very 
distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, whereas we think a better account of 
their relation is in order. 
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If we picture the argumentative structure of the present work as "Y"-shaped 
(with a "fork in the road" located in the middle), we can say that our itinerary in this 
final chapter is to break with the McDowellian and Sellarsian ideas presented in the 
second and third chapter so as to travel in a new direction consistent with the general 
aetiologic posture laid down in the first. We will begin by revisiting under a new 
light the problematic oscillation portrayed by McDowell. Our discussion will look 
at how atomistic and wholistic theories both rest on metaphoric appeals, either 
tacitly or in the form of didactic illustrations. Instead of viewing the employment of 
metaphors with suspicion, we will embrace the feature as a benign fact about human 
understanding generally. With this methodological attitude in place, we will present 
what we believe are the rudimentary conceptions or images underlying the respective 
poles of the seesaw. Although our investigation into this topic will admittedly have 
much in common with McDowell's therapeutic approach, we will insist that 
metaphoric imagery must nevertheless answer sorne basic constraints, chief among 
which are that a proposed picture be exempt of any inner contradiction and that it 
reflect what is actually (naturalistically) the case. McDowell's fusion will be seen as 
failing the first of these requirements, whereas atomism and wholism will be deemed 
wanting in aetiological fidelity. 
Having examined the core images which animate the oscillation, we will then 
forge ahead on a new path and present the key aspects of our own theory of 
representation. Since we consider the appeal to intuitive images to be inevitable, we 
will draw an engaging picture of our own, one which, we argue, holds more 
philosophie promise than the divergent assumptions at the heart of atomism, 
wholism, and fusion. This primitive framework will allow us to address an 
important epistemological Issue we have encountered throughout this 
work-namely, the question of when (if ever) one should consider that certainty 
about the world has been attained. Attending to this matter will permit us to further 
expand on the philosophie rationale which lies behind our rejection of McDowell's 
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standing policy of critical mistrust. Vpon outlining sorne of the more important 
commitments that are required by our positive conception, the remainder of the 
chapter will be devoted to explicating the place of receptivity and spontaneity in our 
third way. Consolidating the many lessons learned, we shaH endeavour to produce 
an account that is more tenable than the ones we have examined thus far. 
4.2 Proceeding from the ideas already on the table: the seesaw revisited 
4.2.1 On the use and misuse of imagery 
Stephen C. Pepper has argued that at the heart of each philosophie system lies what 
he caHs a "root metaphor". The central idea behind Pepper' s elaborate theory is 
remarkably simple: « A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue 
to its comprehension. He pitches upon sorne area of common-sense fact and tries if 
he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes 
then his basic analogy or root metaphor » ([1942] 1972, p. 91). For instance, the 
most primitive root metaphor of aH is animism (Ibid., p. 120-123), which takes the 
human being's attributes (e.g., bodily shape, emotions, motives, etc.) and projects 
them as the interpretative key to aIl things. Similarly, mechanistic world-views rest 
on analogies with machines (Ibid., p. 186-212), whereas the organicist tacitly 
expects « that every actual event in the world is a more or less concealed organic 
process » (Ibid., p. 281). 
Pepper's systematic typologies are actuaHy far more complex than our 
superficial outline suggests. Although we have no desire to rehearse those 
classifications here, much less reprise Pepper's ambitious program for an exhaustive 
survey and evaluation of metaphysical conceptions, we do want to borrow from him 
the idea that understandings of a given object of study are inevitably steeped in tacit 
appeals to primitive metaphors which shape the direction of explicit theorizing. 
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The sort of latent presuppositions embodied in Pepper's root metaphors are 
occasionally assailed, most notably by philosophers (that community of thinkers 
who have come to see it as their dutYto pass under review the most commonsensical 
of metaphysical beliefs). As Sandra Dingli points out, McDowell's so-called 
"quietist" approach « involves exposing mistaken assumptions in pictures which 
have held us captive in their grip and, once we have realized the error of our way of 
seeing things, it puts forward new pictures » (2005, p. 195). While one may 
rightfully question whether and to what extent McDowell abstains from positive 
theorizing and remains "quiet" about the issues he addresses, it does seem fair to 
recognize that Mind and World relies heavily on inventive means of picturing 
abstract situations, and this in order to both "diagnose" philosophic ailments and 
point the way to more satisfactory conceptions. As Dingli correctly observes: « One 
thing that is certain about pictures which quietists favour is that they are replete with 
metaphors [...] » (Ibid., p. 199). 
However, Crispin Wright has voiced fears that McDowell might simply be 
exhuming « barriers of jargon, convolution, and metaphor before the reader hardly 
less formidable than those characteristically erected by his German luminaries 
»---thus fostering an obscurantism which Wright believes has been absent since « the 
academic professionalization of the subject » (2002a, p. 157). In an attempt to 
safeguard « the care and rigor which we try to instill into our students » and to 
protect « the susceptible» fram being wastefully carried away by the ideas of Mind 
and World, Wright warns that «McDowell is a strong swimmer, but his stroke is not 
to be imitated » (Ibid., p. 157, 158). 
In contrast with Wright, we think McDowell should be commended for taking 
the risks he does. While it may irk sorne to recognize it, philosophic metaphors are 
to theories what cuIts are to religions: precursors waiting to be sanctified by greater 
adoption. In our opinion, it takes a significant lack of hindsight not to recognize that 
today' s accepted theories were once fledgling intuitions, and a matching lack of 
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foresight not to recogmze that today's tentative pictures may perhaps enjoy a 
likewise good fortune in the future. Although Wright obviously feels more at home 
in the last hundred years or so of Anglo-American philosophical discourse, we 
cannot help but wonder whether someone like F. H. Bradley (was he a professional?) 
warned his students to be weary of the disruptive idiom of a Bertrand Russell. In 
any event, Wright's paternalistic comments vis-à-vis McDowell's approach rest on a 
romanticized delusion: barriers of jargon already exist, and what Wright is really 
bemoaning is a perceived changing of the guard. 
Of course, the transmutation from the marginal to the mainstream in such a case 
is answerable to processes that comprise their fair share of contingency. However, 
like the practice of 'eating poisonous mushrooms while jumping off cliffs', the 
question of a philosophie proposal' s basis in the natural order is not wholly foreign 
from that of its promulgation in the cultural realm (sect. 2.5.2). When advancing a 
new metaphor, a high premium should therefore be put on demonstrating its basis in 
reality-especially, one would hope, when the addressees are freethinking 
philosophers. In other words, one should seek to put forth images that are motivated 
(in the sense in which even a rough outline of the African continent on a restaurant 
napkin is motivated). 
In our view, McDowell is not so much at fault for essaying new ways of 
picturing as he is for enjoining us to conceive ideas which are plainly contradictory 
(sect. 2.5.3). On that count, pleading the limitations of our "language" can only go 
so far. Granted, philosophers are often captive of their own prejudices, and new 
metaphors can be used with great effect to awake stagnant debates from their 
(unfortunately too-common) dogmatic complacency. Many philosophie problems 
are indeed ill-founded and should be undermined "from the outside", as it were. But 
one must be on guard no to overdo this. Any abstract intellectual problem, if one 
ceases to consider it, magically ceases to be problematic (illiteracy also dissolves 
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philosophie tensions). The abusive attempt to exorcise "blind spots" in cases where 
there is simply nothing there to be seen therefore does more to undermine the 
credibility of what is an otherwise noble move. 
If one has a hard time finding a way to reconcile receptivity and spontaneity in 
explicit theorizing, one need not blame oneself nor reject the inquiry as chimerical. 
Heraclitus and Parmenides had due cause to ponder change, even if they lacked the 
means to reconcile their own oscillation and fathom an appropriate way out (had 
McDowell been around then, what would he have told them?). What we want to do 
now is begin to show how providing an answer to the question of how to represent 
representation is not only soluble but by and large inevitable, and that the manner in 
which one pictures the referential bond to an object orients the stances one will 
adopt when faced with the more overt problem of trying to reconcile receptivity and 
spontaneity in an explicit theory. 
4.2.2 A pervasive but misguided metaphor 
It has long been an assumption of Western thought that the sword wouId be removed 
from the stone in one swift tug, or not removed at all. As far as suppositions go, this 
one is probably not without basis; perhaps it reflects a transposition of the law of the 
excluded-middle on a grander scale. In any event, atomism seems to construe 
representation as such a neat disjunction: a positive state is achieved when reference 
hits its target, and if a representation does not attain its intended mark, it simply does 
not refer. In both cases, reference is held to happen in a flash that admits no 
gradients. Thus, one often sees the notion of reference described as if it were sorne 
kind of beam which, if and when it emanates, travels in a straight line from 
representation to represented. Sorne think the referential laser always fires but its 
targets vary, whereas others insist that targets aIl exist on the same level but reason 
that the laser fires only in sorne cases. Neverthless, both camps accept a common 
prernise: reference praceeds fram a representatian ta an abject directly (cf fig. 8). 
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Figure 8 The "laser" picture of 
atomism. 
If this picture should appear banal, then this means we are nearing our objective. In 
fact, it is perhaps because the idea it depicts seems so brornidic that it is rarely if 
ever framed for attentive consideration. It is ubiquitous, cutting across sorne of the 
more rigid boundaries of philosophy (the beam can be reworked, for instance, into a 
"multiple denotation" reaching a plurality of immanent individuals, to suit 
nominalist demands that no real universal be aimed at; cf Martin, 1958, p. 99-100). 
Given this (largely tacit) framework, the question soon arises: since agents are 
obviously faIlible in their referring, how should one picture unsuccessful attempts at 
representing the world? Two basic answers (or, if you will, families of answers) 
suggest themselves: 1) the laser beam always fires but hits targets of varied 
substantiality, or 2) aIl objects partake of a same worldly substantiality, but the laser 
beam does not a1ways fire. For the first of these options, if there is no cat on the mat 
in the principal worldly domain, then any representation to that effect directs itself to 
sorne cat on a mat in sorne (weaker) subsidiary domain. Thus, for Morris: 
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A sign must have a designatum; yet obviously every sign does not, in fact, refer 
to an actual existent object. [...] Since 'designatum' is a semiotical terrn, there 
cannot be designata without semiosis-but there can be objects without there 
being semiosis. The designatum of a sign is the kind of object which the sign 
applies to, i.e., the objects with the properties which the interpreter takes account 
of through the presence of the sign vehicle. And the taking-account-of may 
occur without there actually being objects or situations with the characteristics 
taken account of. [...] Where what is referred to actually exists as referred to the 
object of reference is a denotatum. It thus becomes clear that, while every sign 
has a designatum, not every sign has a denotatum. A designatum is not a thing, 
but a kind of object or class of object-and a class may have many members, or 
one member, or no members. The denotata are the members of the class. This 
distinction makes explicable the fact that one may reach in the icebox for an 
apple that is not there and make preparations for living on an island that may 
never have existed or has long since disappeared beneath the sea. (1971, p. 20­
21) 
The Fregean strata of Sinn and Bedeutung provide adherents of the laser metaphor 
with another means of accommodating references that miss their target (or simply 
never had one to begin with): the beam hits only a Sinn. The key feature here is that 
lasers coming short of their legitimate referential target are deemed to differ in 
ontology from those that succeed-Frege even wrote of "Scheingedanke" or "mock 
thoughts" (1997, p. 230; cf Evans, 1982 [2002], p. 28-30). It should be noted that 
while the description of intermediary targets as "ideational" or "logical" appears to 
be a widely accepted move, unreserved opprobIium is heaped on whoever dares to 
recast the same posits in a more overtly metaphysical idiom-as testified by the 
ridicule and relative neglect of A. Meinong's theory of "subsisting" objects (cf 
Grossman, 1974). 
Russell-enamoured neither of Frege's abstract stratum (sect. 2.3.1) nor 
Meinong' s subsisting realms-thought the positing of intermediary referential 
targets totally unacceptable. He thus opted for the second basic option, according to 
which aIl objects partake of an equal degree of substantiality but representations do 
not always tire. As McDowell explains, 
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Russell' s restriction results, in effect, from refusing to accept that there can be an 
illusion of understanding an apparently singular sentence (or utterance) [.. .]. The 
upshot, in Russell' s hands, is that we can entertain and express singular 
propositions orny where there cannot be illusions as to the existence of an object 
of the appropriate kind [.. .]. ([1986] 1998, p. 229) 
Russell was by no means alone in adopting such a stance, as the logical positivists 
(largely following the early Wittgenstein' s lead) had made it fashionable for 
philosophers to vigorously declare this or that representation "meaningless" (cf. 
Ayer, [1936] 1952). Adherents to this view thus contend that it is preferable to 
construe reference in such a way that if the laser attains its object, then there is 
reference; and if not, not. 
One of the driving forces having led philosophizing about language, mind and 
knowledge in the English-speaking world has therefore been the attractive 
assumption that one could generate a robust account by associating the notion of 
meaning with that of truth-conditions. To know that P is to know when and where P 
would be true. What this stance calls for, of course, are normative means of 
asceltaining what does and does not obtain in the strong sense. A considerable 
portion of the history of the analytic tradition can thus be read as a sustained and 
concerted effOlt to make the laser view of reference work-to ensure theoretical 
constructs never allow bald French kings to be "denoted" (cf. Russell, [1905] 1956). 
4.2.3 Wholism's equally impractical retort 
Although the idea of organizing the theory of meaning around a hardboiled notion of 
truth remained dominant for quite sorne time (it as not yet fully eroded), many 
philosophers understandably despaired at trying to make the laser view work. By the 
1950s, cracks in the truth-conditional program began to show up with increasing 
frequency. P. F. Strawson ([1950] 1971) was arguably the first prominent dissenter 
in this regard. By insisting that representations need a more palpable contribution of 
agency in order to reach the world, he effectively "humanized" the idea of a 
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denotational laser beam. Although his revamped construal still countenanced two 
levels of objects, the pragmatic tinge he added never stopped gaining ground. By the 
time we reach the influential essays of W. Sellars and W. V. O. Quine, the world no 
longer has any role to play in epistemological normativity. 
Sellars' contribution to the recoil away from punctate receptivity consisted 
mainly in undermining the presumption that, just as photons hit our sensory 
apparatus, so we can direct our reference to an object. Although Sellars cautiously 
countenanced the possibility of direct experiential impingements, his asymmetry 
thesis denounced the very idea that one could muster likewise indices. History 
shows that this critique, though marred in narrow misinterpretations, was quite 
effective (owing in large part to the timely attractiveness of its slogan). Sellars, 
however, was arguably more adept in the art of philosophic criticism than he was in 
that of constructive system-building. On this last front, history also shows that it 
was Quine who supplied the most potent positive contribution. 
Quine is pivotaI in that he took sorne of the most vital theoretical pillars of the 
analytic project and literally turned them upside down. We have seen how Russell 
feared that a logicist semantic might end up floating above the domain it seeks to 
represent in a way that allows for the establishment of self-consistent systems which 
are different but equal, and how he called in the notion of an empirical acquaintance 
as a way to eliminate vulnerability to such "massive reduplication" (sect. 2.3.1). 
Unfortunately, as that project matured, the difficulties inherent in grafting a 
receptive dimension became increasingly apparent. Despite being an able student of 
Russell' s thought-his early fame had come from mimicking his mentor' s derision 
of Meinong-like theories of subsistence (cf Quine, [1953] 2001, p. 1-19)-Quine 
did not try to stymie the empiricist blueprint from the top down. It is a testament to 
the profundity of his philosophical ability that he instead returned to the origins of 
the project itself, re-examined afresh its founding impetus, and gave an entirely 
different appraisal of the very feature which had worried Russell. There can indeed 
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be divergent systems that are perfectly equal in their truth-valences (i.e., 
"equivalent"), he held, but this should not be glossed as a weakness for an 
epistemology to have. Rather, Quine argued, the trait which philosophers in the first 
half of the twentieth century had tried so hard to avoid is the one we should 
embrace: the underdetermination of experience, and the representational spontaneity 
it affords, testifies to our pragmatic flexibility in the face of counter-evidence. 
According to this view, wholes are resilient, and we should look to that 
characteristic in rethinking how to represent representation. 
Quine described his doctrine variously as « a man-made fabric » whose inner­
workings are akin to « a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience » 
([1953] 2001, p. 42), a boat which « stays afloat because at each alteration we keep 
the bulk of it intact as a going concern » ([1960] 1999, p. 4), or again as an arch 
where the « overhead block is supported immediately by other overhead blocks, and 
ultimately by aU the base blocks coUectively and none individuaUy » (Ibid., p. Il). 
What we have here is a rival root metaphor worthy of the laser beam. 
The problem with such a wholistic epistemology, however, is that it is not very 
convenient to implement. The most convincing critiques of atomism had as a 
leitmotif the darion caU that "things just don' t happen that way" (e.g., Kuhn, [1962] 
1996). Yet notice how the atomist framework, though discarded in the name of 
sobriety, was supplanted by an equaUy unworkable idea. While it may seem 
attractive on paper to sorne more speculative-minded theorists, the whole does not 
play into normative assessments of representations. In other words, things just don't 
happen that way. Perhaps the community of inquirers had to take the idea of 
wholism seriously at least once to learn the lesson. In any case, the irony is that 
wholism's adoption has arguably resulted not in a greater concern for integration, 
but in a generalized trepidation over any philosophie endeavour beyond the 
piecemeal. As one needs to consider the interwoven network of sciences and 
languages in its entirety to establish the epistemic merit of even the slightest item, 
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every normative assessment becornes a rather imposing affair. Insofar as this might 
have stimulated a renewed sensitivity for context, then, to that extent, we think the 
change of metaphor has been for the best. However, anecdotal evidence suggests to 
us that the practical impossibility of bringing a total Summa to bear on a given daim 
to knowledge has not had such a salutary effect. Since the whole cannot be lugged 
around, judgement becomes forever qualified and postponed. 
That is not to say that nothing has been gained by the attempt to construct a 
brave new epistemology. Several notable advances have been made. We now know 
that observation (scientific or otherwise) is not as free from theory as was once 
assumed. We see that economic considerations for integrity and coherence often 
overrule empirical considerations, and that sorne representations can be entrenched 
so deeply as to withstand repeated counter-evidence while others can be revised 
simply because developments in other areas have made them to onerous to tow. 
Furthermore, in what is perhaps the most surprising rapprochement between the 
"analytic" and "continental" traditions since their great divergence over 
anatomism-over the so-called "internaI relations" which Hegelian wholists made 
so much of (e.g., McTaggart, 191O)-there is now a heightened sensitivity to the 
role of history and societal practices in structuring our understandings. The 
wholistic adventure has thus left the intellectual landscape of Western philosophy 
changed in a way that mIes out an ingenuous return to atomism. 
Of course, this tally paints a somewhat rosy picture, and leaves out many of the 
more ugly details. For in the sweeping realization that the human mind can choose 
among many world-views, the "view" portion has arguably been focused on to the 
detriment of the "world". The transformation, it seems, happened too quickly; the 
net result being that discursive pluralism gave way to that indigestion of the intellect 
which is relativism (the atomistic program may have had its failings, but to our 
knowledge it never compelled any thinker to wilfully turn off the lights which the 
enlightenment-whatever its flaws-struggled so hard to ignite). For sure, many of 
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those who uphold the standard of whole have refused to acknowledge the presence 
of any inner rationale for this downturn, pointing instead to the fact that theoretical 
endeavours are carried on by very human practitioners who can inject their own 
philosophical agendas into given tenets. Nevertheless, the partiality goes both ways, 
and the non-relativist strikes us as guilty of artificially grafting an optimism onto 
wholism which it simply cannot sustain. 
Sorne wholists have maintained that the only way to be true to their commitment 
IS to confront relativism head-on, the argument being that this will effectively 
dissipate the ailment. One has due cause to wonder whether such a move would be 
beneficial. Whatever the merit of that assessment, it seems untendentious to affirm 
that, as the memory of the original effervescence wanes, the wholistic program is 
attracting the same sort of incredulous commentators and true-believers who had 
jointly carried through the (temporary) demise of atomism. As a result, many 
thinkers (ourselves included) have come to conclude that the threat of relativism 
does not disappear by rushing headlong into it. Yet while the list of that faction 
continually grows, there are still those, like Davidson and Rorty, who cling to the 
general Quinean insight and try to reassure others that contemporary philosophy 
should not falter in its abdication of receptivity. According to this gloss, the promise 
of wholism lingers in coming to fruition only because we have not yet purified 
ourselves of om realist expectations. But there obviously wouldn't be much to 
McDowel1' s seesaw if those pleas were in fact taking hold. Wholism, it would 
seem, was hyperbole. 
4.2.4 Why atomism is still the lesser of two evils 
We opened our investigation by asking what role, if any, supplemental 
representations play in the apprehension of a given object. While we endorsed 
neither the atomist nor the wholist answers to that question, we did conclude on 
more than one occasion that wholism is the least plausible of the two options. We 
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stand fast by that assessment, and can now make sorne clearer sense of why that is. 
The most obvious reason is that the Given (which McDowell situates as one pole of 
the oscillation) actually has sorne basis, if only on a more humble scope. 
We have seen in the third chapter that the syrnrnetrical return to indexical origins 
plays a crucial role in the mind' s ability to draw inferences. In short, every 
deduction perforee involves representational lasers that reach their object directly. 
We may therefore find the appeal to referential lasers occult when those hit worldly 
targets and travel through walls, but we must nevertheless countenance such a direct 
access inside the symbolic space of reasons, on pain of having the entire inferential 
apparatus cave in. The fact that we surnrnon atomic references in content-respect 
thus gives sorne credence to the idea that this is the manner in which minds enter 
into objective contact with the world. Since entailments ultimately subsume 
ostensive appeals which preclude the anatomie involvement of other representations, 
it is perhaps only normal that sorne should want to interpret aIl forms of 
demonstration, including empirieal anes, along similar lines. 
Ostensive reporting wauld seem to be the perfeet eompanian to receptivity, 
insofar as these movements "to and fro" the mind are both held to operate via sorne 
kind of indexical force. In experienee, a human agent is submitted to a stream of 
foreeful stimuli. Seeing haw we ean invite others to position themselves in a 
manner that allaws them to undergo similar inputs, it is tempting to think of our 
claims to knowledge as somehow imbued with a comparable energy. The laser 
view, we eould thus say, is an outgrowth of the empiricists' photographie analogy. 
Just as the mind is construed as an exposure-sensitive medium that records whatever 
experiential impingements it is subjected to, so ean the radiation be reversed and 
aimed back at the world in a referential act. AIl of us who have tasted relish are 
fairly secure in our belief that it tastes a certain way. As such, we tend to confidently 
nurture a representation ta the effect that 'relish is sweet'. If pressed ta prove or 
justify (ta ourselves or to others) that this in absentia representation (belief, 
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cognition, written statement, etc.) has an objective basis in fact, we would be 
naturally inclined to establish the warrant of our representation by way of an in 
praesentia ostention: "Taste it, and you' 11 clearly confirm that 'relish is sweet"'. 
This is the basic motive behind the Russellian notion of "knowledge by 
acquaintance" (sect. 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). 
However, owing to the many criticisms that have been levelled at it, the 
informed participant of academic philosophy has become almost conditioned to take 
a dim view of this sort of appeal. Even if nothing stands out as particularly 
problematic prima facie, there is a knee-jerk tendency to actively search for a flaw. 
True, inviting others to experience something is a discursive act, and (like the 
wholist) we believe there is no principled way to isolate the contribution of the 
actual face-to-face encounter with the world from the context that imbues its 
experiential results with normative significance. AlI the same, we can think of no 
example even remotely close to the tasting of relish that would suggest our minds 
determine the warrant of representations spontaneously from within their wholistic 
web. It is true that neither atomism nor wholism are tenable positions; but at least 
atomism loosely suggests itself from our daily life. Wholism, lacking as it does in 
such mundane motivation, is parasitic: it is a speculative tenet manufactured to 
remedy the technical failings of a more plausible theory. 
But although it unjustifiably pushes the anatomie character of representation aIl 
the way to a speculative extreme, wholism is right to insist that reference cannot 
proceed directly from a representation to its object without the contribution of 
supplementary contents. That said, the idea that it is the whole which alone 
establishes the epistemic merit of each item does not bear out either. What is needed 
then is a fresh metaphor which does justice to the fact of human representation-one 
doubly plausible because il avoids the straits of the laser view and mobilizes less 
than the whole in a given normative assessment. 
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4.3 Towards a more tenable third way 
4.3.1 lntroducing a new metaphor 
Our rejection of the laser view-of the idea that reference proceeds from a 
representation to an object directly-would no doubt look more academically 
respectable if it turned on the sort of serious technical features that bothered the likes 
of W. Sellars. Alas, our grievance is far more vain. Quite simply, we cannot shake 
off the suspicion that, when a theorist says of an utterance like "The cat is on the 
mat" that it "picks ouf' a feline on a padding (what sound does that make?), she is 
invoking a sort of action at a distance, the proposition issuing a mysterious beam 
going from the utterer directly to the intended target-travelling through a wall or 
two, if need be. 
We reject the idea that meaningful linguistic acts like utterances somehow bear 
on their worldly referent(s) without a more concrete actantial contribution on the 
part of the animal utterer. Qua communicative tool, we have no trouble conceiving 
language as a potent information-carrying vehicle. No doubt a Wittgensteinian 
talking lion (cf [1953] 2001, p. 190) would be understood by agents partaking in his 
species-specific mode of communication, but his roars would not by themselves 
reach their intended object-"by themselves" here meaning "without a more 
concrete involvement on the part of the agent(s)". This does not entail that the lion 
at the receiving end of the communication channel has to decipher the roar's 
contents on the basis of the emitter's observable bodily behaviour. As far as we're 
concerned, the above situation could just as easily accommodate McDowell's 
argument that the ability to fix the worldly referents of hearsay is not dependent on 
the ability to ascribe intentions in others (sect. 1.4.1). What we do claim is that, in 
their shared understanding of the roar, both receiver and emitter have access to a 
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representation whose tie to the world lies dormant until and unless they do 
something with it. Nomologically-inflected puffs of air are no doubt of great utility 
in orienting human (and 1eonine) agency, but whatever contact with their worldly 
objectes) those afford exists in potentia in the minds of agents. 
Although we emphatically do not embrace Peirce's philosophy (we will explain 
why shortly), this stance is more or less consonant with the American thinker's 
contention that « every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the 
indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, 
lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a 
conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood » (1998, p. 135; 
there is also a kinship with the Strawsonian amendments outlined above, sect. 4.2.3). 
However, our position diverges with the above formulation insofar as we attach no 
particular importance to the sentence-unit. As we see it, sorne theoretical 
judgements may be too hefty to fit neatly in a sentence, and nothing prevents these 
from being transmissible only in paragraphs, texts, or entire academic degrees. 
Thus, although it strikes us as aetiologically sensible to construe symbolic 
representations as promissory notes on conduct, our third way accepts that sorne 
abstract ideas cannot be expressed (to oneself or to others) in a single sitting, as it 
were. We thus prefer to picture the situation as follows (fig. 9). We shall calI this 
the constrictive or "lasso" view and label any set of representations which 
anatomically collaborate in the task of apprehending a worldly object a string of 
discourse. 
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Figure 9 The constrictive (or "lasso") view. 
According to this view, the mind has at its command an interpretative leeway such 
that it need not adjust its representations in tight one-to-one correspondences. As 
scientists or lay persons, we are not cornpelled to produce piecemeal accounts for 
every single one of our concepts and conceptions (sorne of these, like the connective 
"and", need not ever possess any straightforward empirical account)-yet neither do 
we need to consult the whole in order to assess the merit of a clairn to episternic 
objectivity. 
There IS nothing "contingent" or "sociological" about the anatornisrn we 
advocate. Much the contrary, we believe the fact that humans employ neither 
atornist not wholist episternologies springs from the very "architecture" of the rnind. 
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In short, we think this anatomist model is the only valid way to construe the 
representation of worldly objects because it is the only structural account congenial 
to our jinite nature. More generally, we believe it reflects the Aristotelian insight 
that the principles which underlie any intelligible order are perforee « neither one nor 
innumerable » (189a20). 
4.3.2 Two sorts of scepticism 
According to the constrictive view we have just sketched, our representations do not 
aU have to answer to the world; but somewhere along the way strings of them must. 
There is a thus a limit to our interpretative leeway. An agent attempting to explain 
and/or justify a very complex theory may postpone submission of her narrative to the 
test of forceful indexicality for quite sorne time (sorne objects have a wide girth and 
require a fairly long lasso to be apprehended). But so long as an agent daims to be 
discoursing on things as they are in the world, the anatomie string she weaves must 
sooner or later allow her to seize hold of whatever it purports to represent. 
The norm proper to our constrictive view not only condones impatience with 
anatomie linkages that extend on the sole basis of speculation-it encourages 
intolerance in such instances (when no discursive end is in sight, no worldly end is 
in sight as weIl). McDowell, in contrast, believes that one should always be ready to 
consider criticisms, since « [t]here is no guarantee that the world is completely 
within the reach of a system of concepts and conceptions as it stands at sorne 
particular moment in its historical development » ([ 1994] 2002, p. 40). A1though we 
could challenge this contention on purely textual grounds by highlighting its flagrant 
contradiction with McDowell's Wittgenstein-inspired claim that « when we see that 
such-and-such is the case, we, and our seeing, do not stop anywhere short of the fact 
» (Ibid., p. 29; cf sect. 2.2.2), we want to focus on the substantial philosophie 
presuppositions which underwrite the sceptical contention-disquietingly 
unproblematic to McDowell's eyes-that we can never be certain our 
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representations ever actually bear on their worldly objects. Addressing this topic 
will also give us an opportunity to stake out exactly why we part company with a 
thinker whom we have approvingly mentioned a few times in the course of this 
work, narnely Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Karl Popper prefaced his seminal Logic of Scientific Discovery by forthrightly 
declaring his conviction that « the growth of knowledge can be studied best by 
studying the growth of scientific knowledge » ([1934] 2006, p. xix; italics in 
original). That a philosopher openly states adherence to this methodological 
assumption is somewhat unusual; that a philosopher upholds such a tenet, however, 
is not. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of the "analytic" tradition in 
philosophy has been its respect for the scientific method. Whereas "continental" 
thinkers arguably view social reform as their chief pursuit, English-speaking 
philosophers have in the main directed their efforts to epistemological matters, with 
a particular emphasis on making sure the scientific enterprise is secure in its footing. 
For sorne, this means philosophy must act as keeper of the formaI apparatus of logic 
which scientists routinely calI upon in their quest to elucidate the regularities of the 
world. For others, the disinterested deliberations of philosophical thought can serve 
as a source of arbitrament when disciplinary disputes arise. Still others follow 
Popper ([1934] 2006, p. 10-20; [1963] 2002, p. 44-78) and see it as philosophy's 
task to provide a criterion to guide both the scientist and lay person in ascertaining 
what sorts of knowledge can and cannot claim to being scientific in status. 
These very lofty assignments no longer command unalloyed confidence. A 
growing number of contemporary thinkers have come to view "analytic" 
philosophy' s (still pervasive) fascination with science, if not with suspicion, then at 
least with more reserve. Rorty is arguably one of the best-known English-speaking 
advocates of the stronger gloss (sect. 2.5.3 and 3.2.1). As for McDowell, he holds 
that « it is possible to go that far with Rorty and still dissent from his suggestion that, 
in order to avoid entanglement in that familiar unprofitable epistemological activity, 
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we need to discard the very idea of being answerable to something other than 
ourselves » (2000, p. 110). This statement cornes sorne years after the publication of 
Mind and World, and one may lightfully question whether the view it desclibes can 
be neatly integrated in the systematic network of ideas presented in that work. 
Indeed, it could be argued that McDowell's talk of an answerability « to something 
other than ourselves » (Ibid.) betokens an obvious breach of the Wittgensteinian 
frontier of thought (sect. 1.5.4 and 2.4.1), one that goes against his reproof of the 
Given as an unsound « craving for rational constraint from outside the realm of 
thought and judgement » (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 18). But without unduly 
straining to iron out contradictions which ostensibly do not bother their originator, it 
is safe to say that McDowell believes developments in scientific thought have 
promulgated in their wake impoverished world-views which now make it difficult 
for us to countenance features of human life that do not exhibit any sort of 
straightforward lawfulness (sect. 1.3.2 and 2.4.2). To that extent, we join McDowell 
in maintaining that the root metaphor of the world as ratio has yielded sorne 
discovelies but has blinded us to others. 
The better philosophers have managed not to concentrate on scientific 
knowledge to the detriment of other sorts of knowledge. Popper's philosophy has 
nurtured an ambivalent outlook in this regard. On the one hand, it is abundantly 
clear that scientific knowledge occupies for him a plivileged position. But whilst the 
Popperian corpus never strays from the conviction that science (specifically physical 
science) affords us the best case study for an investigation of knowledge in general, 
it is also replete with (laudable) warnings to the effect that philosophers should 
remain conversant with and open-rninded to other sources of knowledge. This 
reflects the other methodological posit of Popper's Logic, namely that « 
[p]hilosophers are as free as others to use any method in searching for the truth » 
([1934] 2006, p. xix)-which in turn reflects his broader contention that « [t]he 
initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call 
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for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it » (Ibid., p. 7). As we have already had 
cause to mention (sect. 1.3.1), such a twofold epistemology of 'conjectures and 
refutations' not only sanctions the ad hoc raising of doubt in its conjectural phase, it 
also encourages stringent incredulity in its critical phase as a matter of 
principle-the scepticism being aIl the more fierce when dealing with successful 
representations. Nevertheless, despite these considerable fauIts, we think Popper is 
to be commended for resisting the eliminativist reflex and holding that all 
knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is of a kind. Yet if this is so, can we not ask why 
science should be considered the best gateway into the study of human knowledge 
generaIly? In other words, why should the scientist's elaborate theories about this or 
that feature of the world be the examplar which, in virtue of a synecdoche-like 
induction, informs us about other, more humble epistemic ventures? Could not the 
reverse hold true? 
The standard answer here, which has become one of the leading bromides of our 
age, is that scientific knowledge is the most tenable because, through its wilful 
exposure to criticism and revision, it can forever be improved. In essence, this idea 
is a syncretism of two philosophical tenets. The first is Popper's aforementioned 
daim that « the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is ils falsifiability » 
([1963] 2002, p. 48; italics in original). The second is Charles S. Peirce's contention 
that « those two series of cognition-the real and the unreal-consist of those 
which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue ta re-affirm; 
and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied » (1992, p. 
52; italics ours). This is not to say that thinkers who adhere to these views quote 
Popper and Peirce as their source of inspiration. Neither has the discursive 
absorption of these originators' respective ideas gone through without adulteration 
and warpage. But those two philosophical doctrines have been combined 10 produce 
a coherent view of the scope and method of scientific knowledge. Peirce writes of 
an asymptotic horizon towards which unobstructed inquiry will inexorably tend. 
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Seeing as how the passage of time in this picture is a constant we cannot control, 
Popper' s philosophy allows for the addition of a catalyst which accelerates the 
journey. Peirce, of course, knew nothing of Popper's ideas, so we can only surmise 
what his reaction would have been. However, it is clear Popper would resent seeing 
his theses mixed into such an epistemological cocktail, insofar as he abhorred the 
notion of an optimistic teleology (cf Popper, [1945] 1971, p. 5-8). In fact, that is 
Popper's contribution to the syncretism. The resultant conception thus supplies a 
positive normative standing by way of a double-negation: "We can never get there, 
but we can never get there faster by being doubtful" (this, it seems, is a retort to 
scepticism in our times). 
The analogy with a journey here is appropriate. Knowledge is akin to a trek in 
that it perforce has a beginning and an end. In terms of the twofold distinction set 
down in the first chapter, the beginning of inquiry can be either speculative or 
mundane (sect. 1.2.1). On this count, Peirce's stance has much more to recommend 
it than Popper' s. As Peirce was fond of saying, doubt is not something that happens 
when one writes an interrogative remark on a piece of paper (1992, p. 115; 1998, p. 
336). Rather, real doubt in the Peircean sense originates from outside the purview of 
agency as a forceful privation of habit. In contrast, Popper actively sought to steer 
his readers towards a "critical attitude", propounding that « whenever we propose a 
solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution» 
([1934] 2006, p. xix)-a suggestion not unlike McDowell's standing obligation 
(sect. 1.4.2 and 2.4.3). Yet despite this divergence, Peirce and Popper both insist 
that inquiry must work its way up from whatever epistemic materials it fortuitously 
has at its disposaI. As Popper eloquently put it, « the critical attitude is not so much 
opposed to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it [...]. A critical attitude 
needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less 
dogmatically » ([1963] 2002, p. 66). Again, we find an echo of this view in 
McDowell, who rightly argues that « [e]ven a thought that transforms a tradition 
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must be rooted in the tradition that it transforms » ([ 1994] 2002, p. 187). Returning 
to the analogy of inquiry as a journey, we can thus say that Peirce and Popper (and 
McDowe11) dismiss what we sha11 calI scepticism ofbeginnings. 
üwing ta a variety of factors, amongst which we can count Peirce' s and Popper' s 
respective works, such scepticism no longer wields any substantial influence in 
contemporary phi10sophy. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of scepticism of 
ends. This is a11 the more tragic in that the widespread currency which scepticism of 
ends now enjoys can be attributed-this time more definitively-to the works of 
Peirce and Popper. 
It is as if a bargain was struck with the sceptical deceiver whose speculative 
machinations were uncovered in the first chapter (sect. 1.2.5). It was agreed that 
humankind would be permitted to look upon its current store of representations with 
sorne measure of epistemic respect as the inevitable starting point whence aIl inquiry 
must conunence. Yet in exchange for this concession, it was a1so agreed that inquiry 
wou1d forever be barred from resting peacefu11y on a given item-and this, as a 
matter ofprinciple. Thus, regard1ess of whether or not there would be due cause to 
keep the process of inquiry in motion, this covenant stated that the mind wou1d have 
to mobilize its faculty of spontaneity and goad inquiry into activity with speculative 
criticism. Thus, whi1e this mixed view enjoins us to recognize that the betterment of 
our representations must proceed from those materia1s a1ready are at our disposaI, no 
sooner has this been said does it order us to regard that patrimony with suspicion, 
since we cannot be ''fully'' certain of its merit. If it be asked by what standard one 
can suspect that potential failings 1urk beneath what are ostensib1y hea1thy 
representations, the answer is: by the standard of unknown things known to come. 
Scepticism of ends therefore marks a reprise of that well-known theme of 
appearance versus rea1ity (sect. 3.2.1); with the real now projected as a distant 
future, and appearance the stuff of the present. 
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Philosophers like Peirce and Popper therefore encourage us to abandon 
scepticism of beginnings only to supplant it with scepticism of ends. Of course, if 
one focuses on a certain subset of cases, the trade-off can seem reasonable. It is a 
fact that much of what we are led to believe has no basis in reality and will in due 
course reveal itself false. Given the considerable presence of such cases, it is 
understandable that one should want to speed up the process by prodding 
representations and subrnitting them to various tests, formaI or informal. However, 
this restricted account sugar-coats the issue to the point of distortion. For supposing 
that we critically survey our inherited patrimony with an eye to falsity, what are we 
to make of those representations which pass muster? It is here that scepticism of 
ends reveals its membership to the superordinate class of scepticism tout court. If 
we should never fully grant truth to our successful representations, it is on account of 
their being deficient by comparison to an ideal "end of inquiry" which, it is asserted 
openly, we shall never reach (the expression is thus quite a misnomer). 
As it is a pronouncement on the very possibility of the mind representing the 
world, scepticism of ends pertains to all claims to knowledge. Each and every 
thought, belief, theory, and so on, is held to be ever-so-slightly distanced from its 
object in virtue of the fact that in even the most undefeated case an alternative 
representation could one day be adopted. We thus see how scepticism of ends turns 
on issues of modality. There is a present state of affairs, which belongs to an 
assertoric order (the rejection of scepticism of beginnings grants as much); as weIl 
as a future state of affairs, which modally-speaking belongs to the problematic. 
Now it is a profound insight of semiotic investigation that in most if not all binary 
oppositions one term testifies to what has been called "markedness", an 
axiologically-charged feature absent from the other, "unmarked", term (the insight 
was originally Roman Jakobson's, but has since gained a life of its own; cf 
Chandler, 2002, p. 110-118). To be a marked term is to have a different rationale 
subservient to that of the unmarked term, whose own being requires no further 
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sanction. If we juxtapose these considerations onto the above modalities, we obtain 
sorne interesting results. It is one of the more robust axioms of modal logic that the 
assertoric implies the problematic, not the other way round. Given the overlap of 
these distinctions, which is to be the marked term in an epistemology, an assertoric 
present or a problematic future? As we see it, scepticism of ends plants its 
normative flag in the problematic camp, thereby construing present representations 
as deficient by comparison. But can a thinker fully conunitted to a construal of 
inquiry anchored in worldly friction and not speculation overrule the assertoric on 
account of a modal reversaI which makes the actual a marked state and the possible 
an unmarked one-an unproblematic problematic? 
Ironically, it is because scepticism of beginnings views the assertoric present 
with unjustifiable suspicion that thinkers like Peirce and Popper called for its 
abandonment. One of the central argument against this misguided view was that it is 
« as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to 
Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian » (Peirce, 1992, p. 29). 
However, we fail to notice any significant philosophical change when the situation is 
transposed from a geographical picture to a temporal one. That the present is 
deemed epistemologically inferior to a possible future instead of a possible present 
makes no difference, insofar as the asymptotic entelechy which scepticism of ends 
upholds as the "true" standard (with respect to which our representations fail to 
measure up) supplies the same sort of "clear and distinct" certainty which adherents 
of that view hold as a reproach against scepticism of beginnings. ln either case, the 
present's actuality is not appraised for what it is: astate where we manage to 
represent de facto (cf. sect. 1.4.3). 
ln fact, if pushed, we would rather endorse a scepticism of beginnings than a 
scepticism of ends. For while nothing prevents a quest for indubitable First 
Principles from being achieved in principle, it is inscribed into the very constitution 
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of the notion of future-be it a distant terminus or a proximate morrow-that it shall 
always be out of reach (although, rhetorically, appeals to a completed future seem 
more plausible to the educated Westemer). 
Since our natural inclination is to trust uncontested beliefs, not distrust them 
(sect. 2.5.2), it is reasonable to assume that scepticism of ends arose to meet 
technical demands removed from everyday affairs. In our view, the repudiation of 
accessible certainty in favour of an ever-elusive horizon of inquiry marks an attempt 
to insulate epistemology from the disconcerting effects brought upon by a series of 
(apparently very traumatic) paradigm shifts in the sciences. As Nicholas Rescher 
writes: 
[l]f any induction whatsoever can safely be drawn from the history of science it 
is this: that much of what we currently accept as the established knowledge of 
the day is wrong, and that what we see as our body of knowledge encompasses a 
variety of errors. In fact, there are few inductions within science that are more 
secure than this induction about science. (2003, p. 18; italics in original) 
The allusion to lessons learned from the history of science is te11ing. In Rescher' s 
view, the sudden and dramatic breaks famously catalogued by Kuhn ([1962] 1996) 
are not only the diachronie signature of human thought as it strives to fathom the 
world. Rather, the fact that we have heretofore exchanged deficient representations 
for others of greater explanatory power becornes grounds for an inductive 
generalization about the synchronie nature of knowledge as such. In essence, the 
argument is: "Newton (or Euclid, etc.) was wrong; ergo, no one can be fu11y right". 
To be sure, the future holds many untold developments, and there is sorne 
warrant in holding that "For a11 we know, things might tum out very differently from 
how we currently conceive them". However, scepticism of ends makes much of 
this, as it rejects the equa11y plausible supposition that "For all we know, things 
might tum out exactly as we currently conceive them". The philosophie issue here 
tums on the "for <tll we know" clause. We take it that this clause forbids us to 
weaken the standing of a representation we know to be tenable. In contrast, a sceptic 
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of ends like Rescher-building on the syncretism of Peirce' s asymptotic view and 
Popper' s falsificationist mistrust-believes past shifts in the paradigms of science 
instruct us to always qualify epistemic standing and forever consider even our most 
robust representations as heuristic devices whose bearing upon the world can at best 
be surmised but never confirmed. 
There are two very questionable prerruses without which this considerable 
inductive leap breaks down. First, it must be assumed that representations find their 
value only as a corporate whole such that sizeable changes in scientific theory drag 
aIl other forms knowledge along with them. This wholistic assumption however, 
does not suffice, and must be supplemented with another tacit premise. It must be 
assumed that the trials and tribulations of scientists inform us about the natme of 
less lofty forms of human knowledge (cf for example Popper, [1945] 1971, p. 374­
375). Barring these assumptions, it would not be unreasonable to construe changes 
in scientific theories as interesting but relatively minor developments which 
preoccupy a select few but really have no bearing on the kind of knowledge that 
cornes into play in other cognitive situations. For an inference along the lines of 
"Newton (or Euclid, etc.) was wrong; ergo, no one can be fully right" is valid only if 
we assume that Newton or Euclid are the only possessors of genuine knowledge. 
Popper, as we saw, declares upfront his belief that the growth of knowledge per 
se is best understood by studying the growth of scientific knowledge. In his view, 
this is a bold conjecture, and there is nothing inherently wrong in the fact that a 
philosopher might want to adopt this methodological viewpoint without much 
fanfare, insofar as he thinks the real test of that assumption's merit cornes from 
whether or not it survives the test of criticism. Now as was made explicit, scientific 
knowledge can tell us about other sorts of knowledge only if aIl knowledge if of a 
kind. This strikes us as a very just premise (especially when motivated by a concem 
for the nature of knowledge and not wholism). However, untold bodies of 
representations have remained largely unchanged throughout human history-and 
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this in spite of whatever "paradigm shifts" have taken place in the natural sciences in 
the last few hundred years or so. Are we to dismiss these everyday representations 
(say, that onions cook better when a saucepan is uncovered)? 
For our part, we do not feel the least hint of intellectual shame in recognizing 
that such items have been singularly unaffected by the rise of Einsteinian physics or 
non-Euclidean geometries. If one is truly committed to the view that natural science 
does not exhaust the real and that wholism is untenable, then these disciplinary 
traumas should not propel one into doubting one's most readily-accessible 
representational certainties. Why should one feel the need to regard the recipe which 
orients one's cooking as a "conjecture" on account of the physicist's travails? Sadly, 
when philosophers make pronouncements that weaken the latter sort of knowledge, 
it is all representations which are made more distant from their objects. 
Does this mean that in tossing incredulity by the wayside we should consider our 
undoubted representations infallible? For example, despite placing the completion 
of inquiry in a distant future, Peirce sometirnes enjoined his reader to accept that « 
that which you do not at all doubt, you must and do regard as infallible » (1998, p. 
336). The motive here is an almost cynical resignation before the fact that « we 
think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so » 
(Peirce, 1992, p. 115). However, just as the assertoric present is not problernatic, 
neither is it apodeictic-at least, not in the sense in which it wouId rob the future of 
contingency. In our opinion, the entire line of reasoning is thoroughly rnisguided: it 
is not a matter of our representations being fallible or infallible, but of their being 
objectively based in reality or not. As such, the solution is to drop the idea that « the 
sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion» (Ibid., p. 114-115) altogether and 
redirect our theoretical gaze back at the world (cf Champagne, 2006, p. 24-26). 
Peirce and Popper's shared construal of inquiry as a matter of opinions explains 
why they dropped scepticisrn of beginuings, only to ernbrace the scepticisrn of ends. 
It is normal that one should begin with sorne opinions which one considers, indeed 
212 
quite tautologically, to be true. Yet it is also normal that a construal based on the 
notion of opinion should come to visualize inquiry as a process forever incomplete. 
If objectivity is seen as a matter of assent, then the question of the mind's bearing 
upon the world will forever remain a mysterious chimera so long as dissent is 
possible-that is, so long as humans have spontaneity (cf sect, 2.5.1). But if we are 
to take the idea of epistemic normativity seriously and not trivialize it, then we must 
recognize that, properly construed, assent should not be the cause but the effect of 
objectivity. This is no return to any kind of "naive" view, as assent is still required 
to complete the relation. Robert Brandom describes McDowell' s work as addressing 
what he calls "the rational constraint constraint", that is, « to make intelligible how 
perceptual experience embodies the way the world imposes not merely causal, but 
rational constraints on thinking » (Brandom, 1998, p. 369). The influence of Sellars 
here is unmistakable. The whole question, of course, turns on what is to be counted 
as rational. As we understand it, the aforementioned constraint can read in both 
directions, that is, to make intelligible how rationality embodies not merely 
discursive, but perceptual-cum-causal constraints on thinking. In so doing, we not 
only rescue the much-abused idea of rationality fram the clutches of rationalism, we 
also unpack the ramifications of the notion of "imposition" (or "constraint", for that 
matter). 
The Galilean plea that "Regardless of accepted opinion, the layout of the world 
is what it is" is not the sole privilege of those who seek to understand that worldly 
domain through the lens of a telescope, and can be invoked by the simple individu al 
to rebuke the most abstruse of misguided opinions. The reason why inquiry begins 
with an immanent social-historical context is because that's the only context there is. 
That does not, however, pose a problem, as success here and now routinely provides 
us with an incontrovertible demonstration that objective knowledge is possible. The 
philosopher can thus urge with great expository skill that one's representations can 
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never successfully bear upon their worldly object(s), but to the extent that one enjoys 
a roasted drumstick of gavagai by the fire, we think one is justified in not taking 
scepticism of ends seriously. 
There is a tendency to scoff at such an argument and to stipulate that it is 
somehow inadmissible (philosophy tends to nurse a rationalist prejudice to the effect 
that the only knockout arguments must be a priori). But doing philosophy the 
"naturalist" or aetiologic way means that it is sometimes the colloquium which has 
to learn from the campfire-especially when the former becomes so perplexed by its 
various theoretic entanglements that it loses all perspective and starts discarding 
ladders. If a certain string of discourse enables one to successfully better one' s lot, 
then aIl the better; if not, then revis ions are in order. But since the anatomic strings 
in either case are not related to the whole, failures of sorne discourses to seize upon 
their worldly object(s) does not prove fatal for aIl others. There is thus no basis for 
holding a scepticism of ends-for thinking that a lasso would have to constrict 
forever. 
4.3.3 Respecting content-respect 
Let us review what we have set down thus far. We have proposed a new root 
metaphor: representations combine into anatomic strings which enable agents to 
apprehend worldly objects. Justification is largely a discursive activity, and it is 
through the combined use of discourse and the world itself that agents make the case 
for the objectivity of their representations (sections 4.4 and 4.5 will be devoted ta 
elaborating how this collaboration plays out). Discursive deliberations, however, 
cannot go on without end, nor can they stop to ponder aIl the possible variables and 
retorts which can be dreamed up by speculative objectors (tangible or 
schizophrenically imagined). This constrictive picture was therefore augmented 
with a norm: whatever loosens the lasso is "bad", and whatever tightens it around an 
object is "good". As such, the dialogue of inquiry begins when we loose hold of a 
214 
portion of the world, and ends when we recover it. This norm in turn provides us 
with a scale: the lasso' s string is only as long as what is needed to succeed in the 
apprehension of a worldly object, which means it must perforce be greater than an 
atom yet smaller than the whole (following a quintessentially Aristotelian insight, 
any size in between these extremes was held susceptible of intelligible discourse). 
Having presented these key features of our third way, what we want to do now is 
take a doser look at the discursive string itself. 
According to the standard atomist account, smce a chemist' s theoretical 
representations arise from glimpses into a microscope under such and such 
conditions, whatever daims she makes can be defended by instructing other agents 
on how to indexically return to the microscope under the same conditions (in the 
heyday of the Vienna Circle, these were called "protocol sentences"). Once such an 
observational recipe is made public in the syrnbolic space of reasons, it is held, the 
chemist can wash her hands of the affair. As we see it, there is much to recommend 
such an account. It is absolutely correct, for instance, to construe normativity in 
such a way that an agent is not responsible for another's acquiescence. As we have 
just seen, it is one of the cardinal points of our third way that hermeneutic credulity 
in the face of possible alternatives cannot go on without end. It is thus correct to 
require that others muster their own energy in order to grasp for themselves the truth 
of epistemic matters. 
But what is deeply wrong with this atomist picture is that it purports to separate 
the contribution of experience from the discursive context that allows the chemist to 
imbue what she sees with sorne epistemic value (as a verdict upon a daim). The 
reductionist assigns the latter a considerable epistemic load de facto but grants it no 
substantial contribution de jure. Of course, this criticism has been reiterated time 
and time again, and rehearsing it once more would border on the platitudinous. 
However, what is worth describing is how the positive wholistic alternatives 
typically implicit in such critiques of receptivity have dramatically overdone the idea 
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that the mind' s representations are anatornically bound. Realizing full well that the 
laser view is hopeless to vindicate normative claims to knowledge, they take that 
insight and tum it into an all-encompassing interpretative key. In so doing, the 
wholists end up creating their own hardships, the most obvious being relativism. As 
McDowell writes, « Davidson recoils fram the Myth of the Given all the way to 
denying experience any justificatory raIe, and the coherentist upshot is a version of 
the conception of spontaneity as frictionless, the very thing that makes the idea of 
the Given attractive» ([1994] 2002, p. 14). 
But the dangers posed by the flight from receptivity run much deeper than 
relativism. Indeed, we have argued at the close of the previous chapter that if one 
rejects the idea of empirical knowledge on account of its indexical symmetry, then 
one eo ipso rejects inferential knowledge along with il. Theories wishing to stay 
away from indexical appeals should thus be careful not to fall into hasty 
generalizations that assign undue scope to the (otherwise sober) recognition of 
anatornism. If we want to keep content-respect (and we do), our creative mulling for 
a third way must therefore allow sorne kind of direct referential beam into its overall 
picture. The laser picture appears in our earlier figures as an arrow going from the 
symbolic space to the launch pad (figs. 2 and 4). Whilst we may want to abolish this 
view in such mind-to-world contexts, it is clear that whatever picture of 
representation we supplant it with must find a way to leave figure 5 be. 
Although content-respect is pivotaI to the successful working of (monotonic) 
logical reasoning, it is crucial to the unfolding of thought processes generally. 
Evans, recognizing « that there must be a sense in which thoughts are structured » 
(1982 [2002], p. 100), called the feature which « makes it possible for a subject to 
think of an object in a series of indefinitely many thoughts, in each of which he will 
be thinking of the object in the same way » (Ibid., p. 104) 'The Generality 
Constraint'. Like Evans, we would not want recognition of such a feature to be 
taken as an endorsement of the kind of commitments usually associated with 
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"language of thought" theories (cf Fodor, [1975] 2002). That being said, we have a 
hard time seeing how one could ever hope to do justice to the recognition that « [t]he 
though that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry is 
happy» (Evans, 1982 [2002], p. 100) without in sorne way acknowledging that the 
commonality at hand turns on something (i.e., being happy) being regarded in a 
same fashion across thoughts (that the commonality in this example rests with a 
predicate is unfortunate, as the constraint in question is, appropriately enough, more 
general still). One can object to the specific mode of being a given theory assigns to 
the self-standing items at play in content-respect; in Evans' case, he is bothered by 
their characterization as "symbols" (Ibid., p. 101). But the situation seems to us no 
more burdened by ontological partisanships than is for example the caU to recognize 
that there is sorne sense in which "a=b" both is and is not the same as "a=a" (cf 
Frege, 1997, p. 151-152). Similarly-and far less demandingly-all we require for 
our third way is the recognition that the thought that "a=a" involves sorne common 
content "a" in both cases. 
In sum, we hold that apprehension of the mind by itself ean be atomie, whereas 
apprehension of the world by the mind must be anatomie (but not wholistic). The 
net value here is clear enough: this view avoids regress. Since we hold that 
ideational contents make themselves manifest in a noninferential manner, there is 
therefore no need to suppose that a string of discourse is itself held together by little 
lassos. 
4.3.4	 On the importance (or lack thereof) of letting the mind directly refer 
to its own contents 
The sort of aetiological humility we embrace sometimes forces us to straddle facile 
partisanships. No doubt things would be much simpler if we opted to refuse the 
mind the ability to directly refer to its own contents. This move would be 
particularly easy to implement given our commitment to the view that thoughts 
which (collaboratively) purport to represent the world must in the end allow us to 
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fruitfully alter that world. But as we see it, there is no reason why we cannot both 
recognize that 1) thought is a thoroughly natural tool which we employ in order to 
guide agency and that 2) thought is patently different from anything else in the 
physical world. As Aquinas pointed out, although knowledge must in the end 
answer to the thing understood, « still it is not necessary that the mode of the 
knowledge and the mode of the thing should be the same» ([1259-64] 2006, 2.75). 
It would seem, then, that we are making an exception for the mind. We are (the 
mind is an exceptional thing). Curiously, many philosophers today would label our 
position "anti-naturalist". For instance, Ruth Millikan has attracted a great deal of 
attention for attacking theories that assign the mind abilities which do not accord 
neatly with what we know of other human organs (e.g., kidneys). Millikan is similar 
to McDowell in many respects (although he would likely resent the rapprochement; 
cf McDowell, 2004, p. 100-105). Both manifest a revulsion against the Given 
bordering on the compulsive-yet both fancy themselves as opponents of wholistic 
theories. Sadly, just as is the case with McDowell, Millikan overdoes an otherwise 
sober stance: 
[S]uppose we were consistently to deny that there are any epistemological 
"givens". We could admit that people are (sometimes) aware of the 
intentionality of their thoughts, just as they are sometimes aware of others 
looking at them or aware that it is raining. But we would maintain that this kind 
of awareness of, indeed every kind of awareness of, is in part an external 
relation, the inside of the awareness-that feeling part-giving no absolute 
guarantee that it is the inside of a genuine awareness of relation. Consciousness, 
that is, does not contain within it or directly before it any objects of 
consciousness. Even an awareness of an awareness does not have the object 
awareness as an unmediated object. There is nothing diaphanous about 
conSClOusness. 
An unsettling possibility! One implication would be that we are no more in a 
position to know merely via Cartesian reflection that we are truly thinking, i.e., 
that we or our thoughts intend anything, than that we are thinking truly. 
Absolutely nothing is guaranteed directly from within an act of consciousness. 
That is the most ultimate form that an attack upon "the given" or upon 
rationalism could possibly take. 
That is the position that I will adopt in this essay. (Millikan, 1984, p. 91-92) 
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Familiarity with the "art world" has taught us that as soon as a practitioner gets sorne 
attention by employing a novelty, flocks soon follow who implement it with tenfold 
fervour (the tacit expectation perhaps being that this will earn them ten times the 
originator's praise). In any event, Millikan ominously echoes the central daim of 
our third chapter, albeit approvingly: « Should we have expected to be able to give 
up all the other givens (induding, in accordance with Sellarsian insight, the 
givenness of knowledge of sensations) while keeping the givenness of meanings? » 
(Ibid., p. 11). 
Insofar as Millikan seeks to question the laser metaphor and its occult posits, we 
consider her an ally. Indeed, thought does not by itself ensure its bearing on the 
world beyond mind. Moreover, everything from theoretical psychology to everyday 
life instructs us that the mind is deeper than conscious thought can fully 
comprehend. But to explode these truths and alienate the mind so fully from itself as 
to drive a wedge of suspicion through content-respect is a move we simply cannot 
endorse. In essence, Millikan's proposaI takes the destruction of content-respect we 
held as a reproach against Sellars and construes it-not as an espousal of 
nihilism-but as a cornrnitment to "naturalism" (obviously not the sort we are trying 
to emulate). 
When we discussed the epistemic task which McDowell's unduly assigns to the 
notion of culture (sect. 2.5.2), we cited Millikan as a good example of a thinker who 
seeks to situate various logical devices within the natural realm. But Millikan seems 
to think that in order to construe logic in a radically non-Platonic way, the specifie 
character of logic must be dramatically altered so as to mimic the relief of the 
biological world. Let us then ask: why can't something like the law of identity be 
totally un-mysterious and un-magical while remaining an unassailable Law which is 
necessary and not just "reproductively established"? 
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As we see it, snobbery vis-à-vis the necessary because it is not contingent is no 
better than snobbery towards the contingent because it is not necessary. Why can't 
reality be big enough to accommodate both? More to the point, what's to be gained 
by taking a notion away from rationalism and "naturalizing" it if in so doing we rob 
the notion of the sort of monotonie truth-preservation that made it epistemologically 
attractive in the first place? In keeping with our aetiological posture (sect. 3.2.1), we 
believe it shows a lack of humility to assail thinking because it manifests features 
different from those found in the more straightforwardly natura1 world. We do not 
follow Millikan in lumping naturalism with the fanatic rejection of the Given. 
Those are distinct philosophie commitments, and there is a way to recognize that the 
Given, although not the panacea atomists make it to be, has sorne basis in fact. 
Since we hold that one cannot draw any inference without engaging in sorne sort 
of indexically synunetrical appeal (sect. 3.4.2), we accept that the mind is capable of 
noninferentially accessing its own contents. To the extent that such an access can be 
labelled "privileged", we have argued that the privilege is a fairly banal one, 
amounting to no more than a respect of contents. We can be fully confident that, 
from one thought to another, the contents handled by our minds will not somehow 
shift. While an agent can be frustrated by the fact that an anatomie string does not 
succeed in actually allowing her to take hold of a worldly abject, she can at least find 
peace in the fact that the discourse she essayed made sense. There is thus no need to 
raise the accusation of meaninglessness every time certain representations do not 
bear out. True, when such failures occur, the process of inquiry is set in motion and 
a host of representations are revised. However, this can never endanger the logical 
structure of inferentia1 knowledge per se, which remains intact. 
Millikan, however, wou1d see in such a concession a pervasive "meaning 
rationa1ism", since we effective1y ho1d that « there need be no such thing as being 
confused about what one is thinking of» (Millikan, 1984, p. 326)-all in aIl a rather 
modest daim, when one stops ta think about it. While we accept the "meaning" half 
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of Millikan's derogatory label, we simply do not see how the "rationalism" portion 
could apply. The accusation of rationalism (in the very loose sense in which 
Millikan uses the term) would stick only if we were making the indexical appeal to 
contents the necessary and sufficient cause of inferential knowledge. In other words, 
the criticism that countenancing content-respect is somehow "rationalist" is well 
taken only if the "clarity and distinctiveness" at work is transforrned into a perpetuaI 
inference machine, as if grasping the axiom of identity was all that was needed for 
the world's secrets to unravel effortlessly before one's mind. Now that's 
rationalism: the idea that the unaided light of reason is the sole source of knowledge. 
We propose no such thing. 
Incidentally, we find it to be an odd quirk of history that-differences in 
scientistic jargon notwithstanding-Millikan's view that « Absolutely nothing is 
guaranteed directly from within an act of consciousness » (1984, p. 92) is deemed 
respectable (and even revolutionary) whereas a certain Korzybsky was generally 
considered the village idiot of philosophy for denying the law of identity on grounds 
that nothing ensures that A is in fact A (cf. Sebeok, 1994, p. 281). Both of these 
views are, of course, of a kind (let us flee from Descartes, if we must; but let us not 
flee from reason). 
4.4 Receptivity, spontaneity, and their relation: proffering a new account 
4.4.1 The benefits and hazards of engaging in reductions 
Many (if not most) philosophers working within the "analytic" tradition believe that 
epistemological objectivity is best sought by undoing the harm already done by 
natural language. But when aided and abetted by the rationalist persuasion that 
monotonie entailments are divorced from worldly affairs (cf. Wittgenstein, [1921] 
2002, § 5.43), speculation can take command of the logicisation of language in a 
way tha~ makes even the most connotation-ridden dialect a preferable option; as 
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witnessed by the fact that atomism-spurred on by the speculative 
interlocutor-whets its referential laser so fervently that its tip ends up having 
literally no semantic extension (sect. 1.3.3). 
It is understandable that an epistemological inquiry into causes should engage in 
reductions of sorne kind, as primitive situations allow the play of reeeptivity to be 
more readily ascertained. But the enthusiasm for reduction is overdone by the 
standard atomist account. Russell is led to conclude (with Leibniz) that « what is 
complex must be composed of simples, though the number of constituents may be 
infinite » (Russell, [1918, 1924] 1998, p. 173). In this sense, a purely logical tenet 
leads to metaphysical convictions. Whilst a convenient ontology of discrete atoms 
may seem to discharge a theory from having to account for more complex worldly 
objects (these would supposedly be re-constructed by means of formai devices), it 
does so at the priee of making its basic constituents properly ineffable-which, to 
put it mildly, is not a very promising trait for a justificatory fulcrum. Indeed, onee 
this framework is in place, it appears impossible to build our way back up to any sort 
of bona fide knowledge. The more logical and linguistic ingredients we add to the 
mix in order to make obtain something close to our common sense conception of 
knowledge, the more it seems unlikely that the atoms themselves are carrying any 
epistemic weight. Given the terms set down by the atomist, the conceptual 
component of thought (i.e., Kant' s "understanding") basically does all the work, 
whereas the experiential component ("sensibility") seems a needless adjunct. 
To be sure, the sworn atomist would insist that, though ineffable in comparison 
with ordinary language, punctate ostensions nevertheless connect us with an extemal 
worldly object-"blankly extemal", McDowell would say ([1982] 1998, p. 391; cf 
[1986] 1998, p. 229-231). But insofar as one acknowledges that such a worldly 
atom would be too primitive to carry the sort of semantic content we typically expect 
from within language, claims about the theoretical availability of such discrete 
(pseudo?)quales simply cannot be called upon to rescue the disconcerting conclusion 
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that it is in fact the syntax which does aIl the semantic work. In this sense, Sellars' 
asymmetry thesis (sect. 1.5.4) represents an attempt to separate the atornists' 
existential claim (which it agnostically concedes could be true) from their 
epistemological one (which makes little sense). As an acute cri tic of empiricism, 
Sellars brought the inner contradiction of atornism to the fulllight of day. He is only 
being consistent when he states that « the metaphor of 'foundation' is rnisleading in 
that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other 
empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension 
in which the latter rest on the former» (Sellars, [1956] 1963, § 38). According to 
this view, we cannot work our way up, we can only work our way down-a 
contention which, aIl told, trades one implausibility for another. 
One of our goals in this work is therefore to emphasize that the atomist school 
(e.g., Russell, Carnap, etc.) is not the sole spokesperson of receptivity. Strictly 
speaking, receptivity is the idea the world makes itself known forcefully to us and 
that we are equipped with a faculty suitable to profit from this fact. In introducing 
the term, Kant described it as the rnind's « power of receiving representations in so 
far as it is in any wise affected » ([1787] 1965, B75). Now it may be that the 
indexical force at play entails a Given which is aIso atornic and noninferential. But 
we believe there is a way to recognize atornicity in its technical sense (i.e., not 
involving another content) without falling into any sort of speculative myopia. 
As we have made clear (sect. 4.3.3), we are prepared to accept that the 
representation by a mind of its own ideational contents can be atomic (i.e., like the 
"laser beam" metaphor). In fact, it is pivotaI to the success of our proposaI that 
references to one's own thoughts need not follow the constrictive view we advocate 
for the apprehension of worldly objects. We have tendered two important reasons 
for this. For one thing, strong-arming the rnind into anatornism where a simple 
atornic appeal suffices involves a breach of aetiological sobriety. Refusing the mind 
such a privileged access wOllld basically mean that an agent would have to inquire 
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whether she is in fact thinking what she is thinking at a given time (cf Millikan' s 
boastful adoption of this "unsettling" stance, sect. 4.3.4). But we fail to see how 
such an "inquiry" could do otherwise than cripple the mind into a state of schizoid 
paralysis. Thus, although we object to the laser view on account of mystic forces 
like passing through walls and such, it seems reasonable to recognize that thoughts 
can appertain to their brethren through a diaphanous medium which in principle can 
offer neither resistance nor noise. Making allowances for this is not only the 
sensible thing to do from a methodological standpoint, it is also consequential on a 
theoretical front. Indeed, it is our belief that noninferential representation is the only 
way an epistemology can support content-respect. Although content-respect is at the 
heart of inference and computation (sect. 3.4.1 to 3.4.3), it is in fact present in any 
relation holding between cornrnon ideas, induding psychological associations which 
fail to demonstrate any logical validity; otherwise the very fibres which hold 
representations together into discursive strings would unravel. 
However, since we recognize that justification (and the normative defence of 
knowledge in general) is a discursive activity involving not only observations but 
also arguments, framing conditions, and so forth, we do not think the structural 
feature of Givenness can be applicable to the case of mind-to-world representation, 
which we construe as irreducibly anatomie (but not wholistic). As we look about, 
we simply cannot put aside the overwhelming evidence that the objects which 
people the world are far more coarse than is expected by empiricist reductions, and 
that whatever normative daims one can make about these objects perforce involve 
more than one representation. 
As such, we think it is of prime importance that one not loose sight of which 
certainties about the world and the mind are truly self-evident and which are arrived 
at through the prism of abstract thought-experiments. Our animal life provides us 
with a baseline of experiential input. While philosophers may want to go beyond 
this and work their way down to an (unique and ineffable) atom or up to an (equally 
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unique and ineffable) Hegelian "Absolute" in arder to gain a better aetiological 
understanding, such ventures should never be allowed to discard the mundane ladder 
which gets them there (ironically, Russell viewed his original philosophy of logical 
atomism as a revoIt against the doctrines of his one-time master, noted neo-Hegelian 
Francis H. Bradley; cf Russell, [1918, 1924] 1998, p. 158). 
Now in staking out our differences with Millikan's approach to philosophical 
inquiry, we have made it clear that logic occupies an undisputed place in our third 
way. Our anatomist construal of representation has no desire to rob logical 
entailments of their monotonic character. As such, we are committed to concurring 
with the aforementioned dictum that what is complex is eo ipso comprised of 
simpler constituents. But while this logical truth is binding in virtue of its ironclad 
rationality, that remarkable potency does not by itself provide the theorist of 
representation with a sufficient basis whence to (re)build an entire epistemological 
apparatus (cf for example the ambitious but ill-fated attempt by Carnap, [1928] 
2003). The reason for this insufficiency, we argue, is that the results yielded by a 
totally consistent reductionism differ greatly depending on whether the cry to 
"Reduce the complex" is recursively employed in the metaphysical or the 
epistemological sphere. To understand why, let us look at the difference between 
these two philosophic projects. 
Although every critically-minded philosopher who has ever put pen to paper has 
likely entertained her own take on the distinction, it seems untendentious to affirm 
that metaphysics pertains to existence or being "as such"; whereas epistemology 
studies in an abstract manner the means by which that existence or being is 
"grasped" or "apprehended" (the quotation marks here are not intended to convey 
any incredulity towards the projects in question, but to keep the focus generalized). 
We can therefore encapsulate the difference at hand by saying that the former sort of 
inquiry deals with the object while omitting to consider the presence of any 
apprehending subject, whereas the latter studies mainly the subject (but is a fortiori 
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bound to countenancing the object of its apprehension, be it deemed real or unreal). 
This work has not thus far proposed any sort of metaphysical doctrine in the sense 
just outlined, insofar as we have not sought to understand being in abstracto of a 
thinking subject. Our concern has instead been epistemological, our aetiologic 
exploration focusing on the representational relation which can hold between mind 
andworld. 
Given these distinctions, what becomes of the reduction of the complex to the 
simple? In metaphysics, the answer is straightforward enough: one is logically 
driven to reach a point which can be divided no more, thereby attaining an object 
which fully deserves the appellation a-tom. Theorists usually assume that the end­
product of such a reduction would be the same in the epistemological realm. To go 
back to an example that was used when illustrating the Given's main characteristics 
(sect. 1.5.2), if the concept 'Male' is regarded as an atomic rock-bottom which can 
be reduced no further, then its bearing upon worldly males should be singularly 
unchanged by whatever developments might perchance take place in an agent's 
collateral store of concepts. This sort of sovereignty of content is what makes 
atomism such an interesting structural (or rather, non-structural) feature in the eyes 
of epistemologists. For whatever changes perchance occur in a scientific theory or 
any other outlook, atomicity ensures that certain elementary representations remain 
neutral points of reference throughout (cf Fodor, [1990] 2002). There is, of course, 
a great deal of debate among atomist theorists over what constitutes such a bedrock, 
that is, over what can in point of fact be counted as completely devoid of any 
internal complexity. But regardless of these contingent matters, there is a robust 
understanding of what can and cannot count as atomic in principle: in all cases, the 
ostension must "go without saying". 
Let us now ask: is the epistemologist warranted ln thinking that her atomic 
contents can be likened to the sort of atomic monads arrived at in metaphysical 
investigations? Prima fade, there would seem to be grounds for an affirmative 
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answer. After aIl, both were arrived at by means of a logical inference which 
guarantees that if there are complex things, then there are simples. But while this 
much is true, we argue that the terminating simplicity one arrives at in 
epistemology-although il can be used to safeguard or at least confirm 
objectivity-is different from that encountered in a metaphysical inquiry. For the 
kind of monad or atom countenanced by Leibniz or Democritus in the realm of being 
qua being requires that one abstract out the subject from the object, which is a move 
epistemology cannot follow (on pain of no longer being the philosophic project it 
purports to be). What we want to do in the next section is expand on this argument, 
and then spend the remainder of chapter delving into its far-reaching ramifications. 
4.4.2 Countenancing receptivity from the start 
The sorts of minds and worlds philosophers ponder will always be scale-models of 
the real things. That is as it should be, since the price to pay for generalized 
understanding is a coarse pixelation of one' s picture. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that the most important errors are made at the stage where one decides what is and 
what is not to be counted as relevant to one's theorizing. What if, for instance, a 
certain theoretical conception avails itself severely deficient or faulty? In such a 
case, revising the parameters a1ready in place becomes a much simpler and attractive 
task compared to adding a neglected element (which one, anyway?). 
Consider the case of receptivity. There is no need, we have argued, why one 
should have to wait until the end of time to find out whether one's representations 
have an objective basis (sect. 1.4.3 and 4.3.2). Not only does such a misguided view 
reflect an overreaction vis-à-vis the internaI travails of scientists, it completely 
overlooks the fact that our de facto success in life equips us with an unassailable 
proof that human knowledge can indeed bear on the world. Consequently, we have 
placed the end of inquiry in the here and now. Moreover, we have insisted that 
whatever revisions agents engage in as part of a process of inquiry leave the logical 
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structure of inference totally unaffected, insofar as basic principles like the law of 
identity remain Given (it is a considerable cognitive and/or theoretical 
accomplishment, however, to explicitly grasp and/or state this fact). This, we 
claimed, is not a concession to rationalism but to reasonableness. In sum, our third 
way countenances two areas where our faculty of spontaneity appears to be 
impotent. First, the mind cannot remake the world as it wishes. Second, although it 
can refashion representations liberally in its effort to conform to the world, the rnind 
is unable to escape the most fundamental laws of logic. All this seems to point to 
one conclusion: spontaneity has lirnits, and there is indeed receptivity in 
representation. 
Adrnittedly, it can be hard to fit this feature into a more reflective theoretical 
account, as witnessed by the fact that philosophy is drawn time and time again into 
relativism and idealism. Why is this so? We believe the main reason for this 
difficulty is that through a laudable attentiveness to the necessary requirements of 
normativity, the accepted construal of knowledge in its most generic form has 
unfortunately begged the question in favour of spontaneity. To echo a 
quintessentially Wittgensteinian way of speaking (minus anti-programmatic 
aspirations), we could say that philosophers are "held captive" by a conception 
which forecloses a harmonious incorporation of the Given. Contra McDowell 
however, the solution we propose does not require that one seek to conjoin 
antonyms, nor does it require that we give up constructive philosophizing. 
As a means of bringing to the fore the issue at stake, consider the following 
situation. A person is standing on a railroad track. There are large brick walls 
behind and to one side of her (thus forrning an L-shaped barrier). As a train cornes 
rushing towards her, she can stay put and die; or she can move over to the side 
unobstructed by a wall and live. Now the philosophical question here is this: 
supposing she moves out of the way, does she subsequently have a reason to support 
what she has done? In other words, does the situation provide her with a full­
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fledged justification-or does it at best supply her with an exculpation? Would 
removing the side wall and giving the person two sides to choose from modify the 
situation in any way? In other words, do situations which admit no alternative 
possibilities (other than the absence of the living agent) provide material that is 
properly epistemic, or are such cases too structuraIly primitive to partake in the 
deliberations of the space of reasons? 
It could be argued that the scenario we are invoking egregiously betokens the 
sort of unwarranted excogitations we rejected in the first chapter. However, a 
cursory review of one's daily life will reveal the remarkable extent to which our 
thinking is indeed shepherded to such and such contents with or without our explicit 
consent-every time a phone rings, for example. Moreover, not only does our 
scenario exhibit greater naturalistic ubiquity, it is not guilty of any self-contradiction. 
Whereas a narrative like radical translation concludes its extravagant strictures with 
the claim that there can in fact be no such thing as an authoritative translation (i.e., it 
engages in ladder-discarding), our setting is not only mundane in impetus, it 
reflexively seeks to aetiologicaIly comprehend the very idea of a mundane impetus. 
Thus, in the final analysis, what truly differentiates our incoming-train scenario from 
speculative fictions is the fact that we do no add anything more to the mix. One is 
free to roam the evocative setting we have proposed, without any fear that her 
philosophie reflections will meet with erotetic wangles at every step (aIl we ask are 
two waIls and a train, no more). 
So the person on the tracks is, quite literaIly, cornered. Her train of thought (no 
pun intended) is suddenly coerced into taking a certain direction. What we have 
here then is a patent case of "an offer one can't refuse". That we experience such 
events is beyond question. The epistemological bone of contention, though, is 
whether such happenings supply us with knowledge in the demanding sense of the 
term. As Peirce aptly put it: « A man cannot startle himself by jumping up with an 
exclamation of Boo! » (1998, p. 195). There is just no way one can entertain a 
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thought along the lines of "1 am startled", insofar as the reflexive grasp that one is 
indeed in such state effectively dissipates the shock. One couId thus claim that the 
event of surprise is so thinly immanent that all experiences of it are perforce 
memories, and as such belong to the order of in absentia representations, not 
indices. If this is correct, then it seems fair to recognize that the predicament has 
distinctly transcendental trappings. For if surprises are unavoidably cognized as 
recollections ex post facto, then talk of brute indexicality would seem to be deduced 
through a veil of symbolic thought, as it were. This view would be fully consonant 
with the one-way door conception of the mind (sect. 1.5.3). There is indeed a sense 
in which we necessarily clothe all indexical experiences with symbolic meaning; in 
that regard, the transcendenta1 critique is well taken. For his part, McDowell argues 
that « [t]he idea of a transcendental passivity is at best problematic anyway » and 
that « [a]dding this prob1ematic idea on1y undermines the reassurance that empirical 
passivity could afford » ([1994] 2002, p. 42). 
But the issue goes well beyond that of surprise. Suppose that the person in our 
example opts to dodge the incoming train by stepping over to the side available to 
her. Let us grant that, as she stands safe1y removed from the ensuing wreck, the 
entire event (including what might have taken place as part of her ongoing mental 
life) is fully draped in symbolic garb. Her heart may be pounding still, but the 
surprise itself has been thoroughly domesticated. What is to be the normative status 
of the in absentia representations she now entertains? Specifically, is she warranted 
in thinking "1 had a reason to move out of the way"-or should she be limited to 
thinking "1 had no choice but to move out of the way"? Although there is no sharp 
boundary delineating the domain of the ethical within the more broadly normative, 
the di1emma should be read in an epistemological key. In short, the question is 
whether Samuel Butler was correct when he wrote that « He who complies against 
his will, Is of his own opinion still» (Hudibras, 1663-78). 
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McDowell's own answer to this question would be that such an event provides 
one with exculpation only. He writes: « According to the Myth of the Given, the 
obligation ta be responsibly alive to the dictates of reason lapses when we come to 
the ultimate points of contact between thinking and reality; the Given is a brute 
effect of the world, not something justified by it» (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 42). 
McDowell therefore maintains that the Given's very "brutality" prevents it from 
contributing to any normative appraisal. We can better compass this contention by 
examining the very notion of the normative. Normativity in its most basic sense, we 
could say, involves a selection among alternatives, bestowing a certain weight upon 
sorne things and not others. In the ethical sphere, the normative triage pertains to 
actions "good" or "bad". Epistemological normativity manifests itself in the 
aspiration to find reliable means of sorting out the "true" from the "false" (similarly, 
"marked" and "unmarked" terms involve a normative arrangement, albeit one which 
surreptitiously presents itself as a descriptive distinction). In all these cases, 
normativity requires a minimum of two alternative classes in which to put the things 
appraised. The possible outlets one is presented with can be very high in number, 
but for there to be a choice, at least two must be present. In sum, normativity 
requires that an agent select which among two or more disjuncts are to be deemed 
superior to the other (and/or arrange these in an ordered set). Figure 10, we couId 
then say, is the most primitive state in which normativity can unfold. 
Hold thatHold that non-P
P (QI R, S, ... ) 
Figure 10 Binary alternatives as the most primitive 
prerequisite of normativity. 
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p 
Figure 11 Non-epistemic 
unary situation. 
Now consider the peculiar case of the Given. By definition, the Given makes the 
mind an offer it can't refuse. In this case, something is, and could not be otherwise: 
there is no room for negotiation. The world is simply letting us know that P, 
whether we like it or not (we can render this predicament in figure Il). According 
to the atomist, the mind can and should be connected to the world in this way. Of 
course, such astate would effectively foreclose the possibility of any misalignment 
between mind and world (hence its attractiveness to the epistemologist). But if we 
try to intelligibly express what it is that is being forcefully delivered, the best we can 
do is fa11 back to William James' memorable description of the unary state as a 
"bloomin' buzzin' confusion" (note that this peculiarity does not in itself provide 
grounds for dismissing the ontological possibility of this sort of situation). 
Although advocates of this view recognize this situation to be the baseline of 
thought in theory, they maintain that humans are so constituted that a corrupting 
influence intervenes in practice. One of the more popular culprits adduced in this 
regard is the idea that the human mind is cluttered by a11 sorts of superfluous 
psychological noise and inferential imperfections, a huge portion of which cornes 
pre-packaged in natural languages. What is needed, according to this gloss, is a 
system of symbols which « will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the 
logical structure of the facts asserted or denied. [... ] It is a language which has only 
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syntax and no vocabulary whatsoever» (Russell, [1918, 1924] 1998, p. 58). Russell, 
of course, believed such a language would ultimately link up with its referential 
domain via punctate ostensions, and that « [i]n a logically perfect language the 
words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the 
corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not' , 'if', 'then', 
which have a different function »(Ibid.). All that is needed for objective knowledge, 
according to this view, is to travel the open book of nature with a sensory apparatus 
and a well-chosen posse of syntaxic connectives. In keeping with the prototypically 
empiricist insight, epistemology thus becomes a subtractive endeavour, a question of 
trimming representations until a point of direct contact with the world is reached. In 
essence, the hope is one of recovering a lost alignment between representation and 
represented, the world effectively furnishing an Adamic lexicon (the idea of a formaI 
apparatus sifting through the contingent disorderliness of common language is of 
course not limited to atomism; cf for example the "regimentation" proposed by 
Quine, [1960] 1999, p. 157-190). 
There would seem to be good grounds for discounting an "ultra-atomised" 
content as a possible recipient of normativity. For if an agent were to give her assent 
to the P of figure Il, the ensuing judgement would be indiscernible from that of her 
dissent, which would also register as P. Since in either case one is cornered into 
thinking that P, any exercise of agency would for all intents and purposes be 
nullified. In fact, it could be maintained (against Samuel Butler) that the very 
notions of assent and dissent loose their meaning in such cases. Obviously, 
commitment to the view that « it is only because experience involves capacities 
belonging to spontaneity that we can understand experience as awareness [...] of the 
world » makes the predicament all the more worse (McDowell, [1994] 2002, p. 47). 
If one holds that freedom permeates rational thought, then it is only normal that one 
should come to view "offers one can't refuse" as outside the purview of 
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rationality-with the consequence that Givenness becomes either an ineffable 
margin or is dispelled altogether (compare Sellars' transsemiotic agnosticism, sect. 
1.5.4; with McDowell's pansemiotism, sect. 2.2 and 2.4.1). 
But one need not follow McDowell's fusion in order to recogmze that the 
"mono-thematic" character of the content Given in figure Il would place it squarely 
outside the purview of epistemology. As McDowell writes: « If we suppose that 
rational answerability lapses at sorne outermost point of the space of reasons, short 
of the world itself, our picture ceases to depict anything recognizable as empirical 
judgement; we have abliterated empirical cantent altagether » (Ibid., p. 42-43; 
italics ours). Thus, McDowell contends, it is not only the application of normative 
assessment that is made impossible by Givenness, but the very possibility of 
meaningful content as weIl. To understand why that is, one need only recall that the 
smallest unit of information is the binary digit or "bit". Since "offers one can't 
refuse" appear to be unary, their very structure would seem to make them incapable 
of acting as transmitters of information. A submariner cannot emit (or receive) 
Morse code information when the light of a periscope is left perpetually "on" (or 
perpetually "off'). 
Since we have severely criticized the rejection of Givenness throughout this 
work, it could appear that we are playing devil' s advocate by raising these problems. 
Not quite. What we want to emphasize is this: we fully agree that the consequences 
just outlined follow from the conception of the Given as depicted in figure Il, that 
is, from a construal of receptivity as unary. Acquiescence in this case is a simple 
matter of logic; we would never dare pretend that something unary could be a 
vehicle of information-much less an object of normative appraisal. What we do 
want to argue, however, is that receptivity is not unary in the sense expected by the 
standard atamist accaunt, but rather presents itself ta a living agency as a binary 
alternative. 
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To see how this is the case, let us return to the idea of an offer one can't refuse 
which is at the heart of the notion of receptivity. Take the case of the person 
cornered into dodging the train. It seems fair to say that she was coerced by her 
environment into taking that direction, and that since spontaneity and understanding 
in general require the presence of at least two possible alternatives, the situation 
generated an outcome devoid of epistemic value. But is it really correct to say that 
there was but a single alternative, such that 'Moving to the side' becomes an 
unintelligible singleton? It is understandable that we should come to view the 
situation in this way, as remaining put would have resulted in her certain death. Yet 
is not this gruesome fate also a possible alternative, one which-despite its 
unattractiveness-is on par with that of the dodge? Granted, the normative charges 
attached to these respective options exhibit a salient inequality, one so pronounced 
that the negative party propels agency almost necessarily to the positive side. 
However, one must be on guard not to let such polarized normativity rewrite the 
logically-prior descriptive state whence the sharp contrast arises. In other words, 
one must not let the repellent option of death recede into an untold obscurity. For 
the person's demise remains as legitimate a possible outcome as that person's side­
stepping the incoming train (in fact, it is only because that possibly exists that the 
positive alternative is compelling). 
Here then is our main thesis regarding the faculty of receptivity: in every 
instance where the world makes itself known to the mind, there are only two 
alternatives; namely, acquiescence or death. We hold that a thinking agent declines 
to Accept "offers she can't refuse" only at her own peril qua living animal. As we 
see it, if the objective representation of the world by the mind is to be our theoretical 
concern, then there is no way to circumvent the fact that a) the situation of figure Il 
is ineffable and that b) figure 10 plainly involves the faculty of spontaneity, not that 
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of receptivity. In other words, the unary monad begins to Low, and the binary 
choice between P and other contents begins too high. By our lights, only figure 12 
can do justice to the notion of receptivity without destroying il. 
In short, our intent is to incorporate worldly friction at the most elementary 
level-instead of having to append it further downstream by artificial means (pace 
McDoweIl). As we saw when discussing philosophy and science's divergent 
propensities, if one constructs an account of mind solely on the terms laid down by 
the natural sciences, then it becomes difficult if not impossible to reconstruct 
spontaneity with lawful materials only (sect. 1.3.3). Mutatis mutandis, if one 
focuses primarily on spontaneity in developing one's theoretical understanding of 
representation, receptivity willlater haunt one's theory as a bothersome square peg 
where only round holes are available. Since a philosophie conception stands or faIls 
on the variables it chooses to countenance, we have made aIlowances for friction 
from the very start. There is thus no need to fear that relativism might creep up at 
sorne point and leave the mind disconnected from the world. In this sense, our 
proposaI is diametrically opposed to McDowell's. For it is not a refined "second 
nature" which provides socialized humans with friction from the top-down in our 
philosophy. Rather, we hold that normativity arises bottom-up from the finite 
character of Life as such (human or otherwise). 
Hold that Stop livingp 
Figure 12 Receptivity as a binary choice between 
a content and the absence of life. 
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To be sure, an animal may wish to Refuse what it is Given. In that sense, 
although the subject of indexical forces is incapable of spontaneity, it remains 
capable of a minimal agency. When a content tries to be driven into the mind, a veto 
of last resort remains at one' s disposaI. But what could such a rejection possibly 
look like? Row can one both stand before the approaching train and obstinately 
spurn its incontrovertible cornmand to move aside, or have a spoonful of relish in 
one's mouth and Refuse to taste its sweetness? There is, we argue, only one way to 
accomp1ish this, namely by the cessation of life. We the living may not be able to 
deny experiential impingements, but a corpse can pull the remarkable feat of both 
having relish in its mouth and not tasting il. Likewise, the person with a death wish 
is a rare and tragic guinea pig who teaches the rest of us that the dictates of an 
incoming train can indeed be Refused. Rowever, unti1 and unless an agent is willing 
to surrender that privilege which is her life, the Given must be Accepted. 
So why should an agent want to live, to choose the left-hand side of the above 
disjunction? We are not quite sure (self-love, perhaps?). By its very nature, the 
conative contribution to thought is a fairly slippery topic of discourse. No doubt the 
distinctiveness of the power itse1f goes a long way towards exp1aining why conation 
remains a vast1y under-exp10red area of philosophic inquiry. Rumbly bowing before 
these (no doubt unavoidable) difficu1ties, we will not attempt to describe the notion 
in detai1 (let us only gesture that conation seem to us most manifest in extreme 
bodily exertion, as a trained power1ifter 1eaves his technica1 execution in the hands 
of his conditioning come competition day and directs his efforts solely on the task at 
hand, with the raw desire "UP!" filling his being, as it were). 
To summarize, we maintain that if we do not let loose the stubborn interlocutor, 
the furthest we can take epistemological (not metaphysical) simp1icity is the 
e1ementary situation illustrated in figure 12. Let us then ask: how many concepts are 
invo1ved in this construal of receptivity? Strict1y speaking, since there is but a single 
representationa1 content in figure 12, the situation fully satisfies the requirements of 
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an atomic theory (sect. 1.5.2). Now it could be replied that the play of agency 
contaminates this atomicity. As we see it, such a criticism would be gravely 
mistaken. We could cite for instance Sartre's thesis that « AlI consciousness is 
positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself 
in this same positing » ([1943] 1958, p. xxvii). But this strategy, though respectable 
in its own right, appears to us rather overdone for the purpose at hand, as there is 
simply no supplementary consciousness there to he exhausted. Rather, the situation 
schematized in figure 12 seeks to identify a conative contribution which, and as far 
as we can see, has not the faintest relation to conceptual content, however loosely 
construed. The right-hand side of figure 12 is, in fact, a void. It is intended to 
underscore the fact that "offers one can't refuse" present the mind with an (albeit 
unpalatable) alternative. An agent may embrace the option of life in all instances, 
but the ubiquity of this decision should not obscure the fact that genuine alternatives 
were available throughout; thereby imbuing the lone content of the left-hand side 
with nonnative value. But to transmogrify the raw drive which seeks to avoid the 
right-hand side it into an additional conceptual content (or into a cogitating 
homonculus) would not only be to engage in an unwarranted hypostatisation, it 
would bespeak a general poverty of insight into those aspects of human life which 
cannot be captured by the sole exercise of intellectual deliberation. 
4.4.3 Worldly objects as complex 
If all there was to epistemology was the choice to Accept the deliverances of 
experiential impingements, there would be no need for a normative theory of 
knowledge partitioning the true from the false. Supposing the presence of a non­
vanishing and univocal source of proximal stimuli, the distal configuration of the 
world would be untendentious. EITor and subjectivity would be the problem of the 
dead and could not, by definition, affect those living. For the very fact that one 
would be alive would entail that one Accepted all thè contents forcefully put before 
one's mind up to that point. It would be an empiricist Garden of Eden, as there 
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would be no possible misalignment between one's representations and the layout of 
the world. Certainly, the lottery of experiential exposure would vary from one agent 
to another, the result being that individual stores of representations would differ. 
There would thus be a need for schools and language to help agents profit from 
others' experience and fill in the gaps. But all in all, humanity would be running 
around in an epistemological "shopping spree" without end. The book of nature 
would be open for all to read, all would be born literate, and (presuming 
cornrnitment to a continued life) the only remaining issue would be how to take in as 
much of the landscape of the world as possible in one lifetime. 
This, of course, is pure fantasy. However, as recently as the positivists' Unified 
Science Movement, the picture has been sufficiently motivated to captivate the 
programmatic aspirations of very able thinkers (the Utopian ideal itself can be traced 
as far back as Pythagoras and Plato, but obviously the rationalist view of the senses 
as an impediment to truth spoils the inclusion). So what's wrong with the picture? 
If it is indeed motivated to a certain degree, why does it not bear out in point of fact? 
The reason is that the choice to Accept the Given and live is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of knowledge and representation. In other words, the normative 
choice of alternatives does not end the moment one has chosen to live. Such a 
conative Acceptance of receptivity' s input marks the beginning of objectivity, not its 
end. If we are to understand why that is, we must not look to any inherent flaw in 
the "crooked timber" of humankind. Rather, we must look to the world' s 
complexity. 
According to atomism, normativity in epistemology is a question of trirnrning 
excess representations until a point of direct contact with the world is reached. 
However, the idea of logically pruning representation to its bare essentials rests on 
the supposition that a corresponding ontology of worldly kernels is in the offing. As 
Brand Blanshard writes in his classic polemic, Reason and Analysis: 
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One of course does not prove that the world is made of atomic facts, re1ated to 
each other on1y externally, by showing that a wonderfully convenient system of 
statements wou1d be applicable to them if only there were such things. An ideal 
language is surely to be devised by first noting what things exist and then 
adjusting the language to their nature and relations. 
Now in the intercourse of mathematics with atomism the curious fact is that 
this process was reversed. The language was not accepted because the facts 
required it; the facts were construed to be thus rather than so because the 
conditions of what was conceived as an ideallanguage required it. ([1962] 1991, 
p. 140) 
But what if the world comprises certain objects the representation of which, for one 
reason or another, simp1y does not admit of any kind of atomic reduction? 
Certainly the choice presented in figure 12 is more plausible when we are 
dealing with a bulgy red tomato (sect. 1.5.3). But consider an object like that 
presented in figure 13. Even if we were to amend the idea of Givenness so that it 
became a disjunctive choice rooted in an agent's desire to live, it remains doubtful 
we could do justice to the worldly feature illustrated in the right-hand side of this 
schema by confining it to a one-place mould "P". Since atomism is by definition 
committed to the view that receptivity involves a direct contact which cannot be 
"eut" ("tomos") further, it would reject a priori the complex configuration of figure 
13 as an inadmissible candidate for representation. 
77 y A 
8 1.5 4......, Stop living 
8 F 12 
Figure 13 Complexity of content and the play of 
spontaneity. 
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Should a daim pertaining to the object of figure 13 be put the test, atomist 
normativity would instead instruct us to "analyse" or break it down in such a way 
that we could experience it one atomic bite at a time. However, the discursive 
instructions brokering such contacts wouId no more count as part of the epistemic 
justification than the connectives binding the various qualities were considered as 
belonging to the complex object. 
But the mind's contribution in atomism can go beyond supplying logical syntax 
and framing conditions for punctate encounters. According to a familiar framework, 
we should countenance two broad ontological categories. On one hand, we should 
recognize that there are immanent worldly particulars. On the other hand, this view 
posits the (far more controversial) existence of transcendent generals or "universals". 
In this deeply-ingrained schema, particulars are represented in language by 
grammatical subjects, whereas generals are represented by predicates. Oddly 
enough, despite having accrued their authority through the scholastic tradition, these 
distinctions were not cast aside by early twentieth century logicism. Much the 
contrary, Frege breathed new life into the overlapping subject / predicate and 
particular / general dichotomy by likening it to the mathematical function (sect. 
2.3.1). Whatever its origins, this schema underwrites a very strange division of 
labour: the world fumishes only immanent subjects, and the mind supplies aH the 
rest. As McDowell explains, 
There was a time when the standard view of reference was inspired by Russell's 
Theory of Descriptions. The idea was that whenever a thought is directed at a 
particular object, part of its content is given by a specification of the object in 
general terms: conceptual terms, the equation 1 am considering would lead us to 
say. [...] So the picture is that the conceptual realm does have an outside, which 
is populated by particular objects. ([1994] 2002, p. 105) 
This picture has predications in the conceptual realm, but thought supposedly has 
to break out of the conceptual to make contact with the objects of which 
predications are to be made. And that leaves no room for a coherent conception 
of how a predication, located within the circumscribed conceptual realm, could 
be brought into connection with an object. (Ibid., p. 106) 
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As critics of this view were quick to point out, if the particulars we connect with 
in experience are so simple as to be in fact ineffable, the mind' s contribution to 
intelligibility (i.e., predication) is no mere addendum. It as if a friend invites you 
over for dinner but asks you to bring the food, the cookware, the utensils, and to do 
all the cooking. What does the friend's contribution amount to then? The wholists' 
answer, in effect, is that the "guest" does all the work. In so doing, wholistic 
thinkers were simply working out the logical consequences nested within the 
standard atomist account(s). But no sooner had they completed this task did 
relativists move in and work out the consequences which logically followed from 
their wholistic account(s). Obviously, neither the atomist nor the wholist-relativist 
answers will do. For if the end result is that we cannot describe our acquaintances 
nor acquaint ourselves with our descriptions, then something must have gone deeply 
wrong somewhere. 
Atomism construes the grammatical subject as a referential laser with virtually 
no girth and then, in order to prevent such a construal from being totally irrelevant, it 
posits a suitable ontology. However, not only do we not share the view that 
grammatical subjects somehow need to tag onto worldly particulars in order to be 
contentful, we also find no convincing reason to rule out irreducible ontological 
complexity from the armchair. It could very well be that atomists were right in their 
daim that, when pursued to an extreme, ostension would have to be ineffable (cf the 
"No Terminus Theory", sect. 1.3.3). However, we do not see why we should buy 
into the ancillary premises typically annexed to this thesis, namely that 1) such 
manie reductionism-Iogical though it may be-is desirable and that 2) whatever 
does not admit of atomic ostension admits of no reference. The first of these 
premises is rooted in speculation and the second in a unjustified prejudice against 
the anatomie. 
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Atomists recognize that the world often presents us with an informational 
surplus-value: « In mathematics we frequently call a problem overdetermined if 
more data are given than are necessary to solve the problem [... ]. In this sense our 
experience is (epistemologically) overdetermined. We experience more than is 
necessary in order to gain the knowledge that can be obtained » (Carnap, [1928] 
2003, p. 311). In keeping with their assumption that the only possible way to refer 
to the world is to directly target a particular by means of indexicals-be they simple 
terrns like "this" or statements detailing a "protocol" for contact-atomists view 
features like multiplicity and inforrnational richness as calls for reduction. In short, 
atomists take the complexity of worldly objects as an indication to redouble their 
efforts, whereas we see it as a clue that most things in the world do not admit of neat 
ostensions and a calI to work out a theoretical understanding of representation that is 
irreducibly anatomic. 
Granted, one can sometimes make quite elementary claims about the world (e.g., 
that a tomate is red). However, even in such modest cases, we do not see how one 
could divorce the justification's context from the actual experiential episode. As 
such, we hold that the simplest ostensions involve the anatomie collaboration of 
more than one representation. In sum, the smallest possible justification we are 
prepared to countenance wouId run along these lines: "1 claim that P"-"You mean 
like this?"-"Yes"-"Üh, 1 see. P it is then" (taken with a large grain of salt, we 
could describe our anatomist stance as an herrneneutic impatient with hermeneutics). 
Such a string of discourse may seen rather plain, but there is a universe of semantic 
richness separating it from an ineffable atom (and a great expanse between it and the 
whole as weIl). Does such an anatomist stance mean that representations are forever 
barred from achieving a high degree of precision, like clumsily trying to pick up a 
pin off the floor with mittens? The question is quickly settled when we ask: 
precision by what standard? If we prohibit the intervention of the stubborn 
interlocutor, the above discourse reveals itself a gem of epistemological precision. 
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4.4.4 Spontaneity as an upshot of complexity 
According to our constrictive view, there is nothing inherently problematic about the 
fact that reference to worldly objects requires the collaboration of more than one 
representation. As we see it, this is no different than saying that while information is 
most efficiently transmitted by employing binary digits, not everything can be 
transmitted by the use of a single bit. In other words, if a representation like 
"E=mc2" could be written as "E", it likely would be. But it can't, so it isn't (in fact, 
popular folklore has Einstein saying that « Everything should be made as simple as 
possible, but no simpler »). In terms of our lasso metaphor, what this means is that 
beyond a certain point, purgation of representations increases the risk that we might 
loose hold of the worldly object we aim to capture. 
We hold that it is the complexity of the left-hand side of figure 13 which makes 
human spontaneity possible. In essence, we think that the objects of the world are so 
constituted that the mind can successfully represent them in more than one way. 
Suppose for example that one has to teach the content of figure 13 to a class of 
undergraduate students. There are several ways to go about this task. In discoursing 
with the class, one could weave together an anatomic string to the effect that "77, Y, 
A, 8, 1.5,4, 8, F, 12". Or again, one might opt to for "77, 12,2(8),4, 1.5, Y, A, F'. 
Moreover, if for sorne valid reason it would facilitate exposition, the discursive 
string could be augmented with supplementary contents. The point is this: aIl of 
these different representations would succeed in referring to (i.e., seizing hold of) the 
object of figure 13. In other words, according to the lasso view we advocate, the 
student having fully understood each of these explanations would be equipped to 
affect the worldly object in question. However, against the relativist, the world 
supplies a limit to the sort of interpretative leeway one can engage in. For instance, 
a person who has been taught that "Y, 4, 3, 2, 1" would never be able to employ that 
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anatomie string of representations to successfully control the object represented in 
figure 13 (in light of the disjunction, there is no way one couId both be alive and pull 
this off). 
Of course, if the mind was a spectator seated in a one-seat theatre and forced at 
the point of a gun to assent at sorne giant P projected before it, this much would be 
obvious, and there wouldn't be any controversy about knowledge (let alone room for 
living error). However, the world's complexity allows humans to go about 
representing that domain in more than one way. Not only are the objects we 
encounter far more intricate than the atomist school's supposed unary content, the 
multiplicity of objects in the world is such that we need not always heed the world's 
imperatives. A great many things may therefore have to occur for us to even realize 
that a long anatomie string of representations was mistaken. But regardless of the 
complexity, spontaneity has its limits, and the world's indexical force will seep 
through the thickest wall of books. 
We know that our representations sometimes fail to accomplish the sort of things 
they should have allowed us to do, had they been true. More importantly still, we 
also know that our representations allow us to accomplish fruitful inflections of the 
worldly landscape when they are true. In our view, however, it would be 
philosophically misguided to respond to this by seeking a line delineating the scope 
of our leeway, figuring out in advance of error what we control and what we do not. 
According to our anatomist stance, il suffices to know that the constantly moving 
frontier between these two states peiforce lies somewhere between a totally 
receptive atom and a totally spontaneous whole. 
To illustrate, imagine that the complex object in question is the structure of a 
skyscraper. Our teacher, in this case an engineering professor, has a very complex 
string of representations about how to properly construct such a structure. She 
Imows that this anatomie string bears on its object since in the past she (and others 
following more or less the same combination of contents) was able to employ it to 
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great success In erecting a very tall building. Things would probably be much 
simpler if skyscrapers admitted only one representation, in comparison to which all 
other would be false. In fact, she probably would welcome such rigid unambiguity. 
However, she recognizes that the complexity of the object in question is such that 
her representations afford her considerable elbow room. For example, she would 
never deny that several competing design plans can be equally sound from an 
engineering standpoint, although she would likely be hard-pressed to point out 
exactly where that interpretative leeway ends. Nevertheless, our professor is fully 
confident that she knows-not merely supposes, but knows-how to build a 
skyscraper. Thus, when she enters the classroom everyday, she never doubts that the 
complex information she will convey enjoys an objective relation with the world and 
that, to the extent her students appropriate her instructions, these can and will be of 
great value in their own endeavours. 
Now the classroom itself is a space of discourse, not action per se. One talks 
and reads about building skyscrapers, but one does not actually build any then and 
there. The strings of symbolic representations which are exchanged in that space are 
thus in absentia of their object proper. As the teacher unravels the long discursive 
string which enables her to successfully erect tall buildings, students are free to ask 
her questions. This erotetic dimension is no hindrance and does not bother the 
professor in the least, as she knows both from pedagogical theory and from 
experience that such queries facilitate the students' ability to make the 
representations their own. However, every once and a while, she encounters a 
student whose persistent questioning seems to drag the class further and further 
away from their intended object. It seems every time she answers one interrogation, 
two more pop up. In the best case scenario, this would be an indication of a 
student' s avid interest in the subject matter and/or eagerness to make sure the job 
will be well executed once in the field. But the proliferation of questions can 
sometimes follow a very different erotetic rationale. It is as if a student is trying to 
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forestall the actual building of skyscrapers and remam forever seated in the 
classroom. Discursive exposition of theOI"y becomes an end in itself, and one gets 
the impression that, should the student be taken through the entire construction 
process step by step from initial planning to completion, the interrogative pestering 
would continue unabated even after the deed is done. 
However, the professor's mandate is to teach, not to vociferate gratuitously. 
Thus, if a student brings a salt dispenser to class and asks what relation her 
knowledge of its emptiness or fullness has to the building of skyscrapers, she 
promptly and accurately answers: none. Or again, if on a visit to a construction site 
a student walks over to a beam of steel, crouches over, presses her face to the metal, 
and asks if the grey of patch of colour before her then and there is the reason why 
knowledge about skyscrapers is objective, the teacher promptly and accurately 
answers: no. 
4.5 Closing arguments: synoptic review of our proposai 
4.5.1 Scale 
It seems fair to say that, from a non-speculative perspective, the most interesting 
cases of normative controversy involve worldly objects that are very complex. It is 
legitimate to aetiologically inquire, for example, into how an elaborate scientific 
theory manages to be true-how such a complicated string of representations 
manages to take hold of the world. Such an epistemological task is aU the more 
pressing when the object at hand is carried by a fairly large and intricately twined 
serniotic vehicle (say an entire body of literature). Given that it is impossible to 
reduce our most meaningful representations to punctate encounters an independent 
judge could verify piecemeal, we need an epistemology that fils the bill. 
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One of the reasons why wholistic theories gained prominence is because they 
satisfied this need for a larger framework. Kuhn' s talk of "paradigms" ([ 1962] 
1996), whatever its faults, provided epistemologists with a theoretical idiom capable 
of accommodating the representations collectively heId by entire disciplines (Kuhn 
was by no means the sole driving force behind this wholistic tum). But in our view, 
the unfortunate downside to this move away from reductionism was that normativity 
became effectively detached from the world. To be sure, consistency and coherence 
are considerable episternic virtues. However, the assumption that such traits 
increase the probability of objectivity holds up only so long as one takes them to be 
features of the worldly domain represented (short of such a realist reading, lies are to 
be avoided only because we lack the requisite memory, and errors are failures only 
because they do not gain favour with the review boards that oversee the cohesion of 
our "paradigm"). In describing epistemological normativity as an alignment 
between mind and world, we have thus knowingly embraced the sort of "rnirror of 
nature" correspondism famously criticized by Richard Rorty (1980). But to the 
extent that such representations are (or strive to be) depictions of the world, it is not 
to satisfy any manic impulse-much less to surreptitiously reinforce sorne 
hegemonic political and social order. The position we have taken throughout this 
work is rather that representations matter, the question of how we go about 
rendering the world being in our view an issue of vital importance. 
The fact that symbolic representations like linguistic devices are detachable from 
immanent contexts should not blind us to the fact that they have enjoyed 
evolutionary good fortune because they served a purpose beyond the poetic, and that 
somewhere along the way our schemes (linguistic or otherwise) must be subrnitted 
to the test of worldly correspondence. Whatever her excesses (sect. 4.3.4), Ruth 
Millikan has done much to underscore how in absentia representations serve our 
furtherance as biological organisms. We have therefore taken it for granted since the 
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beginning of this work that humans can and do routinely represent objects in the 
world, and have taken up the question of how this fact comes about so as to develop 
a proper framework for evaluating the normative standing of such representations. 
That aetiological inquiry, conducted as it has been in a mundane (i.e., non­
speculative) key, has had to address three competing theoretical models, namely 
atomism, wholism, and McDowell's unbounded fusion. Each of these construals, 
we argued, rested on more or less tacit ways of picturing the interface of mind and 
world. Given our dissatisfaction with each of these, we felt it necessary to produce a 
metaphoric conceptualization of our own. As such, we described our anatomist third 
way as a lasso of representations constticting around an object. 
Atomism, in contrast, construes the representational bond as sorne sort of beam 
or "laser". In keeping with the atom' s noninferential and indexical nature, the 
understandable expectation is that an individual representation reaches its object 
directly, without the co-operation of collateral representations. As we have argued, 
there is much to recommend such a view in an abstract symbolic domain, especially 
since we deem this sort of noninferential Givenness to be the cornerstone of mental 
associations generally (sect. 3.4.2 and 4.3.3). Indeed, if we eschew speculation, it 
becomes quickly apparent that the search for normative security cannot be open­
ended (sect. 4.3.2). Certainly, appraising the warrant of a representation can be 
tedious business. However, if someone wishes a justification of why a given 
syllogism colligates in such a way that its conclusion ensues or why conflicting 
remarks about an identical content warrants her being dismissed as self­
contradictory, normative grounding should go no further than an appeal to 
Givenness. As we argued in the third chapter, content-respect is a precondition of 
inquiry, not an object of it. Thus, whereas a question like "Why are tigers 
aggressive?" merits an anatomic (but not open-ended) answer, we hold that a query 
like "Why are tigers tigers?" merits no answer. Upholding a double-standard in this 
regard is imperative, as we think the former sort of (anatomic and non-Given) 
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explanation has no hope of succeeding if the latter sort of (atomic and Given) 
explanation is rejected (note that this does not involve acquiescence to any sort of 
"analyticity": when we maintain that "Gold is gold" goes without saying; we do not 
daim that "Gold is yellow" enjoys a similar privilege). 
Thus, from our perspective, the atomist commits an understandable but 
misguided extension: she takes validation of our knowledge of the world to be an 
analogue of content-respect (sect. 4.2.4). While we endorse the basis whence this 
juxtaposition proceeds and sympathize with the (overly-optimistic) belief in our 
ability to get to know the world, we nevertheless think the idea of ineffable punctate 
encounters does not hold up. Empiricism, in our view, should be soiled by 
discourse: one does not objectively represent the world simply by experiential 
exposure to nature' s book of lessons (sect. 4.4.3). Inference (loose and tight), 
psychological associations, the kitchen sink-aU can be twined via content-respect 
into potent discursive strings that enable us fathom worldly objects. Our third way 
thus construes experience as a necessary but not sufficient condition of nonnative 
justification. 
Admittedly, this can seem akin to Rorty' s contention that "mere looking" cannot 
settle the question of which set of representations best renders a portion of the world 
(sect. 3.2.1). However, given our non-speculative stance, we see nothing in this 
move away from atomism which might remotely suggest the adoption of any sort of 
wholism. The wholist, in contrast, effectively takes anatomism to be a license for 
flights of philosophic fancy (sect. 1.2.2). Observation, we are told, is 
underdetermined to such an extent that any representational scheme can be made to 
fit with experience. This fallacious leap from anatomism to wholism thus sanctions 
a profound change of epistemological outlook. The warrant of a representational 
scheme is no longer a matter of properly conjugating experiential receptivity with 
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conceptual spontaneity. The laser metaphor of atomism having been (to a certain 
extent rightfully) discredited, a new metaphor arises-one which is beholden to the 
faculty of spontaneity only. 
In our assessment, this move away from receptivity, which marks the initial 
recoil in McDowell's seesaw, comIIÙts a grave epistemological mistake. To be sure, 
justification is a largely discursive activity which involves something like a "space 
of reasons" (pace Sellars). But just as experience supplies one with a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for normative justification, so we have argued that 
argumentation is a necessary but not sufficient contributor to our objective 
knowledge of the world (sect. 3.3.4). We believe this combined view faithfully 
captures the spirit of Kant' s thesis to the effect that « Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind » ([1787] 1965, B75). Upholding this 
tenet, however, does not spare us the task of explicating the particular relation which 
holds between conceptual spontaneity and indexical forcefulness. 
McDowell's work, as we have seen, answers this challenge in a very different 
way than ours. On sorne level, McDowell senses that an appeal to argumentation 
alone is unable to fully account for the episteIIÙc warrant of our representations. 
Coherentism, he argues, gives one a sense of vertigo. In making such a claim, 
McDowell effectively lets his case against wholism rest on the subjective 
undesirability of the theory. But as thinkers like Davidson and Rorty wouId be quick 
to reply, wholism is not made less reasonable on account of the discomforts it might 
engender. There is nothing, they point out, which ensures that our persistent urge to 
find foundations in fact testifies to the availability of such ultimate epistemological 
bedrock. Rather, they maintain that we should learn to master whatever dizziness 
may spring from an exclusive appeal to internaI coherence (cf for example Rorty, 
2000, p. 126-127). 
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Like McDowell's rejection of wholism, this sort of voluntary embrace rests on a 
subjective appeal: one is more likely ta buy into it if one does not in point of fact 
feel any vertigo. It therefore appears both parties have reached a stalemate. Not so, 
says McDowell. The advantage of his own philosophy over wholism, he maintains, 
is that it sympathizes with the yearning for Givens (sect. 2.5.3). To be sure, his own 
therapeutic project converges with Davidson and Rorty insofar as it too aims to 
dislodge the craving for external constraints. But instead of leaving the idea of 
empirical friction as is and calling for its abandonment, he attempts to rethink the 
notion so that we can accommodate it into our overall picture while staying within 
the bounds of the Wittgensteinian frontier of thought (sect. 2.2). His means of 
achieving this tall order is to revisit the Kantian project and remedy its central failing 
by rejecting transcendental agnosticism, thereby fusing receptivity with spontaneity. 
ln the end though, what we get is not a truly novel notion, but an unstable 
compound weaker than the sum of its constituents: experience looses its ability to 
supplY friction, and conceptual thought sees its freedom undercut by an ethos of 
scepticism. Our anatomist third way, in contrast, does not require that one relinquish 
the notions of receptivity and spontaneity, but rather directs its efforts at elucidating 
their interrelationship without jeopardizing their distinctiveness. 
4.5.2 Norm 
Just as we have encountered three different scales in this work, so have we dealt 
with three basic sources of normative arbitrament, namely offers one can't refuse, 
concern for maximal integrity and coherence, and spontaneous criticism of beliefs 
arising from socialized humility. We have rejected the last two notions, which are 
espoused-by no means exclusively-by Sellars and McDowell, respectively. 
Although we did not adopt in toto the atomistic empiricism of the sort propounded 
by the early Bertrand Russell, we did insist that the idea of a forceful imposition of 
content can be reworked in such a way that it gains in plausibility and escapes the 
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shortcomings of the standard account. Central to this reworking was the realization 
that offers one can't refuse admit an alternative after aIl; to wit, the demise of the 
apprehending agent. In our view, there is a "quite sizeable kernel of truth" in 
empiricism (sect. 2.3.1). However, according to our interpretation, atomism ends up 
spoiling this insight. Perhaps owing to the predilection for reductionism which gets 
the speculative philosopher to the point of a single representational content (sect. 
1.3.3), the living agency which does the actual apprehension becomes totaIly 
forgotten (cf fig. 11). In truth, there may be more to this than a simple penchant for 
reduction. For although the logicist program which drives the philosopher to dig all 
the way down to the atom manifests a healthy anti-psychologism, that same impetus 
often degenerates into what may be termed anti-agentism, which is an altogether 
different beast. In any case, the end result is a unary state which, despite its 
epistemological attractiveness, is riddled with profound difficulties. Topping the list 
in this regard is the fact that if the representation of the world ultimately rested on 
foundations that foreclosed the possibility of falsity, there would be no such thing as 
error, much less a need for norms guiding humans in their thinking. Clearly, this is 
not the case. 
This discrepancy between theory and practice has always been recognized by 
atomists, and most advocates of the view have found solace in the twentieth 
century's fashionable tendency to blame any and aIl philosophie puzzlement on the 
"vagumies" of natural language (sect. 4.4.2). Departing from this (by now stale) 
strategy, we chose to countenance the possibility of error at the most primitive level. 
Experience, we argue, can indeed serve as a potent source of normative arbitrament. 
However, if we do not faU prey to anti-agentism, we see the Given does indeed 
admit an alternative. Offers one can't refuse are disjunctive in that the vital energy 
which is coerced into Accepting a content can protest by effectively ceasing to be. 
Granted, by its very nature, this is a veto one exercises at one's peril; but that 
peculiar trait does nothing to undermine the insight. Therefore, aside from the more 
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overtly volitional dimension at play in assent to logical entailment, we hold that the 
grasp of a single content involves a conative contribution on the part of the thinking 
agent. 
Does such a primitive situation deserve to be placed under the heading of 
receptivity? We believe so. Conation is by all standards an under-appreciated 
dimension of our lives. But while it is doubtful inquiry into the matter can ever be 
satisfactorily carried out by theorists (as opposed to artists and athletes, for 
example), it seems crystal clear to us that the conative drive deserves to be 
notionally distinguished from the far more complex exercise in conceptual thought 
that we have here termed the faculty of spontaneity. There is something patently 
distinct between a cognitive state whose only alternative is the absence of the 
apprehending agent and one which does not threaten that agency directly but 
postpones that disjunct with a brochette of contents to spontaneously choose from. 
Now the abstract construal of receptivity we have developed is intended to 
answer a legitimate (i.e., non-speculative) technical concern. We know from 
everyday life that the world manages to instruct us in an informative way, and it 
behoves us to produce a sensible aetiological account of how this is so. In keeping 
with our policy of not discarding ladders, it is thus imperative to ensure that we not 
advocate a tenet which contradicts logically-posterior data. This in turn entails that 
we not fall into any sort of ineffable situation. Thus, to the extent that one carries 
reduction to the point of a single content, one is justified in asking how the resulting 
conception can in fact support the inquiry's intuitive point of departure. But our 
aetiologic posture also means we must not loose sight of the fact that a reduction has 
taken place when we reach such a level, and that it is we who are responsible for its 
making. The experiential stream may be constituted by myriad confrontations 
between conative agency and worldly contents but it is not lived as such, and it is a 
planned exercise in conceptual deliberation which attains such an explanation. 
Consequently, we have not assumed the need for any sort of mysterious 
254 
recombination of contents, much less striven to orchestrate the eventual emergence 
of language-compatible intelligibility by means of a factitious notational apparatus 
(for an aetiological naturalist, talk of having to reconstruct our familiar surroundings 
from abstract theoretical postulates begs the question, if anything does). 
Recognizing complexity in this way is not only methodologically sound, it also 
allows us to develop a plausible account of how our representation of the world 
affords us spontaneity. We have already said that receptivity is acquiescence before 
an offer one cannot refuse. So long as an animal (human or otherwise) is alive, that 
activity obliges it to take cognizance of the world. Given that we are mortal 
creatures imbedded in that milieu and not just imperishable beings spectating from 
afar, the contents forcefully delivered to us actually have an axiologic significance 
beyond the merely informative. In effect, we are presented with an alternative by the 
world: "Know me or perish". Assuming a healthy conative drive (which we might 
characterize as self-love), an agent presented with such a disjunct willlikely come to 
see the cognitive task of understanding its sUIToundings as a serious affair. Yet it 
may be asked how, if this indeed characterizes the human condition, the project of 
developing principles that lead us to greater alignment with the world is time and 
time again viewed with incredulity. In short, would not the philosophic 
commitments of the relativist and sceptic ipso facto condemn them to the status of 
endangered species? It is here that the notion of complexity intervenes. 
Consider the following fable. Instance a person falling down a tall building. 
Suppose that the person's life-expectancy lies somewhere in the range of 80 years or 
so, and that the edifice in question of such height that it would take over 120 years of 
plurnmeting to actually reach ground level. Given these parameters, it is possible a 
falling person could spend her entire existence unaware of her fate. In fact, were she 
to read a book informing her of her situation, she would likely laugh the matter 
away. Having long ago domesticated whatever vertigo might have perchance ensued 
from her fall, she might scoff at talk of a ground fIoor forcefully making its presence 
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known. Supposing a strong theoretical bend, she might even find the time to write 
books of her own, developing a sophisticated philosophie position called "free­
floatism". The doctrine could even gain adherents who, leaping in their turn, wouId 
happily seek to confirm for themselves the cogency of those teachings. 
But now suppose the building were shortened such that it takes a year to travel 
down its length in free fall. AIl other things being the same, this curtailment would 
have serious repercussions for free-floatism. The plausibility of the doctrine, we 
could then say, feeds on building height: the taller the structure, the more credible 
the theory. We maintain that a relation of this kind holds between spontaneity and 
complexity: the greater the world's complexity, the greater leeway we have in how 
we represent it. The sizeable philosophie difficulty here is that the complexity we 
live in often exceeds our ability to detect the world's contribution with any 
obviousness. Going back to figure 13, we can say that our representation of the 
world is fragmented to such a degree that, if one is cunning enough, one can 
meander through grids of semiotic complexity without ever having to answer the 
disjunction per se. 
To be sure, each is free to shrink our fable's building, as it were, and test for 
themselves the relativist's contention that the world can accommodate any 
representation. But the idea of a single living agent confronting the world (à la 
Robinson Crusoe) is very much like that of a single mental content isolated from aIl 
others: it is by and large the product of a deliberate reduction, something we know 
can obtain but hardly ever encounter without doctoring (sect. 4.4.1). Just as the 
experiential flux is already complex, so our life is already social (Crusoe was 
marooned with considerable luggage, notably mastery of natural language 
categories). In and of itself, this is nothing to be feared or avoided. In fact, we have 
argued that it is such baseline complexity which gives rise to our freedom in thought 
and representation. Granted, it this same trait which makes possible short-sighted 
abuses of spontaneity. But in order to find a constructive way to undercut these 
256 
philosophical stances which does not rely solely on their intrinsic loathsomeness, we 
must not relinquish the very of idea of freedom. Rather, the new intellectual must 
reclaim both faculties by achieving a firmer grasp of the specifie manner in which 
conceptual spontaneity conjugates with experiential receptivity (we hope this work 
will have contributed to bettering our understanding in this regard). 
There are those who, upon hearing these arguments, would ignore the message 
they are intended to convey, latch onto our insistence that the baseline (ideational or 
social) is already complex, and attempt to shave off the pestering indexical 
disjunction. That such can be done-with impunity, moreover-is a fact we cannot 
dispute. But not only would such a move effectively reset the oscillation to the 
"ft1ctionless spinning in a void" position, it would also highlight how the normative 
issue of thought's beaI1ng on the world raises indelible ethical and political 
concerns. 
4.6 Conclusion 
What we tried to do in this chapter is put the various conclusions drawn over the 
course of our investigation to good use so as to fashion an alternative more tenable 
than McDowell's fusion. Breaking away from the rival pictures of representation as 
a beam of light or a fabric, we proposed a new image: representations bind together 
via content-respect to form strings of discourse which constrict around their worldly 
object. This image entailed an anatomie scale and a non-speculative norm 
recognizing both receptivity and spontaneity. 
As a means of letting our proposaI grow out of the issues already examined, we 
revisited the oscillation between atomism and wholism under a new light. Central to 
our gloss was the idea of competing root metaphors. As we see it, atomism 
construes epistemological normativity as a mirror-image of expet1ential input, with 
the mind targeting worldly referents in the same manner as radiations impact its 
sensory apparatus. Since this view takes objectivity to be a direct contact, 
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intermediaries like language are seen as an impediment to the mind's ability to 
represent the world. However, we saw how the wholist daims that it is precisely 
these so-called impediments wmch do aIl the normative work, insofar as a pure 
ostension would be ineffable. As such, wholism replies with a metaphorical idiom 
of its own (one which, on many fronts, surpasses that of atomism). 
By accepting the atoTIÙst as the sole spokesperson of experiential receptivity, the 
wholist condudes that if receptivity is impotent, than we should jettison it from 
epistemology altogether. However, we argued that it is at this precise moment of the 
theoretical cut-and-parry that anatomism becomes lost as a possible option. Why 
should we accept that the proper way to respond to the implausibility of a unary 
atom is to embrace the whole as a substitute? Certainly, if one assumes that the 
atoTIÙst school is the sole experience-friendly epistemology on the market, then the 
absurdity of ineffable appeals entails the absurdity of receptivity as weIl. But what if 
the assumption of exclusivity is dropped? Would it not be far more prudent (and 
aetiologically sensible) to say that, in its speculative fervour to reduce the complex 
to the simple, atoTIÙsm dictated from the arrnchair what the world should be like in 
disregard of what the world actually is? For we should not loose sight of the fact 
that empiricism and reductionism are distinct philosophie commitments. Indeed, 
nothing prevents the founding of a school of "coarse empiricists" who would look to 
actual human life, not manic logicism, as their source of guidance. As such, we 
think one can buy into the idea of experience as a source of episteTIÙc 
normativity-while recognizing that the only objects one can ever be receptive to are 
comp/ex. 
Granted, one can dip below such a de facto line and engage in phenomenological 
reductions, if one wishes. But if one goes out into a field and digs a hole where 
there was none to begin with, one cannot subsequently be dismayed that a hole will 
be there-much less loose sight of the heap waiting besides the hole or curse the dirt 
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for not being able to stay there and be in the hole at the same time. In any event, that 
one can dig below such a baseline says more about our ability to shovel than about 
the landscape we alter. 
According to the outlook we advocate, there are essentially two ways the mind 
can lose hold of a worldly object, namely by twining anatomie strings which are too 
100se or too tight. In either case, it is philosophical prejudice vis-à-vis one of the 
Kantian faculties which leads to the loss of objectivity. Seen in this light, wholism 
and atomism reveal themselves incapable of seizing upon worldly objects; the first 
because its desire to rely exclusively on the faculty of receptivity unduly reduces 
reference to the point of ineffability, the second because its wish to make due only 
with spontaneity allows for the ad hoc proliferation of interpretations and defensive 
stratagems. However, we believe both of these views should be rejected, as 
ineffability and prolixity both make normativity impossible. As stated, we think this 
epistemological view is in keeping with Aristotle's contention (in metaphysics) that 
the principles which make intelligibility possible must be « neither one nor 
innumerable » (189a20). 
Tt is a fact that objects larger than ineffable atoms and smaller than an (equally 
ineffable) "Absolute" fit our anatomie theory of representation like a glove. In this 
sense, one could argue that we are guilty of the sort of reification we hold as a 
reproach against atomism. Yet this could also be a sign that our theoretical account 
is tailor-made for the world as we find it. Obviously, we think the ontology enjoys 
priority over the epistemology in this case. But we shall let the fecundity of this 
work (as a lasso) defend that contention. 
CONCLUSION 
We are not retreating. We are advancing 
in another direction. 
Major General Oliver P. Smith 
Answer to a journalist (December 6, 1950) 
Throughout this work, we have been considering ways to model how agents 
represent the objects of the world, with a particular emphasis on what sort of account 
can be produced if one wants to normatively establish the warrant of such 
representations. At the heart of that investigation lies a fundamental tension. It 
seems intuitively clear that an important component of our ability to understand our 
worldly surroundings is a matter of being receptive to whatever presents itself to us 
in experience. Yet insofar as our knowledge of that domain is a structured product 
which we can detach from its immanent experiential origins and carry around with 
us (and share with others) in abstract form, it is evident that representation allows us 
a fair share of freedom. Things would no doubt be simpler if aIl we had to do to 
establish the objective basis of our in absentia representations was to go back to 
their indexical birthplace. But such a move would at best repeat a discrete event, 
and it is hard to see how that could carry the sort of weight expected of intelligibility 
and epistemic justification. 
Faced with this dilernrna, the widespread reaction has been to try and rebuild our 
theoretical understanding of representation in such a way that we can ground reasons 
without having to calI upon the problematic faculty of receptivity. With this 
programmatic orientation firrnly in place, the impulse has been to find alternative 
sources of normativity. Amidst the proposaIs that have sprung from this effort, a 
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fairly stable idea has emerged. The general consensus amongst theorists wishing to 
reject the appeal to atomic receptivity has been that, when considered as a corporate 
body, representations supply their own brand of normativity. As long as 
philosophers kept their sights focused on the atomic scale, these wholistic forces 
went largely unnoticed (or at any rate under-appreciated). However, the moment the 
project for an empirical normativity was seriously dumped, a store of new insights 
opened up. It was like a wholistic Klondike. 
But like any gold rush, there cornes a time when the riches are depleted, and a 
somewhat bleaker mood sets in. Thus, one of the things that has become 
increasingly apparent-probably to the dismay of the paradigmatic pioneers 
themselves-is that wholism has a tendency to lead to relativism. As neither sheer 
receptivity nor unconstrained spontaneity have availed themselves tenable sources of 
knowledge, the Zeitgeist has issued a cali for tenders. Enter Mind and World. 
If there were a great Agency behind developments in the history of ideas, it could 
not have chosen a better spokesperson than John McDowell. With its memorable 
depiction of post-wholist discourse as a seesaw, his book Mind and World presents a 
profoundly dialectic exercise where contradictory theses exert pressures that call for 
a synthesis. Although McDowell daims not to produce any constructive theorizing, 
he does present an ensemble of philosophic ideas which work together in sustaining 
an ambitious aim. His goal, in short, is nothing less than a full dismount of the futile 
oscillation between atomism and wholism. 
In the first chapter, we singled out two far-reaching concessions we thought 
could only lead such an enterprise to calamitous results; namely the sceptical 
assumption that the mere possibility of yet another variable makes ostensive appeals 
impotent, as well as the technical argument that indexical force can at best cause but 
not warrant a representation. Motivated by a thoroughgoing naturalism which 
refuses to countenance arguments that arise from imagination alone, we felt 
compelled to think-over the basis of wholism. While we opted to present our 
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opposition to the first of these two ideas from the very beginning, we forwent 
criticising the asyrnrnetrist thesis so as to better understand the elaborate manner in 
which McDowell negotiated that constraint. By the end of the second chapter 
though, we duly concluded that the countermeasures had grown out of proportion, 
and opined that major revisions were in order. We thus opted to retrace the steps 
which lead McDowell to so questionable a tenet as fusion, and investigate what went 
wrong-not with that proposaI-but with the problem it was intended to assuage. 
Instead of accepting the rejection of atomism as an article of faith, we retraced 
McDowell' s seesaw to its initial egress so as to re-examine for ourselves the most 
notable critique levelled against atomist epistemologies. Seeing how we had 
conclusively rejected speculative scenarios that question-beggingly protect their 
wholistic contentions in the first chapter, we devoted the third chapter to considering 
a subtle argument which exploits a difference which we ourselves recognize, namely 
that between the Given and non-Given. According to the Sellarsian critique, 
experiences causally contribute to the mind in a manner that renders them impotent 
to nonnatively vindicate the symbolic representations which are the (publicly 
accessible) bearers of epistemic value. Taking the asyrnrnetrist's ambitions at face­
value, we applied the technical rejection of Givenness to all spheres, worldly and 
ideational. Although this tactic brought to the fore a host of implausible 
consequences, by far the most damning outcome was the realization that indexical 
asynunetry sunders content-respect. As a result, the conclusion we drew at the close 
of our inquiry was that adopting the asymmetrist constraint is ultimately self­
defeating, insofar as it effectively subverts both atornistic and wholistic 
epistemologies. A good way to summarize the critiques of the first and third chapter 
would be to say that, when it rests on radical scenarios, wholism begins in 
scepticism; and when it rests on indexical asymmetry, wholism ends in nihilism. 
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However, as we saw in the second chapter, McDowell takes an entirely different 
view of the situation. Whereas we see the poles of the seesaw as extremes to be 
avoided, he sees them as limitations to be overcome. Thus, although McDowell 
shares with us the belief that neither receptivity nor spontaneity by themselves 
provide tenable sources of knowledge, he believes the failings of each can be 
remedied by erasing the very distinction between the notions. Although we have 
made an honest effort to try and understand this proposaI, we nevertheless think that 
the idea of blurring the boundary between receptivity and spontaneity can be rejected 
from the outset on aetiological grounds. To be sure, the reigning fashion of the day 
is to seek out and destroy dualisms of aIl sorts (we've lost count of how many 
dogmas have been uncovered since Quine). But the situation we are concemed with 
is not like the now-prevalent rejection of the analytic and synthetic, a distinction 
which was artificially contrived from the very beginning. Rather, the distinction 
which McDowell seeks to assail is at the very heart of philosophic epistemology. 
There is a sense in which our thinking is free from the world, and another in 
which it is not. Of course, this sort of cryptic statement is far from satisfying, and 
heeding the challenge of elucidating the actual relation is a legitimate (and pressing) 
pursuit. Yet we simply cannot sanction a philosophy which sees in this curious 
tension a tangible call for resolution-but then makes it its programmatic mission to 
discard the problem-situation which set its inquiry into motion. Although we have 
made a conscious effort to steer clear of exegetic commentary, it seems to us that 
whatever Kantian inspiration there might be in Mind and World has been overstated 
by its author, and that Wittgenstein and/or Hegel would have been far more apt 
sources in this regard. For while McDowell declares his allegiance to Kant' s 
admonition, we believe his advocacy of a radical notional fusion belies a gross 
misreading: Kant does not say that thoughts and intuitions are one and the same. In 
fact, he made it a point to insist that... 
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These two powers or capacltles cannot exchange their functions. The 
understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Gnly through 
their union can knowledge arise. But that is no reason for confounding the 
contribution of either wilh that of the other; rather il is a strong reason for 
carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other. (Kant, [1787] 
1965, B75-B76; italics ours) 
Considering the kind of concerted efforts that have been successively exerted to 
make the atomist and wholist programs viable, one could be forgiven for 
entertaining the knee-jerk abandonment of epistemology altogether. We surmise 
that the frantic flight from Cartesianism and the concomitant rise of "externalism" 
(cf Rowlands, 2003) points not to a revamped conception of epistemology but to a 
renewed interest in metaphysics (one still too petrified by the echo of the positivists' 
invectives to come out of the closet full y). Perhaps this shift is motivated by a desire 
to eradicate relativism once and for aIl. However, we believe it likely will do so 
only at the cost of drastic eleminativism. Externalism is a tough epistemology to sell 
when it cornes to those many concepts that do not have a corresponding worldly 
counterpart. Are we to unearth the distinction between appearance and reality once 
again? If this happens, we think those disciplines that do not enjoy the privilege of 
an external object will simply retreat deeper into hermeneutic self-sufficiency. 
Instead of melodramatically jumping ship, we would much rather see the 
twentieth century as epistemology's (slow and painful) recognition that the rnind's 
representations are not little kernels that tag onto things-yet neither are they 
constructs answerable to nothing but themselves. In our opinion, the moral here is 
that one should not overreact. It was an overreaction that took anatomism and blew 
il up into a wholistic panacea-and il will be an overreaction if we let the hard­
earned anatomie insight be discarded along wilh the whole. 
The world is what it is, regardless of what we think, and we refuse its inputs only 
at our own peril. Metaphysical complexity, however, buys us sorne epistemological 
time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that spontaneity has free reign. Luckily, 
264 
most humans implicitly recogmze this, and go about their daily business 
accordingly. Now if we are particularly intelligent (or are lucky enough to trade 
with others who are), we can conjugate receptivity and spontaneity in a way that 
allows us to enjoy the benefits of a surplus-value. But while the fruits of one' s 
labour can be exchanged, the conviction of objectivity which ensues from fruitful 
conduct is not transferable, as it requires the assent of each thinking animal. Of 
course, to the extent that they manage to transport their persons to the nearest 
university lectern, the sceptic and the relativist also marshal actantial fecundity. But 
if this does not provide them with sufficient evidence that the mind's representations 
can correspond to their worldly objects, then one should simply let them go their 
merry way-remembering aIl the while that it is the realist side of their comprise 
(and ours) which allows them to go about discarding ladders without falling. 
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